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ABSTRACT
LEGAL DISCOURSE, CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS, AND BASIC WRITING
PROGRAMMING: A STUDY OF AYERS V. FORDICE
by Joyce Olewski Inman
December 2011
In what ways does legal discourse influence our perceptions of students labeled as
basic writers and these students’ perceptions of themselves? How does standards-based
discourse affect student writers’ abilities to define themselves in academe? This
dissertation involves an examination of legal and public discourse surrounding Ayers v.
Fordice, one of the most prominent desegregation cases in higher education, in an
attempt to answer these questions. Its intent is to explore how conceptual metaphors
prevalent in these discourses affect our understandings of basic writing programming in
the state of Mississippi but also in the field of composition more globally.
My project is framed within three fields of study: composition theory, studies of
language and law, and socio-cognitive linguistics. My study begins by contextualizing
the exigency for additional research regarding how legal discourse impacts institutional
policies, public discourse, and composition classrooms. I then examine how legal
discourse shapes institutional policies and public discourse surrounding basic writing
programming through critical discourse analysis of the federal judicial opinions that
constitute the Ayers case and identify three primary conceptual metaphors that are
repeated throughout the twenty-five year long case. This study led me to conduct archival
research regarding how the public responded to the court case and the institutional
agreements that resulted. The same conceptual metaphors present in the judicial opinions
ii

of the case were overwhelmingly present in archived federal and local newspaper articles
as well as letters to state government officials from private citizens.
My readings of these documents show that while the final Ayers settlement
suggests additional access for Mississippi students traditionally denied entry to college,
the legal and public discourse addressing the case does not support these same aims. The
study concludes by calling for an awareness of how conceptual metaphors are yoked to
the discourse surrounding basic writing programs among writing program administrators
and presenting suggestions for making rhetorical spaces that will allow basic writing
students to define themselves.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Education may well be, as of right, the instrument whereby every individual in a
society like our own, can gain access to any kind of discourse. But we well know
that in its distribution, in what it permits and in what it prevents, it follows the
well-trodden battle-lines of social conflict. Every educational system is a political
means of maintaining or of modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the
knowledge and the powers it carries with it.
Michel Foucault, The Discourse on Language1
The question of whether basic writing programs maintain or modify the
appropriation of discourse—and the powers that discourse “carries with it”—is not new,
and it continues to be a major source of contention as composition scholars critically
examine the institutional discourse that frames basic writing pedagogies. Indeed, for
almost forty years the field has debated the status of basic writing and the function it
plays in promoting access or perpetuating an always-new student subclass. The resulting
scholarly impasse involves whether a) basic writing programming performs a necessary
service to students often considered underprepared by traditional standards by offering
them access to an educational institution to which they might not otherwise have been
accepted; or b) if it serves the institution as a means of generating additional tuition
moneys (for classes that do not normally include any college credit) and creating merely
a façade of equal power relationships between the community and the ivory tower. Each
of these arguments is extremely complex, and both have merit. What is missing from
these conversations, however, is an inquiry into how and why these representations of
basic writing programs continue to exist at cross-purposes. Not only do these polarized
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perspectives regarding the role of basic writing in higher education influence how various
communities view basic writers, but ultimately they also influence how basic writers
view themselves. This project will examine the various ways legal discourse literally
frames, affects, and makes possible these competing situations and subject spaces—the
transformation and the ghettoization of students who are considered “basic writers.”2
Hence, my project is intended as a catalyst for discussion concerning the ways
legal discourse has the potential to enact specific identities and activities involving the
basic writing classroom. Over the past two decades a growing number of scholars have
argued that legal discourse, spoken and written language distinctly associated with
judicial proceedings, plays a primary function in social construction. These scholars
represent numerous disciplines: composition and rhetoric, linguistics, cultural studies,
law, political science, and philosophy.3 In general, each of these scholars considers
language as ideological and as a “regulated and regulating social institution” (Stygall 4).
The recognition of law as a language has allowed compositionists specifically to view
legal documents as much more than the “rules and regulations” of our society, and
instead as both written and verbal texts that are representative of and that construct power
relations in our society. Indeed, in Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric, and
Legal Analysis, Peter Goodrich claims that legal discourse is “pre-eminently the
discourse of power” (88). As I attempt to articulate the connections between legal
discourse and the various subject identities at play in basic writing programming, I will
assume a similar stance, adhering in this project to James Paul Gee’s theory that
“language has meaning only in and through social practices,” and, consequently, that
legal language enacts social perspectives and identities (Discourse Analysis 8).
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In order to explore the relationship between legal discourse and basic writing
programming, this project will explore the legislation enacted by Ayers v. Fordice, one of
the most prominent desegregation cases in the history of higher education, through
critical discourse analysis of the judicial opinions that constitute the case, the public
discourse in response to the case, and the resulting institutional mandates. Very little
scholarship exists regarding Ayers v. Fordice, despite the case’s significance to battles
over segregation in higher education, and there is no scholarship addressing the final
settlement’s impact on the basic writing classroom. I hope to initiate a conversation
regarding how legal discourse frames basic writing programming by examining the
effects of the Ayers case on marginalized students in what one might easily characterize
as the most marginalized state in our nation—Mississippi. And though Mississippi’s
history with basic writing is unique in some respects, it is my belief that a critical
examination of the local ways in which students are affected (in most instances
unknowingly) by legislative acts will compel further and productive exploration of how
the field of composition responds to state and institutional guidelines regarding the
teaching of composition more globally.
Indeed, the impact of legislation on access, diversity, and marginalized student
populations drives much of the scholarship directed at basic writing. Much of the
discourse surrounding the histories, pedagogies, and theories of basic writing stems from
research that explores the “effects” of open admissions legislation on students,
instructors, and institutions. However, while current basic writing scholarship
contemplates the history of higher education institutions and their responses to
underprepared student populations due to such state and institutional legislative acts, it
neither adequately addresses how this legislation directly connects to the composition
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classroom, nor does it look specifically at the legal language that both enables and
disables those same classrooms. In what follows, I wish to examine several important
texts in the field of composition in an attempt to establish the exigency for this research
based on two central premises: a) that basic writing is intimately related to, and in some
ways a product of, legislative rhetoric regarding underprepared students; and b) that
while more current discussions regarding the institutional language defining basic writers
continue to look at the field’s relationship to open admissions, they tend to ignore the
institutional and legal language that comprises such legislation as well as how such
discourse affects basic writing programming and students.
Basic Writing and the Institution: The Road to an Impasse
One need only look to Mina Shaughnessy’s seminal text, Errors and
Expectations, to see the most visible of the field of composition’s responses to legislative
acts and the writing classroom. Shaughnessy attempted to address the needs of basic
writing students enrolled at CUNY during their open admissions experiment.4 However,
while Shaughnessy’s research was in response to legislation, her published works
concentrate on the very immediate needs of basic writers affected by open admissions,
not the specific legislative acts themselves. Not surprisingly, Shaughnessy’s call for
practical pedagogical research in relation to teaching basic writers led to a large amount
of scholarship aimed at defining why basic writers encounter problems in their writing as
well as how these problems should be addressed in the classroom. Much of this early
research regarding basic writers embraced cognitive research practices involving the
writing processes of these students,5 and partly due to this movement, the 1980s saw a
paradigm shift in the field’s responses to basic writers. Scholars began to consider basic

5
writers as individuals in multi-layered and historically, culturally, and politically varied
discourse communities.6
The resulting set of charged debates regarding basic writers, in turn, led to
conversations regarding the programs serving these students as the field of composition
began to examine the institutional discourse that characterizes basic writing
programming. For example, it is this institutional discourse regarding access for
underprepared students that Mike Rose refers to when he defines institutional language
about basic writing instruction as a “language of exclusion.” According to Rose,
institutions of higher education and even composition programs forward and advocate a
“fundamentally behaviorist model of the development and use of written language, a
problematic definition of writing, and an inaccurate assessment of student ability and
need…it keeps writing instruction at the periphery of the curriculum” (“Exclusion” 341).
Language such as that used by Rose, language that points out the institution’s hegemonic
denial of the political nature of basic writing, became the prevailing discourse on basic
writing as scholars began to debate the conflicting needs and goals of administrations and
basic writing students.7 Scholars began to note the complete disconnect between
administrative and pedagogical goals for basic writing programming, essentially claiming
that access, retention, and fiscal responsibility cannot be achieved simultaneously.
For example, David Bartholomae claims that while basic writing programs do
unfairly label students and service institutions, they are perhaps a necessary evil to ensure
student access. In “The Tidy House,” Bartholomae argues that our concepts of and
desires for basic writing programming are in themselves developmental as they have
become the following:
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expressions of our desire to produce basic writers, to maintain the course,
the argument, and the slot in the university community; to maintain the
distinction (basic/normal) we have learned to think through and by. The
basic writing program, then, can be seen simultaneously as an attempt to
bridge AND preserve cultural difference, to enable students to enter the
‘normal’ curriculum but to insure, at the same time, that there are basic
writers. (8)
In this compelling critique of the discourse of liberalism and its role in basic writing
programming, Bartholomae underscores the institutional politics that hamper the
effectiveness of such programming. He acknowledges the practical effects on student
admissions and retention if we were to abandon basic writing programming but insists
that such courses further alienate students who are already at risk. Bartholomae’s
emphasis on the university’s tendency to reason about students in ways that label them as
“basic” or “normal,” provides an early glimpse of scholarly critiques of programming
formerly defined strictly as a means of access.
In “Our Apartheid,” what may be the field’s most biting example of the scholarly
impasse regarding the role of basic writing programming in higher education, Ira Shor is
neither ambivalent nor ambiguous when he argues that basic writing is a “mechanism that
functions to ease the growing conflict between corporate economic policy and a mass of
aspiring students who are being deterred from democracy and from the American Dream”
(95). Politically speaking, for Shor, basic writing is a “containment track below freshman
comp, a gate below the gate” (94). Shor critiques the social context of basic writing and
the political and economic factors that he argues contribute to a top-down enterprise that
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can serve as nothing more than an undemocratic tracking system of higher education
students.
And while Shor’s ideas were met with vigorous responses from the basic writing
community defending the need for basic writing courses lest we deny students who do
not meet traditional entry requirements access to the university, one cannot
overemphasize the impact of “Our Apartheid.”8 This single article changed the way
compositionists view basic writing programming by introducing economic and political
discourse to the already fragile conversation regarding basic writing’s role in higher
education. Shor’s argument represents a very clear picture of how institutions and
administrators view and use remedial coursework—even if that is not how
compositionists view the same courses.
Mary Soliday also examines the history and politics of remediation in higher
education, and she echoes Shor’s claims that remediation serves institutional needs more
so than the needs of individuals. She claims that “remediation exists also to fulfill
institutional needs and to resolve social conflicts as they are played out through the
educational tier most identified with access to the professional middle class” (1). Soliday
cites Marilyn Sternglass’ Time to Know Them in a discussion of how remediation itself
plays a lesser role in student retention and intellectual growth than we, as
compositionists, want to acknowledge.9 She argues that while
remediation is always with us, it is never present in quite the same ways; it
is organized differently to mediate the political needs of institutions at
specific moments and places. More directly responsive to changing
historical circumstance than any other aspect of English departments,
precollege writing instruction is therefore more nakedly reflective of the
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material and ideological struggles over access to the B.A. than any other
aspect of English studies. (69)
This description of remediation as “always-new” in its service to institutional demands is
alarmingly accurate (10). Soliday’s research clearly illustrates how developmental
programming is both a response to legislative rhetoric and a political football that is reenvisioned each time it changes hands.
In response to these debates regarding the role of basic writing in higher
education, composition scholars continue to both critique and defend basic writing
programming, often by citing and reevaluating basic writing’s history and relationship to
open admissions. For example, in his critique of “dominant discourse” and its impact on
basic writing instruction, Bruce Horner argues that “public discourse on higher education
and open admissions perpetuates the denial of the academy as part of the material,
political, social, and historical worlds” and that the “cost of such a strategy…has been the
erasure of any sort of critical insights that first propelled practices and projects in basic
writing and the near permanent institutional marginalization of basic writing courses,
teachers, and students” (“Discoursing” 200). Horner explores the binary thinking
involved in describing open admission students in both political and non-political terms.
Likewise, Min-Zhan Lu examines the political implications of open admissions and
critiques compositionists’ responses to the political and socio-economic factors involved
in the uproar surrounding the “literacy crisis” of the 1970s. In her critique of early basic
writing scholarship and pedagogies, though, Lu extends this argument to illustrate and
analyze the relationship between open admissions and standard conventions of writing.
She argues that “acculturation and accommodation were the dominant models of open
admissions education for teachers who recognized teaching academic discourse as a way
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of empowering students, and in both models conflict and struggle were seen as the
enemies of basic writing instruction” (“Conflict” 33). Lu and Horner’s concerns
regarding the political realities of open admissions and their impact on the writing
classroom—despite the scholars’ admitted differences of opinion—gesture toward basic
writing programming’s relationship to legislation and to academic discourse in
provocative ways.
Tom Fox’s Defending Access provides yet another illustration of the ways in
which scholars examine our history with open admissions legislation and its impact on
writing standards as a way to evaluate the role of basic writing in our institutions.
Beginning with nineteenth-century Harvard composition classes, Fox historicizes writing
standards, specifically examining how they have been used to socially classify and
exclude. Fox acknowledges the political, cultural, and historical nature of remediation by
describing the meritocratic discourse that labels underprepared students and access to
higher education as the “rhetoric of access.” Fox points out that the “argument, as old as
freshman composition and as young as yesterday, is that anyone can master a neutral
language and that this mastery will create ‘equal opportunity’”; but, in fact, argues Fox,
“language is socially located and works to demarcate social boundaries. Economic and
social power precede school success, not the other way around” (27). As his title
suggests, Fox sets out to defend the need for basic writing programming based on our
long history of remediation in public higher education. Fox’s emphasis, however, is on
our history of writing standards and narratives of institutional change as he attempts to
demonstrate how “standards” have been misused to exclude various groups of students
and various means of resisting such institutional guidelines.
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Each of these scholars views basic writing programming through a specific
“discourse lens”—a very specific linguistic representation of the field. What I believe is
missing from these cogent arguments is an examination of the concrete and complicated
distinctions between the law and the legal discourse that comprises legal decisions.
Understanding the law, in other words, is not the same as understanding how the law is
constructed, interpreted, and understood. Previous scholarship addressing legislation and
composition simply ignores the legal discourse that leads to the institutional policies that
these scholars do examine. It is important to note that I am not attempting merely to add
yet another “discourse” that we must examine in order to rethink basic writing
programming. I believe that an analysis of the connections between legal discourse and
basic writing programming could prove to be more fruitful than arguments previously
made in the field, in large part, because it will allow us to understand the ways legal
discourse mandates and restricts basic writing programming, as well as why competing
subject positions in basic writing continue to exist. Compositionists must acknowledge
and refer to the field’s responses to open admissions legislation via what would become
labeled basic writing programming and the ways the subject positions created for basic
writers almost forty years ago continue to define basic writers today. In “Discoursing
Basic Writing,” Horner argues that we are in danger of forgetting the lessons learned by
early pioneers in the field if we ignore responses to open admissions legislation. I agree
with Horner’s assessment, but add that, by not examining both legal discourse and more
current legislative acts, we have, in many ways, already forgotten.
The Field of Composition and Rhetoric and the Law
Philosophers and scholars have been discussing the relationship between rhetoric
and justice for centuries, and in this section, I will provide a brief overview of the
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relationship between the field of composition and rhetoric and legal discourse. For
beginning with ancient rhetoricians, the relationship of rhetoric to idealism, rights, rules,
justice, the public and the private spheres has led to constant articulations and
rearticulations of the ways language constructs and influences communities and how they
govern themselves. Aristotle’s stasis theory, as developed in Book III of the Rhetoric, is
a form of invention commonly mentioned in discussions of the relationship between
rhetoric and the law due to its emphasis on determining the nature of the questions being
asked in a legal setting. The conjectural, definitional, translative, and qualitative
questions posed by stasis theory have long been acknowledged as contributing factors to
modern jurisprudence, specifically in regards to the influence of stasis theory on Cicero.
Consequently, scholars commonly associate Plato and Aristotle with our notions
of civic jurisprudence. However, I agree with Frederic Gale’s characterization of
sophistry as more significant to Anglo-American jurisprudence than to that of the more
prominent Greek philosophers because it was the sophists who recognized the importance
of rhetoric to the delivery of practical justice.10 The sophists of fifth-century Greece
understood and rationalized the essential nature of nomoi, community specific customs
and laws, in regards to rhetoric and social action. Their rejection of eternal truths and
their emphasis on “the power of language in shaping human group behavior explicitly
within the limits of time and space” represents what is now a distinctly modern view of
rhetoric and law (Jarratt Rereading 11). Gale argues that, unlike Socratic beliefs in
absolute standards and unvarying truths,
the relative importance of the ‘appearance’ of things and events in
contradistinction to their abstract ‘reality’ was the central concern of the
sophists. This view of the world, typified by the philosophy of Protagoras,
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leads to an ethics of relativism and to legal realism, the view that the
interpretation of laws is a pragmatic, situational concern deeply involved
with social practices and economic interests. (28)
The emphases placed by sophists on both perception and situational ethics are extremely
relevant to our understandings of the political implications of legal discourse. For the
sophists, “human perception and discourse were the only measure of truths, all of which
are contingent” (Jarratt 64). Sophists, unlike their contemporaries in ancient Athens,
viewed discourse as a means of combating oligarchic political structures and encouraging
civic virtue among participating members of Greek society. While numerous schools of
thought regarding the relationship between language and reality have entered the
philosophical realm since these ancient articulations, the fundamental questions regarding
the relationship between rhetoric, the law, the public, and power are nearly the same as
they were twenty-five centuries ago. In fact, one might argue that what has changed
significantly is the public’s general lack of knowledge regarding the original language of
the law.
As mentioned previously, in spite of this interconnectedness of the field of
composition and rhetoric and legal discourse, few compositionists currently engage in
discourse analysis of the law and even fewer examine the roles legal language plays in
the composition classroom.11 Such examinations have enormous potential, given the
linguistic, social, cultural, and political complexities of legal discourse. Gail Stygall
suggests, “if at least part of the work of compositionists includes understanding the
production and consumption of texts in the professional world, the legal community
seems an ideal community in which to study that production and consumption, and the
effects of both. Yet studies of legal texts are rarely seen under the banner of research in
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composition” (“Narrative Discourse Analysis” 262). Stygall argues that the sheer volume
of texts produced in the legal realm combined with the high stakes implications and
consequences for citizens make the study of these texts imperative in our attempts to map
out the effects of legal discourse in local communities. Indeed, in “Unraveling at Both
Ends,” an examination of policy statements and community responses regarding basic
writing at the University of Washington, Stygall argues that
the challenge for rhetoric and composition scholars in reading [policy
statements and public responses] is to take seriously those public
documents that educational institutions and governmental commissions on
education produce. Legislators and educational policy makers in state
governments treat university policy documents as just that—policy
contracts. So when these documents contradict and undo other policy
initiatives, such as diversity commitments, we must point to the
contradictions and present counter arguments. (7)
Stygall’s call to action is pertinent to this project as it points out the complicated roles of
state and university policy statements in regards to diverse student populations and
access. However, Stygall’s challenge to compositionists is one that has yet to be fully
accepted. Scholars have indeed examined the public and institutional policies that
influence the composition classroom; they have not, however, considered the legal
discourse that comprises the documents that lead to such texts.
Like Stygall, I contend that much of the conflict seemingly intrinsic to basic
writing programming, institutional discourse regarding first-year students, and
community responses to perceived literacy crises might be addressed more effectively
through compositionists’ analyses of legal discourse. The movement to address the
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potential roles of legal discourse in the field of rhetoric and composition is also taken up
by Frederick Gale. Gale argues:
the discourse of legal interpretive theory must be considered as much a
part of the current rhetoric and composition discourse as any other written
discourse and as such shares the interests, concerns, and much of the
philosophical substrate of the field of language theory; and therefore, legal
rhetoric in the scholarly commentaries and the rationales for higher court
opinions—that is, the metatext of legal interpretation—may work to
undermine justice as it attempts to deliver justice, just as we see that any
other rhetoric may reinforce social injustice and repression. (17)
Gale, like Stygall, focuses on the tendencies of legal discourse “to undermine justice as it
attempts to deliver justice.” The very notion that the discourse that constitutes a legal
case might serve to counterinfluence the decisions of the case is disturbing to say the
least. Indeed, James Boyd White argues, “the central activity of law is the reading of
texts—cases, statutes, regulations—and their imperfect reproduction and arrangement, in
compositions of our making, in contexts to some degree distinct from those in which they
were made” (241). White goes on to argue that it is the distinction between a judge’s
written opinion and the result of a case that deserves insightful rhetorical analysis. In
fact, White claims that very often when the opinion and the result differ, it is the
opinion—not the actual result—that has the most effect rhetorically (92). Essentially,
White critiques current legal criticism that relies on analytic philosophy and a discourse
of economics and, instead, offers a method of legal “translation” based on literary
analysis.12 White examines judicial writings through a lens of both law and social
discourse analysis as a means of looking at how we literally build our identities and
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communities through language. The suggestion that the written and verbal texts that lead
to and stem from the law involve a cultural significance beyond the mere legal statutes is
a foundation of this project. Each of these scholars approaches legal discourse from a
different perspective while also recognizing the inherent value of such studies in regards
to social justice and the field of rhetoric and composition. In fact, inclusion of the study
of legal discourse seems both natural, and, perhaps more crucially, necessary when
considering the priorities and positions of the field regarding a broad range of issues from
students’ rights to public and civic discourse.
Not surprisingly, the histories of student access, race, and education in the state of
Mississippi are fascinating; however, it is the relationship between these histories and
composition that intrigues me and that I explore in Chapter II, “Language, Law, and the
Power of Metaphor.” In Is Separate Unequal: Black Colleges and the Challenge to
Desegregation, Albert Samuels argues that “Mississippi represents a classic case study in
how racial considerations have profoundly shaped the politics of education in America”
(90). Samuels’ research considers the manners in which politics and American belief
systems are represented in the historic rulings regarding historically black universities
and colleges—most specifically in Ayers v. Fordice.
Like open admissions experiments at CUNY, the Ayers v. Fordice case—filed in
1975—came in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education and amid a changing political
landscape in higher education. It is historically situated in a manner that mimics yet
perverts the goals of open admissions administrators and liberal educators due to the
emphasis on both student rights and institutional rights. This case resulted in state
mandated requirements for remedial programming in higher education that ultimately, I
argue, privilege the institution over students.
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As pointed out by Mike Rose, the origins of the word “remedial” can be found in
law and medicine.13 This provenance seems particularly relevant given my position that
legal discourse frames basic writing programming—the most commonly used term in
academia for what the public (and many academics) consider remedial writing. That
said, this project is grounded in the idea that legal language is “the means through which
a social goal is accomplished or through which a contested social site may be glimpsed”
(Stygall 20). This chapter, therefore, provides a history of Ayers v. Fordice and a
substantial discussion of the methodology—a combination of critical discourse analysis
and social and cognitive theories of language—involved in my attempts to analyze the
judicial and community documents related to the Ayers v. Fordice case and their impact
on the basic writing classroom as a “contested social site.” The overarching goal of the
chapter is to explore how legal discourse enables such a site and to establish the crucial
relationship between legal language and power by examining the relatively small number
of texts in which we can glimpse the ways legal discourse is addressed by
compositionists as well as texts in what some consider the sub-discipline of Language
and Law.14 The chapter concludes with a brief introduction to conceptual metaphor
theory.
In my third chapter, “Ayers v. Fordice: A Case Study in Conceptual Metaphor,” I
explore the judicial opinions that constitute the more than twenty-five year history of
Ayers v. Fordice in an attempt to grapple with how this particular legal battle continues to
affect all students pursuing degrees of higher education in this state as well as the field of
composition. I begin by examining George Lakoff’s and Mark Johnson’s conceptual
metaphor theory and its relationship to how the public reasons about the law, minority
students, and educational rights. My analysis of the judicial opinions handed down from
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the District Court, Appellate Courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court reveals three major
conceptual metaphors that frame our understandings of these documents: Law as
Looking Glass, Racism as Environmental Disease, and the liberal and conservative
metaphors associated with Moral Politics. An examination of these conceptual
metaphors and their rhetorical context provides insight into how legal language, despite
rulings that are suggestive of access and acceptance, reinforces a lack of power for
students who are required to participate in “remediation.”
Analyses of the judicial opinions in Ayers v. Fordice establish the link between
legal discourse, basic writing programming in Mississippi, and basic writing subject
spaces in general; however, an understanding of the power relations involved in the legal
discourse of judicial opinions requires an examination of the community’s response to
enacted legislation. One cannot comprehend the extent of the power of legal language
without exploring the public’s perceptions and responses to that power. Therefore, my
fourth chapter, “Ayers v. Fordice: Public Responses and Institutional Enactments,” will
consider the ways the national and local press, state officials, and community members
represent expected and pre-determined responses to legislation that rely on many of the
same conceptual metaphors prevalent in the legal discourse of Ayers. For, as suggested
by Peter Goodrich,
the law as a structure of material life, as an institution, is a system of
images, and it is through its symbolization of authority and through its
signs of power that the law dwells within the subject. The law is in that
sense nothing other than its image, no more and no less than a sign; it is
the spectacle of the scaffold, the aura of judgment, the sense of normal.
(Language of Law 210)
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Society, in other words, has very little conscious understanding of “the law”; rather, the
power of law over society rests more in our unconscious perceptions of what laws
symbolize and represent. There is a disconnect between legal statutes, the language of
the law, and the public’s perceptions of these laws. Society tends to respond to
perceptions, symbols, and interpretations of law, not to individual readings and
understandings of legal documents. In addition, the ordinary daily texts that portray these
responses—news articles, editorials, and letters to governmental officials—have an
enormous impact on institutional policies.
My concluding chapter, “Reframing Basic Writing: Recommendations for
Breaking out of the Ghetto,” focuses specifically on the literal impact of Ayers at my
institution, as well as on the ways in which our programs are yoked to standards-based
discourse and conceptual metaphors. My experiences teaching basic writing over the
past decade have resulted in my own moral back-and-forth regarding the role of basic
writing at my institution. What has not changed, however, is my belief that my students
are always unfairly and generically labeled and unduly underestimated. Recently, Kelly
Ritter challenged our view of basic writers and access, claiming that current basic writing
scholarship often “assumes that those students lacking access, those who are and have
been excluded, are of one person-type, one generic group of ‘basic’ that keeps faculty,
administrators, and the public from seeing other student groups who have also been
marginalized through the gate keeping function of basic writing programs” (13). Ritter
critiques our definitions of “basic” and insists that in order to adequately address the
needs of individual students, we must take into consideration local and institutional
values.
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Ritter’s call to action partly inspired me to begin this project. The students I
encounter on a daily basis are not only not generic, but they are also, in most cases,
completely unaware that they have already been defined by our state legislation and,
consequently, by our institution. Their position in academe is predefined by standardsbased rhetoric that will not allow them to define themselves and their goals. The “flags”
and “holds” on their records determine what courses they will take, when they can take
them, even when they can register for the next semester—all based entirely on an ACT
score. Not only are these students wronged in a sense, but also, by using such measures
for academic proficiency, we ignore a student population that also needs additional
attention and instruction in the writing classroom because they do not want to take
“dummy English.” Many students who would benefit from taking a preparatory writing
course choose not to do so because they are discouraged by the stigma of a course that
offers no academic credit.
I find Ritter’s emphasis on first-year writing intriguing, as I believe that, more
often than not, basic writing courses are divorced from the first-year sequences employed
by most universities. This separation is due, in part, to the marginalization of basic
writing programming as it is framed in our legislation, and, in part, to our refusal to truly
“see” our basic writers. This final chapter will consider potential responses to the
problematic subject positions of basic writers that are enacted, in part, by the conceptual
metaphors that constitute legal discourse and the institutional discourse that describes
basic writing programming. In addition, I show how these same conceptual metaphors are
evident in our scholarly literature regarding basic writers and the programs that serve
them. I will conclude by highlighting alternative programming options that effectively
bridge the gap between the competing doctrines of basic writing scholarship in an attempt
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to allow students to better understand their own subject positions and hopefully reclaim
their right to define themselves in the educational arena.
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CHAPTER II
LANGUAGE, LAW, AND THE POWER OF METAPHOR
In every opinion a court not only resolves a particular dispute one way or another,
it validates or authorizes one form of life—one kind of reasoning, one kind of
response to argument, one way of looking at the world and at its own authority—
or another.
James Boyd White, Justice as Translation
Legal discourse—that is jurisprudence—is rhetorical because it is the expression
of a social practice. The law is not a universal, timeless set of rules that arises by
necessity but is created, defined, and maintained by the discourse in which it is
situated.
Frederick Gale, Political Literacy
The details of legal discourse matter because language is the essential mechanism
through which the power of the law is realized, exercised, reproduced, and
occasionally challenged and subverted.
John M. Conley and William M. O’Barr, Just Words: Law, Language, and Power
The introductory chapter to this project examined the impasse among composition
scholars regarding the subject positions of basic writing students and the programs that
serve them. This chapter, as suggested by the above epigraphs, makes a case for the
relationship between legal discourse and social construction. I will explore the ways in
which analyses of legal discourse and responses to that discourse have the potential to
bring into focus the framework that determines basic writing programming in academic
institutions. This examination will include a brief history of Ayers v. Fordice, as well as
discussion of the various theoretical approaches to analyzing the legal discourse of
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judicial opinions. In undertaking this examination, I hope to establish a useful historical
context for my project in addition to laying out an argument regarding how legal
discourse enacts the subject positions of those in the legal community and the public they
profess to serve in interesting and problematic ways. In this chapter, I will also discuss
the value of critical discourse analysis, enactment theories of language, and conceptual
metaphor theory to the examination of legal discourse and community responses to
consequent legislation. These varied approaches to the study of discourse will allow us
to reconsider our methods of analyzing judicial texts and how they frame basic writing
programming.
In order to contextualize my discussion of the impact of legal discourse on basic
writing programming, I feel it is necessary to provide insight into my own experiences
regarding how my classroom is affected by legislative acts, legal discourse, and, perhaps
more importantly, perceptions of the law. In hindsight, I recognize that while state and
institutional mandates continue to affect my classroom in various ways, perceptions of
these laws infiltrated all aspects of basic writing programming at my institution with
almost a trickle down effect—the type of effect in which the message gets diluted and
misrepresented at various levels. In addition, it is clear to me that my administrative and
classroom experiences are in no way unique to my institution; rather, they are a trend in
higher education today.
The University of Southern Mississippi and Ayers Lore
The University of Southern Mississippi is an institution to which I have been
attached for more than a decade. Located in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, a city with a
population of roughly 45,000 people, USM serves a diverse student population of almost
16,000 students. During the 2010-2011 academic year, USM enrolled 15,778 students.
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Of these students 59% self identified as Caucasian and 41% self identified as nonCaucasian. 27% of these students self-identified their racial identities as African
American. Just as interesting, however, is that of the 2,677 admitted and enrolled firstyear and transfer undergraduate students for the Fall 2010, 59% self identified as nonCaucasian, and 35% of these students identified themselves as African American. In
addition, the average composite ACT score for first-time entering freshman at USM is
21.6.15 One of eight four-year, public institutions in the state of Mississippi, USM is
often considered by locals to be somewhat of a stepchild in regards to the state
institutions—overshadowed by well-endowed SEC schools such as Mississippi State
University and Ole Miss. Founded in 1910 as a teacher’s college, USM was officially
granted university status by the state in 1962. Now a comprehensive doctoral and
research extensive university, USM’s mission is to “cultivate intellectual development
and creativity through the generation, dissemination, application, and preservation of
knowledge” (“Vision, Mission, and Values” n.pag.).
Like many public universities, USM is striving to fulfill its mission and maintain
the intellectual rigor of its programs while often dealing with students who are not
considered adequately prepared for college-level work. The Department of English
comes in contact with almost every student who chooses to enroll at USM as a freshman
through our requisite first-year composition program and our core world literature course.
And as is the case in many institutions, much of the university considers our first-year
composition sequence to be a gatekeeper sequence designed to filter out students who
might not meet college requirements. The same professionals who hold this perspective,
more often than not, consider our basic writing programming to be even less significant
to the progress of university students.
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In compliance with regulations established by Mississippi’s Institutions for
Higher Learning (the elected governing board for the eight state institutions), my
institution currently requires an Introduction to Composition course (ENG 099) for
students with an ACT index of 16 or below, students whose scores suggest they might not
be prepared for college-level writing. In my previous position as the Basic Writing
Coordinator for the English department, I was responsible for designing the syllabi and
assignments for this course, mentoring teaching assistants and adjuncts teaching the
course for the first time, and performing assessment procedures in order to determine the
course successes and any apparent inadequacies. My position was classified as a oneyear, visiting faculty instructorship. I accepted this position the summer of 2008 after
meeting the new Director of Composition. I was extremely excited by our conversations
regarding the potential for the program to address problems facing USM students. I
knew the position offered no real job security, but basic writing had always been my
passion. In my previous positions at USM as a graduate, adjunct, and full-time instructor,
I was one of the few instructors who requested to teach the developmental writing course.
Interestingly enough, the longevity of my relationship with this institution is the only
reason I had any awareness of Ayers v. Fordice and its impact on basic writing in
Mississippi.
That said, I now realize that while I knew there were these “laws” somewhere in
the academic stratosphere, I actually had very little knowledge of the laws or how they
affected my students or me. My knowledge base was from snatches of conversation in
hallways and reminders that certain things had to be done because of “the Ayers case.” I
remember the Fall semester of 2002 we suddenly offered a record number of ENG 099
classes. When I asked about the reasons behind this scheduling move (up until this point
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we only offered two sections of the course per semester on average), I was told it was
because of “the Ayers case” and that the University could be sued if we did not offer the
courses. During this particular phase of my life, I had chosen to accept a position
administering federal grants regarding service-learning and literacy and was an adjunct
instructor studying to take my comprehensive exams. In hindsight, I recognize that my
response as an adjunct instructor to this new development—“the Ayers case”—was no
response at all. I ordered my books, and I taught my classes. No one informed me about
the Ayers case, but I also did not ask any questions. I simply assumed that someone else
with more authority, power, and foresight than I was doing what was necessary to ensure
compliance with what I thought was merely University anxiousness about potential law
suits.
When I accepted the Basic Writing Coordinator position six years later, I again
encountered the lore of “the Ayers case.” I sat down to discuss the position with a friend
and former colleague who was relinquishing the position in order to take a position at
another university. My colleague was generous with her time, advice, and experience.
While explaining the position and its challenges, she discussed requirements for student
syllabi, grading requirements, and enrollment caps. When I asked questions about these
issues, however, the answers were always the same: “IHL requirements” or “because of
the Ayers case.” Yet again I found myself nodding my head in agreement and purported
understanding, and I diligently took notes regarding her suggestions.
The Director of Composition and I met regularly to discuss our plans for the basic
writing program at USM, and we found ourselves desiring a certain level of flexibility in
regards to the development of effective programming for our students. We knew that
Mississippi was one of a handful of states in which a governing state board mandates
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laws concerning “remedial education,” so I researched the state guidelines for
developmental coursework.16 This led to the relatively complicated layer of mandates,
funding, legal documents, and, one might even suggest, sheer assumptions, regarding
these courses and their relationship to the Ayers case. The histories of student access,
race, and education in the state of Mississippi were fascinating, and their potential
relationship to basic writing intrigued me as I approached our programming.
Prior to the semester beginning, I was invited to participate in an IHL Strategic
Planning Session for Developmental Education at which all eight public universities were
to be represented. I was relieved to be attending this meeting as I was certain it would
lead to further understanding regarding IHL recommendations and requirements for basic
writing programming at my institution—including Ayers. However, while there was
general information provided about the history of the summer developmental programs at
Mississippi’s public universities (a product of the Ayers case and final settlement), the
primary goal of the workshop was to collect information from the various institutions
about how to make developmental education more effective. This was especially
intriguing as the various institutions represented had significantly different ideas
regarding how to ensure student success and retention. Listening to various groups report
their brainstorming sessions was enlightening—especially when suggestions from each
group regarding increased success for this student demographic varied from
implementing additional standards to surrounding developmental students with “a culture
of love.” Interestingly enough, the one common theme reported by the various groups of
faculty and staff represented involved the desire for more freedom to address the needs of
their individual student populations with programs that may or may not comply with IHL
guidelines for developmental education. Faculty at each of these institutions clearly felt
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unable to provide adequate support for students enrolled in their basic writing programs
due to the top-down requirements imposed by the Ayers settlement.
It became clear to me in my role as the Basic Writing Coordinator, and later when
I agreed to serve as the Acting Director of Composition, that further exploration was
needed regarding my adopted state’s complicated history of race relations and the effect
of this history on developmental writers and “remedial” coursework. The issue of race
has been at the center of many discussions regarding basic writing, but in Mississippi
race and basic writing are in some ways connected via legislation. Of course race and
socioeconomic status are at the heart of the discriminatory practices of education being
discussed in this project, but what are the state legislative policies involved in these
issues and how have they been implemented? How does the legal discourse that led to
and comprises these acts affect our perceptions of the legal decisions themselves? And,
finally, in what ways do these legal mandates and our perceptions and lack of
understanding (if not willful misunderstandings) of them influence basic writing
programming and students identified as basic writers? My larger goal for this project is
to begin answering these questions by examining the judicial opinions proffered through
the lengthy Ayers v. Fordice case using critical discourse analysis. Such an analysis will
allow me to illustrate the effects of legal discourse on basic writing programming at my
institution, as well as provide a framework for understanding the significance of legal
discourse to our efforts to rethink basic writing within our discipline.
Ayers v. Fordice: A Case Study
In order to begin exploring these issues, I begin with as brief an overview of this
case as I can provide, given its long and complex history. 17 In 1974, Mississippi’s IHL
Board of Trustees adopted a Plan of Compliance promoting further racial integration and
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equality among its public, higher education institutions. The Plan of Compliance, written
in response to the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s (HEW) request
for a desegregation plan, expressed the state’s objectives to improve educational
opportunities for all citizens, specifically in the areas of access and retention. This Plan
was rejected by HEW, but the IHL decided to implement the rejected Plan nonetheless.
This decision precipitated Ayers v. Fordice.
Plaintiffs in the case asserted that since the Supreme Court decision, Brown v.
Board of Education, higher education institutions designed to serve black student
populations were “markedly inferior” to institutions designed to serve whites (Ayers v.
Allain GC75-9-NB n. pag.). The plaintiffs argued that a racially dual system of education
was perpetuated via discriminatory admissions policies and hiring of faculty and staff, the
operation of historically white institutions in close proximity to historically black
institutions, and unequal distribution of financial resources, mission opportunities, and
academic programming. The defendants, however, claimed that good faith,
nondiscriminatory and nonracial policies had been implemented in respect to each of the
plaintiffs’ allegations and that where students chose to attend college was, in the end, a
personal choice.
On September 17, 1975 a three judge panel was convened to preside over
attempts at consensual resolution, and a plaintiff class was certified and defined as:
All black citizens residing in Mississippi, whether students, former
students, parents, employees, or taxpayers, who have been, are or will be
discriminated against on account of race in receiving equal educational
opportunity and/or equal employment opportunities in the universities
operated by said Board of Trustees. (Ayers v. Allain GC75-9-NB n. pag.)
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For over a decade, there were unsuccessful attempts at settlement. Finally, on April 27,
1987, a trial commenced in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi. On December 10, 1987, District Judge Neal Biggers dismissed the case,
finding and ruling that the state had lived up to its responsibilities in good faith. The case
went to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit where it was reversed and
remanded with one dissenting opinion on February 6, 1990. On rehearing en banc,18 the
Court of Appeals vacated the panel opinion and reinstated the District Court’s findings
and conclusions. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari19 in 1991, and it reversed
and remanded to the District Court in 1992 finding four aspects of Mississippi’s higher
education system as constitutionally suspect. In addition, the Supreme Court ruled that
the District Court did not apply the correct legal standard in its rulings and that the
“correct inquiry asks whether existing racial identifiability is attributable to the
state…and examines a wide range of factors to determine whether the state has
perpetuated its former segregation in any facet of its system” (Ayers v. Fordice 90-1205
n. pag.).
Justice White delivered the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, ruling that
Mississippi’s adoption and implementation of “race-neutral” policies did not prove it had
abandoned the formerly racially-dual system of education and that in order to dismantle
this system the state must “take the necessary steps to ensure that this choice [of which
college to attend] now is truly free” (Ayers v. Fordice 90-1205 n. pag.). Justice
O’Connor and Justice Thomas filed concurring opinions, and Justice Scalia filed
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Once again, under the auspices of Judge
Biggers, the defendants proposed modifications in light of the Supreme Court’s order in
1992. After two years of fruitless negotiations, another trial was set for May 1994. The
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state was ordered on March 7, 1995 by the District Court to implement various policies
and procedures in light of the Supreme Court ruling and in an attempt to reach a final
settlement regarding the specifics of the complaint.
Considering the Supreme Court’s guidelines, Biggers held that the following
policies and practices were remnants of de jure segregation: undergraduate admissions
policies and practices, the state-designated missions of individual institutions, funding
policies, participation in various athletic conferences, duplicative offerings between
proximate institutions, operations of two racially identifiable land grant institutions, and
operation of eight universities, all of which were to some degree racially identifiable.
Briefly stated, Biggers’ response to these remaining elements of segregation involved the
following: the adoption of system-wide admission standards, a required Summer
Developmental Program as the primary remedial measure for students ineligible for
traditional admission, suggestions for improvement of the state’s historically black
colleges and universities, a declaration of intent not to merge institutions at the present
time, and the adoption of a monitoring committee for further review of state compliance.
The plaintiffs appealed, and in April 1997 the District Court’s findings were
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Most importantly for the purposes of
this project, the Court of Appeals did not affirm the Summer Developmental Program as
the primary means of remediation for ineligible students and the possible “elimination of
the remedial courses previously offered at each of the eight universities” (Ayers v.
Fordice 95-60431 n. pag.). The Appeals Court also addressed issues pertaining to the use
of ACT scores to award scholarships, funding, monitoring, and clarity in regards to the
status of Mississippi Valley State University. A settlement was finally reached between
the parties and approved on March 29, 2001.20
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If nothing else, this brief history outlines the lengthy legal battle involved in the
Ayers suit and settlement. The longevity and genealogy of the case is further emphasized
by Judge Biggers in his memorandum opinion and remedial decree that led to the final
IHL agreement regarding access and instruction at the state universities. Biggers opens
with the following quote from Charles Dickens’ Bleak House:
Jarndyce and Jarndyce drones on. The ... suit has, in course of time,
become so complicated, that no man alive knows what it means. The
parties to it understand it least; but it has been observed that no two
lawyers can talk about it for five minutes without coming to a total
disagreement as to all the premises. Innumerable children have been born
into it; innumerable old people have died out of it. Scores of persons have
found themselves made parties in Jarndyce without knowing how or why.
The little plaintiff or defendant who was promised a new rocking-horse
when Jarndyce should be settled, has grown up, possessed himself of a
real horse, and trotted away into another world. Fair wards of court have
faded into mothers and grandmothers; a long procession of judges has
come in and gone out; thirty to forty counsel have been known to appear at
one time; costs have been incurred to the amount of many thousands of
pounds; there are not three Jarndyces left upon the face of the earth
perhaps, but Jarndyce and Jarndyce still drags its dreary length before the
court.... (as quoted in Judge Biggers’ 1995 decision)21
It is certainly no coincidence that Biggers’ chosen epigraph is from a Dickens novel that
critiqued the British judicial system and that literary and historical scholars suggest
eventually spurred legal reform. The similarities between Dickens’ fictional case of
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Jarndyce and the very real case of Ayers are obvious to those familiar with the lengthy
Ayers case: the drawn-out, “dreary,” lengthy process of the suit, the lack of public
understanding and “total disagreement as to all the premises” that show themselves in the
Ayers case, the considerable amount of money spent trying the case, and the effects of the
case on the “children” who will inherit Mississippi’s college systems. Indeed, Biggers
begins his statement by claiming that while the parallels between the two cases are not
relevant in his statement, similarities worth exploring do exist, and they are “better left
for the reader who might so choose to draw for himself from the novel describing
Jarndyce, cited above, and the opinions chronicling Fordice, cited below” (Ayers v.
Fordice 4:75CV009-B-O n. pag.). His somewhat sarcastic suggestion that exploring these
similarities can no longer be his responsibility but is the responsibility of the public
provides a background for my reading of the judicial opinions that constitute Ayers v.
Fordice because true educational reform requires examination of the legal discourse that
leads to institutional policies such as those dictated by Ayers.
The Function and Ideology of Judicial Opinions
In Political Literacy: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Possibility of Justice, Fredric
Gale argues for changes in the ways the public is educated about politics and individual
and social rights. Gale claims that citizens must be educated in the inherently rhetorical
nature of language in order to understand and interpret the laws that govern our society.
In what is a revealing look at the political and ideological nature of judicial opinions,
Gale successfully argues that citizens enjoy individual and social justice in direct
proportion to their ability to pursue and comprehend the rhetorical elements of judicial
writing. And while Gale’s work primarily involves what he terms the “rhetoric of
justification,” or the discourse used to explain judges’ decisions regarding their rulings,

33
his emphasis on the need for political literacy is an interesting point at which to begin this
project. Gale argues that society’s willingness to adhere to cultural literacy dictated by a
“ruling class” as opposed to critical literacy is what allows dominant ideologies to remain
in existence (4). For Gale, as for most scholars who propose a rhetorical approach to law,
judicial language (as all language construction) is always already ideological and,
therefore, incapable of representing complete objectivity and impartiality (4). This
recognition of law as a rhetoric has led to increased attention to the role such language
plays in the shaping of our lives—our legal rights, responsibilities, and limitations.
Indeed, a rhetorical approach to the law—judicial opinions specifically—
encourages analytical methods of interpreting the law as opposed to reliance on
traditional jurisprudential reasoning involving intention, precedent, and literal meaning.
Such an approach treats the genre of judicial opinions as more than statements regarding
the outcomes of an individual case. As pointed out by Glenda Conway, the sheer length
of most judicial opinions sustains such a claim. Indeed, most judicial opinions are at
least twenty pages in length, and many opinions are likely to consist of fifty or more
pages (46).22 And while the content of various opinions may differ, the purpose and
format is relatively consistent. According to Ruggero Aldisert, a judicial opinion is
“defined as a reasoned elaboration, publicly stated, that justifies a conclusion or decision.
Its purpose is to set forth an explanation for a decision that adjudicates a live case or a
controversy that has been presented before a court,” and “the quality of a decision is
commensurate with the quality and logical force of the reasons that support it” (12). In
other words, the judicial opinion functions as a medium for judges to present a detailed
history and justification of their rulings. It is a text in which judges explain the questions
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involved in a case and how and why they are resolving them in the manner posited by
their final rulings.23
In Justice as Translation, James Boyd White suggests that successful analysis of
judicial opinions requires the public to ask the following questions regarding the opinion
at stake:
How does it define the constitution it is interpreting; the process of
constitutional interpretation in which it is engaged; the meaning of the
particular provision at issue; the place and character of the individual
citizen in our country, and that of the judge, the law, and the lawyer?
What conversation does it establish, in what relation to “democracy?”
What community does it call into being, constituting what practices and
enacting what values? (141)
White is, in essence, viewing the judicial opinion as a narrative capable of both judicial
self-definition (establishing the ethos of the judge writing the document) and composition
of the socio-political subjects involved (members of the public who play a role in the case
or are affected by its outcomes). This is to say, it is simultaneously a cultural and
rhetorical text. From White’s perspective, all judicial opinions are “interpretive and
compositional” (91). His insistence that judicial opinions are central texts in the making
of the law—as opposed to mere justifications of legal decisions—and that through such
texts, “legal power is exercised before our eyes” is a powerful one (xv). Indeed,
according to White, the judicial opinion is “the representative legal text, the document
that catches and freezes for a moment the legal mind at work” (90). From White’s
perspective, the judicial opinion functions not only to provide the public with written
documentation regarding why judges ruled one way or another, but also as a means of
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establishing an individual judge’s credibility and authority in any given legal situation.
White discusses judicial self-definition and points out how important the judicial opinion
is in a judge’s attempt to establish himself and his role as a judge. He suggests we view
the judicial opinion as “an ethical and political act—as a way of defining the judge
himself, the court of which he is a part, the constitution upon which his power depends,
and the conversation that is the law” (Justice 112). Individual judges utilize this medium
as a means of establishing their own ethos and appealing to the reader’s sense of emotion
and logic simultaneously. Unlike the actual decision, finite and static, a judicial opinion
allows a glimpse into the judge’s personal opinion regarding the logistics and legalities of
the case discussed. However, not only are these legal texts capable of recognizing and
enacting the identity of the respective judge, but they also serve to define the various
participants in the case, the public community that will be affected by the final rulings,
and the relationship between each.24 Judicial opinions, therefore, provide a rationale and
background regarding how power is executed in the American legal system.
The legal discourse of judicial opinions, then, creates cultural and rhetorical texts
pertinent to our understandings of power relations, social construction, and justice.
Indeed, Conley and O’Barr argue the following:
focusing simultaneously on law, language, and power can give us a new
insight into what has been the fundamental question in American legal
history: how a legal system that aspires to equality can produce such a
pervasive sense of unfair treatment…If the law is failing to live up to its
ideals, the failure must lie in the details of everyday legal practice—details
that consist almost entirely of language. (Just Words 2-3)
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The linguistic details to which Conley and O’Barr refer represent the metatext of local
governance; they are what allow us to analyze the ways abstract social concepts, such as
justice, are carried out at a local level. It seems fairly obvious, then, that in-depth, textual
analyses of legal discourse will lead to more complete understandings of the role legal
language plays in constructing all aspects of society, including the composition
classroom. This is to say, inquiries regarding legal discourse—how it is used, perceived,
discussed, and responded to—are necessary to understand how such language creates the
social power dynamics that permeate and construct basic writing programming and the
basic writing classroom. In the case this project examines, the language of the court (trial
language, individual testimonies, expert testimonies, judicial opinions, written appeals,
and, finally, laws themselves) filters to a state governing agency, then to individual
higher education institutions. By the time it reaches the institutional level, the language
has changed—only in the university legal department is it clearly in its original form.
From there it eventually trickles through administrators, to departments, and then it
somewhat silently—but still quite adamantly—makes its way into our classrooms. This
probably is not very surprising to most; perhaps it is even fairly obvious, but my own
experiences with the Ayers case suggest it is the norm.
Several closely related forms of discourse analysis have surfaced that encourage
scholars to consider the intersections between discourse and the social implications of
documents such as judicial opinions. Methodologies such as rhetorical analysis, cultural
studies, critical discourse analysis, and social linguistics share notable commonalities that
make them each suitable for analyzing judicial opinions and their impacts on American
power structures and culture. For scholars engaging in such research, discourse is a locus
of power, as it represents not only language as words, as text, but language in the social
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sense of how language is structured, utilized, and talked and written about. Given such a
wide array of similar yet distinct methodologies, some may question how best to read and
analyze legal documents, and as mentioned above there is a long tradition of how to do so
in the fields of rhetoric and composition studies and literary studies. The kinds of close
textual readings I intend to conduct are different than the rhetorical analyses suggested by
the legal scholars noted earlier in this chapter. In the section that follows, I will explain
why critical discourse analysis is the most effective approach to deconstructing the
judicial opinions of the Ayers v. Fordice case based on the rhetorical nature of legal texts
in general and the priorities of composition studies today.
Critical Discourse Analysis: An Overview
Critical discourse analysis is an academic movement that bridges the gap between
social structures and rhetorical moves made in various public texts.25 A context-sensitive
form of discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis insists that close readings of texts
“be done in conjunction with a broader contextual analysis, including a consideration of
discursive practices, intertextual relations, and sociocultural factors” (Huckin “Critical”
157). As argued by Thomas Huckin, “the main purpose of critical discourse analysis is to
show how public discourse often serves the interests of powerful forces over those of the
less privileged” (159). Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak provide a definition of
critical discourse analysis that serves as a useful starting point for my project:
CDA sees discourse—language use in speech and writing—as a form of
“social practice.” Describing discourse as a social practice implies a
dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the
situation(s), institution(s), and social structure(s), which frame it: The
discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is,
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discourse is also socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned—it
constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of
and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive
both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status
quo, and in the sense that it contributes to reforming it. Since discourse is
so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power.
Discursive practices may have major ideological effects—that is, they can
help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for
instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities
and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and
position people. (Fairclough and Wodak 258)
Fairclough and Wodak’s stress on the dialectical relationship between discourse and
social structures provides a revealing view of the ways critical discourse analysts view
discursive practices. Indeed, no other approach to textual analysis allows for a research
agenda that includes the social, the contextual, and textual details in its attempts to show
the ways social and political inconsistencies are reconstructed in texts. As pointed out by
Wodak and Michael Meyer, critical discourse analysis, with its emphasis on ideology and
textual performance, is not necessarily interested in “investigating a linguistic unit per se
but in studying social phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a
multidisciplinary and multi-methodical approach” (Methods 2).
According to Teun van Dijk, advocates of critical discourse analysis agree that it
is not a research methodology but rather a “socially critical attitude of doing discourse
studies” (n. pag.). Methods utilized by critical discourse analysts in the humanities and
social sciences incorporate both qualitative and quantitative methods of research
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including, but certainly not limited to, formal studies of syntax, word, sentence, and textlevel analysis, and studies of narrative structure, argumentative structure, and rhetorical
strategies. Ellen Barton and Gail Stygall argue that critical discourse studies provides
compositionists a theory of language in use and various methodologies to “formulate and
test insights about social interaction and structural analysis” (9). Barton claims that the
status of critical discourse analysis as a cross-discipline of sorts as opposed to a strict and
discipline-specific research methodology is part of what leads to some scholars’
suspicions regarding the efficacy of the approach. She also argues, however, that the
combined qualitative and quantitative characteristics of these methodologies are what
provide a more rich and reflective reading of texts that ensures linguistic integrity and
contextual value.26
As mentioned previously, critical discourse analysts are at liberty to utilize any
number of research methodologies in their attempts to uncover the relationships between
social construction and texts—in the case of this project, legal texts specifically.
Previous works in legal discourse analysis have established the validity of these methods
in uncovering the various means by which legal texts influence and enact social
construction.27 Studies involving narrative, talk and silence, voice, and translation in the
metatexts of legal discourse have established various ways scholars can systematically
explain the cultural and political relevance of discourse in various legal texts. It is my
intention to contribute to these efforts through an investigation of the judicial documents
in the Ayers v. Fordice case utilizing a similarly critical approach. The remainder of this
chapter serves to begin to articulate the discourse theory and method utilized in this
study.28
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Critical Discourse Analysis: Metaphorical and Literal Enactments
Fairclough and Wodak argue that there are three primary areas of social life that
are discursively constituted: “representations of the world, social relations between
people, and people’s social and personal identities” (273). The theory that any text
functions simultaneously to “constitute representations, relations, and identities” allows
us to analyze how even individual clauses—the smallest details in a sentence—function
ideationally, interpersonally, and textually (275). They go on to argue the following:
We can only make sense of the salience of discourse in contemporary
social processes and power relations by recognizing that discourse
constitutes society and culture, as well as being constituted by them. Their
relationship, that is, is a dialectical one. This entails that every instance of
language use makes its own small contribution to reproducing and/or
transforming society and culture, including power relations. That is the
power of discourse; that is why it is worth struggling over. (273)
The dialectical relationship between discourse and culture is significant in its ability to
maintain or challenge hegemonic ideals. The idea that ordinary language in the most
ordinary of rhetorical situations is capable of either reproducing or transforming society
reminds us, once again, of the power of discourse and our responsibility as
compositionists to examine the ways discourse determines our social labels as well as
those of our students.
James Paul Gee also assumes this particular theory of discourse in Social
Linguistics and Literacies; for Gee, Discourses are “matters of enactment and
recognition” (156).29 Social theories of Discourse, he claims, rely on specific manners of
reading/writing coupled with specific social characteristics in order “to enact specific
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socially recognizable identities engaged in specific socially recognizable activities”
(155). In his textbook regarding discourse analysis, Gee asserts that “speakers and
writers use the resources of grammar to design their sentences and texts in ways that
communicate their perspectives on reality, carry out various social activities, and allow
them to enact different social identities. We are all designers—artists, in a sense—in this
respect. Our medium is language” (Introduction 5).
The similarities in the theories of discourse summarized above are obvious; the
scholars’ own articulations of their methods, however, are distinct in their verb choice.
Fairclough and Wodak utilize the verb “constitute” throughout their explanations, while
Gee’s work repeatedly employs the term “enact.” This distinction is important: the term
“enact” relays a sense of intent and performance on the part of the persons involved.
Ideologically speaking, if we believe discourse to be capable of doing ideological work,
that is representing and constructing society in ways that inform power relations, the term
“enact” carries a much stronger and ideologically informative connotation. In my
readings of judicial opinions, I will rely on this theory of discourse as an integral
component of enacting the individual and group identities of basic writers.
When I originally approached this project, I felt confident that close readings of
the judicial opinions of the Ayers case would reveal inconsistencies between the legal
decisions of the case and the ways the discourse comprising these decisions label basic
writers, as well as examples of how institutional and student subject positions are enacted
and limited by such discourse on a daily basis. Following Huckin’s seminal
methodological discussion outlining context-sensitive text analysis—an early description
of discourse analysis that is still valuable today—I selected my initial corpus of texts: all
judicial opinions associated with the Ayers case.

Huckins’ outline of procedural steps
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for such research involves selecting an initial corpus of texts potentially interesting to the
field of composition; reading those texts holistically in order to identify salient patterns of
interest; questioning the “interestingness” of developing patterns; selecting a study corpus
in order to verify the patterns; and conducting functional-rhetorical analysis as a means of
interpreting the results of the study (“Context-Sensitive” 90-93). Having selected my
initial texts, I began reading these opinions with an eye for language that conflicted with
the final outcomes of the Ayers case. This is to say, the stated outcomes of the Ayers case
purportedly involved additional access and educational opportunities for minority
students. Based on my knowledge of the historical, cultural, and political issues
associated with education in Mississippi, I wanted to know if the judicial opinions
associated with this case were at odds with the outcomes. My initial readings confirmed
my “hunches” regarding the disparate nature of these judicial opinions when compared to
the final decisions, but I also quickly became intrigued by the prevalence of metaphors in
the various judges’ opinions.
My interest in these metaphors led me to recent research by cognitive linguists
regarding conceptual metaphor theory. Such theorists argue that language not only
makes possible certain ways of being and thinking, but also enacts power structures by
“unconsciously shaping discourses and culture” (Eubanks “Corporate Rule” 237,
emphasis in original). Since the publication of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s
Metaphors We Live By, “conceptual metaphor theory has provided overwhelming
evidence that every day language so routinely incorporates metaphors that we cannot
explain how we think without taking into account the metaphors we think with” (Eubanks
“Corporate Rule” 237). According to Lakoff and Johnson, “the essence of metaphor is
understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another”; and metaphors as
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linguistic expressions exist, they assert, because there are metaphors in a person’s
conceptual system, their very thought processes (5). This argument—that all linguistic
expressions are rooted in cognitive, metaphorical mappings based on our perceptions of
ourselves and our world—challenged me to reconsider the ways in which I was
approaching the situational discourses connected to this lawsuit. I was confident that
further exploration of the metaphorical patterns repeated in the opinions of the Ayers case
would be useful in deepening my understanding of basic writing programming.
As mentioned in the introductory chapter to this project, basic writing
programming tends to be labeled from two distinct and divergent perspectives: such
programs are either considered transformative in their goals of providing access to higher
education institutions for students who for any number of reasons are considered
underprepared for college level work; or, these programs are considered damaging to
institutions and, consequently academic culture, as a result of a misinformed perception
of the lowering of academic standards. Each of these viewpoints is consistent with the
constant ideological warfare between liberal and conservative educators regarding the
relationship between the academic institution and the community it serves. Indeed, as I
will illustrate in the next chapter, both liberal and conservative worldviews are clearly
articulated through the metaphorical language always present in the discourse of
education. The rhetoric of progressive educators tends to highlight access, service,
nurture, and relationships; whereas conservative rhetoric often emphasizes accountability,
standards, economics, and the individual.30
In the next chapter, I will return to Lakoff and Johnson’s theories of conceptual
metaphor as well as Lakoff’s articulations of conservative versus liberal metaphors and
examine how they are enacted in judicial documents and, consequently, in the classroom.
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Little critical attention has been paid to the origins of such metaphorical language use in
the fields of law and composition. This project argues that in order to comprehend the
ways the subject positions of basic writers are predefined, we must critically analyze the
legal and public discourse that leads to institutional policies regarding basic writers, as
well as the community’s responses to such policies. In other words, the discourse of
judicial opinions has the power to enact specific, individual subject positions of students
in our classrooms, and this power often is enacted through metaphor. The goal of this
analysis is to point out how conservative and liberal ideas regarding remedial education
get performed on a syntactic level. In addition, because the assumed objectivity and
balance of the law is a belief that, as Americans, we all share, it is our responsibility to
consider how the very laws governing our communities are presented in a discourse
replete with metaphors that, once examined, are most clearly laden with subjective
language. Such an examination will lead to an understanding of how students come to
rely on and be limited by these same metaphors in programmatic and classroom settings.

45
CHAPTER III
AYERS V. FORDICE: A CASE STUDY IN CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS
Mayor Tilman: Fact is, we got two cultures down here: a white culture, and a
colored culture. Now, that's the way it always has been, and that's the way it
always will be.
Anderson: Rest of America don't see it that way, Mr. Mayor.
Sherriff Ray Stuckey: Rest of America don't mean jack shit. You in Mississippi
now.
Mississippi Burning (1988)31
[Mississippi’s] admissions requirements even for full regular admission are quite
moderate. As one witness testified, with such moderate admissions requirements,
it might well develop that in the future in some states such as California, where
approximately only one out of ten applicants is admitted to the state university
system because of the competitive admissions requirements, students will hear
about a state with moderate admissions requirements, a clean environment,
relatively low crime rates, and college campuses where as many as 90% of the
students are attending on federal Pell Grants, and there will be a mass migration
to that state.
Judge Neal Biggers (1995 District Court Opinion)32
In previous chapters, I have established the significance of legal discourse to
power relationships, the effectiveness of critical discourse analysis in the examination
such discourse, and the ways social and cognitive linguistics can illuminate our
understandings of the complex relationship between law, language, and power. Now, I
will focus on examining the linguistic and cultural significance of conceptual metaphor
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theory—a theory that has become central to cognitive scientists’ arguments regarding
how humans think, articulate their thoughts, and act. As mentioned previously, the
publication of Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By significantly altered our
understanding of metaphor. Their initial research has led to plentiful evidence that
conceptual metaphors are not merely a matter of language or linguistic expressions.
Rather, these expressions are possible because they are part of a person’s conceptual
system. Lakoff and Johnson argue that “human thought processes are largely
metaphorical” and that metaphorical expressions, then, are physically and culturally
inscribed concepts that dictate how we experience and articulate the world around us
because they are located in a person’s conceptual system (6).
The most commonly cited example of the ways in which conceptual metaphors
structure our thoughts and actions is the concept of Argument as War.33 Lakoff and
Johnson explain that “ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed, and
talked about in terms of WAR. The concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is
metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured”
(Lakoff and Johnson 5, emphasis in original). The authors point out that when we
“defend” our ideas, “attack” a position, or “gain ground” in an argument, we are not just
talking about argument in terms of war, and we are not devising and considering these
articulations anew each time we utilize them. Rather, we are simply voicing our cultural
concept of argument as a war, and, in essence, we are living according to this concept.
We actually can win or lose an argument, and many of our actions are based on this
concept—not just our words. We “defend,” “attack,” and “counterattack.” There is not a
literal battle that will result in physical death, but we can “demolish our opponent.” In
addition, our belief that Argument is War is the ordinary way for us to view argument. It
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merely requires that we be able to visualize the similarities between the two conceptual
domains: opposing sides, offence and defense, winning strategies, and the goal of
defeating one’s opponent (Lakoff and Johnson 3-6).
Lakoff and Johnson point out that while there are other ways to conceptualize
argument, such conceptualizations are unlikely to be recognized as argument because
Argument as War is our culturally inscribed way of interpreting what it means to argue.
For example, we might conceptualize argument as a dance, one in which the participants
are performers engaged in a choreographed routine designed to achieve balance and
duality; this, however, is not the ordinary way for our culture to view argument.
Therefore, according to Lakoff and Johnson, if we encountered two people having a
conversation utilizing the concept of Argument as Dance, we would not even recognize
their actions as characteristic of what we consider to be argument. In addition, Argument
as War is so entrenched in our cultural mindset that the cultural metaphor itself does not
even have to be explicitly stated in order for us to comprehend and process it. This same
theory holds true for other conceptual metaphors that Lakoff and Johnson cite, such as:
“Time is Money,” “Happy is Up,” “Love is a Journey,” and “Ideas are Food.”34
Superficially, conceptual metaphors appear to be simple; in fact, they are very
complex. Not only are conceptual metaphors pervasive and multitudinous, but they have
a basis in our physical and cultural experience that ultimately results in metaphorical
layers that allow us to experience, interpret, and articulate abstract ideas. These
metaphorical layers are a result of conceptual metaphors operating simultaneously with
other conceptual metaphors; they entail each other, “creating a coherent system of
metaphorical concepts and a corresponding coherent system of metaphorical expressions
for those concepts” (Lakoff and Johnson 9). In addition, it is impossible for us to know
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which features of these conceptual metaphors will function as coherent, complementary,
or contradictory,
unless we know the circumstances in which the metaphor is uttered—by
whom and to whom. No matter how we may insist on the fiction of an
isolable metaphoric expression, no metaphor can be separated from its
discursive milieu. It is impossible for a metaphor to be uttered except by a
concrete, historically situated speaker. Thus every metaphor is inflected
by a range of discursive forces: politics, philosophy, economics, social
class, professional concerns, individual goals, and so on. (Eubanks
“Conceptual Metaphor” 175)
This is to say, analysis of the contextual situations and speakers involved is as important
as the identification of the conceptual metaphors that permeate any given text. The
purpose, then, of utilizing critical discourse analysis to examine the conceptual metaphors
involved in the legal reasoning of and responses to Ayers v. Fordice is that such a method
allows us to explore the specific conceptual metaphors evident in legal and public
discourse alongside these various discursive forces. Such contextualization enables us to
understand how specific conceptual metaphors can be utilized to forward very different
priorities; however, one of those priorities is the one that is consistently recognized and
invoked.
Such an examination requires an understanding of how we conceptualize justice,
education, and remediation in America today. In short, we must identify the conceptual
metaphors at play in numerous discourses: those of education, of higher education, of
institutional policies, of legal discourse, and of justice.35 It is, therefore, helpful that
some of the most promising new applications of conceptual metaphor theory are in the
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field of law.36 While the majority of scholarship on metaphor and law adheres to an
Aristotelian view of metaphor as merely a two-part expression, legal theorist Steven
Winter writes extensively about the centrality of conceptual metaphors to legal
reasoning.37 In A Clearing in the Forest, Winter argues that no human phenomenon,
including law, can be comprehended without an understanding of imagination and the
cognitively entrenched role it plays between humans and their environment. For Winter,
“cognitive theory transforms everything that depends on categories—including
phenomena as prosaic as rules and as obscure as ‘judgment’” (7). Beginning with the
role of narrative in law, Winter examines the ways conceptual metaphor theory
(specifically Lakoff’s Idealized Cognitive Model) informs both our understandings of the
law as a constraint and contemporary legal scholarship and theory. In his examination of
conceptual metaphors and law, Winter cogently argues the following:
the exegesis of the metaphorical structure of [a written excerpt of any
type] might be of little more than literary interest except for two facts.
First, each and every one of these expressions and the accompanying
patterns of inference are the product of a more general, conceptual
metaphor. Second, these conceptual metaphors are neither arbitrary nor
mere products of chance and history, but are grounded in our most basic
embodied experience. (15)
This is to say, our basic ability to comprehend and react to laws and the social
implications of laws are dependent on structures of bodily experience. Our ability to
make sense of our society (and our role in that society) is related to the image-schemas of
conceptual mappings that allow us to interpret our various social interactions. Winter
argues that legal decisionmakers employ conceptual metaphors “automatically and
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unreflectively” in their judicial decisions in part because the narratives of judicial opinion
are socially enmeshed and, therefore, highly structured and regular (144). His argument
provides a basis for rethinking the ways we interpret legal discourse.
This chapter will involve the analysis of the legal opinions that led to the
Mississippi’s Institutions of Higher Learning’s ruling regarding Ayers v. Fordice in an
attempt to understand how a “commitment to diversity” could result in the labeling of the
very students we are supposed to serve and protect. 38 I intend to explore how Ayers v.
Fordice legislates composition in the name of racial politics, places institutional rights
and reputations above students’ needs, and implements additional bureaucratic mandates
and standards that restrict the abilities of composition teachers to respond to classroom
needs appropriately. To this end, I will consider the various conceptual metaphors
evident in these legal texts as well as how they might complicate our understandings of
the educational policies that derive from Ayers v. Fordice and help further our
understandings of the relationship between conceptual metaphors and the subject
positions of basic writers.
My analysis of the judicial opinions that comprise the lengthy Ayers case includes
opinions from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi,
the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme Court. I begin by
analyzing an early court opinion in which the suit was remanded to the District Court
after being summarily dismissed, analyze it for typical conceptual metaphorical mappings
and structures, and then turn to the proceeding opinions. I will then consider the role of
the metaphorical language in these particular judicial opinions and how it both constructs
limiting narratives of educational opportunity and enacts competing and sociallyprivileged identities for basic writing programming and basic writers.
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Law as Looking Glass
I begin with the Law as Looking Glass metaphor, not because it is the most
prominent or most powerful of the conceptual metaphors this project will discuss, but
because it is literally the first metaphor encountered by the reader in reading Judge
Goldberg’s epigraph to his opinion on behalf of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
when the court reversed and remanded the District Court’s original dismissal of the Ayers
case. The Court of Appeals “held that continued racial identification of the state’s public
universities violated equal protection and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” (West
Law summary n. pag.). Filed February 6, 1990, this particular set of opinions contains
explicit metaphorical constructions that are then utilized and reframed in each of the
proceeding judicial opinions that led up to the final settlement of the case.
“The time has come,” the Walrus said, “To talk of many things:
Of shoes—and ships—and sealing wax—Of Cabbages—and kings—
And why the sea is boiling hot—and whether pigs have wings.”
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There
(1872)
We’ll sit and chat of times gone by, and visit with the queens.
Brown, and, Sweatt and Meredith not to mention the fertile Green
And then we’ll see why Ayers should fly and how equality is king! (Ayers
v. Allain, 88-4104 n. pag.)
Certainly judges have a long history of using literary references as epigraphs in their
written opinions, but Carroll’s Alice and Wonderland and its sequel, Through the Looking
Glass, have an especially interesting history in the writings of judges, due primarily to
Humpty Dumpty’s famous statement that when he uses a word he means it exactly as he
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states it.39 Indeed, the Comparative Law Blog cites Carroll’s works as the most widely
cited children’s texts in all legal literature (2006). And while Goldberg’s artful prose and
rewording of the Walrus’ rhyme is both humorous and informative in its referencing of
legal precedents, a closer reading of the text in its entirety reveals explicit references to
the conceptual metaphor of Law as Looking Glass that hold significantly more meaning
than simply a literary allusion.
Indeed, this metaphor becomes significant to our understandings of this case
when, after presenting the factual information section of the court’s opinion, Goldberg
begins the opinion and discussion section by analyzing the cases mentioned in the rhyme
of his epigraph and claiming, “these cases demonstrate that law should be society’s
mirror casting reflections of individual dignity upon all” (Ayers v. Allain, 88-4104 n.
pag.).40 In this context, the looking glass adheres to our cultural understandings of mirror
metaphors as always self-reflective. In such a metaphorical context, the Law is
reflective; it is objective in its imaging; it is representative and reflective of light; it
considers cases in light of context and previous rulings; it truthfully represents the object
before it; it is exact—a mirror image. Consider the phrase “mirror into a person’s soul”
and its suggestion that mirrors provide a closer and more accurate look at all things.
Such examples allude to our cognitively entrenched belief that mirrors provide exact
reflections. In addition, when we apply our culturally conceived notion of Mirrors as
Truth in regards to the law, we automatically recruit the conceptual metaphor Law as
Truth.41 Winter alludes to this metaphoric scheme when he argues that “the most
powerful determinants of law are embodied in the social interactions and practices that
give rise to one’s senses of order and cultural truth” (343). In other words, our
willingness as a society to conceptualize law as truth is part of what enables law to
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function and govern in our society. We trust and believe in the “letters of the law.” We
solemnly swear to tell “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth” in a court of
law. The combining of these two complementary metaphors allows for our
conceptualization of Law as Looking Glass. The conceptual metaphor Law as Looking
Glass, therefore, entails that law, in the abstract sense of justice, should reflect a society’s
beliefs and social mores in the same way that a looking glass reflects the object before it.
In this sense, laws are always reflective of truth and justice.
This cultural understanding of mirror representations, however, conflicts with the
concept of the distorted and image-altering looking glass of Lewis Carroll’s fantasy
referenced by Goldberg. The looking glass in the story of Alice is not an object of selfreflection, but an object used to view others; and while these “others” are familiar and
distinguishable in Carroll’s sequel to Alice in Wonderland, they are distorted. They are
versions of themselves, but they are no longer recognizable as mirror images. From this
perspective, the looking glass perverts the objects seen through it. Everything, even law,
is reversed and perverted in Alice’s later version of wonderland. Suddenly we are faced
with the looking glass as distortions of funhouse mirrors—not honest representations, but
a world gone topsy-turvy.
Our reading of Goldberg’s opinion is altered by these conflicting versions of the
looking glass—especially given the subject matter of the case, race. Does the law reflect
our understandings of race and racism in America or does it distort them? Like Eubanks,
I would argue that such “metaphors are not worth studying because of their novelty or
singularity but rather because they are culturally entrenched and integrally involved with
other metaphors and figures” (“Corporate Rule” 241). Mirror metaphors are obviously
entrenched in American culture and language, but there is not enough research into how
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these metaphorical utterances enact the identities and subject spaces of individuals—in
this case minority students with a right to educational opportunities. A key passage from
Goldberg’s opinion will serve as an example. In it, Goldberg cites legal precedent, the
1986 case, Bazemore v. Friday. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court found that it held
no jurisdiction in forcing North Carolina Agricultural Extension Services to disestablish
segregation of its separate and racially identifiable 4-H and Future Homemakers clubs.
The Court reasoned that club members had a choice as to which club they joined, and the
state need only adopt non-discriminatory practices and race-neutral policies in order to be
compliant. Goldberg writes:
Courts must not become anesthetized from gazing too deeply into what
some believe is the platonic vision of Bazemore. Bazemore’s vision of a
state government is one resurrected from a past marred by racial
subjugation without the ashes of its fire-laden history to gray the façade.
Unfortunately, this vision rests on the blithe assumption that the moral
ambition of Brown has been conquered; an egalitarian society where the
elixir is choice blended into a grog of neutral admission policies. The
most abhorrent implication of the idea that the effects of segregation may
vary with the admissions and attendance policies of an institution,
however, is that black citizens are demeaned with the quality of
chameleons. The color of their skin is presumed to change with the
structure of an institution where they will see the world as do whites.
(Ayers v. Allain, 88-4104 n. pag.)42
This passage centers on a metaphoric scheme that casts the law as a mirror that certainly
has the potential to distort and enact the subject positions of black Americans; in
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addition, our ability to internalize and comprehend Goldberg’s passage is based on the
fact that the Law as Looking Glass metaphor is cognitively entrenched. This allows
Goldberg to reason in the manner that he does, and it allows us to follow his reasoning.
Therefore, Goldberg’s admonishment that courts not “gaze too deeply” into the “platonic
vision” of Bazemore argues against the conceptualization of law as reflective of truth and
adheres to a version of the metaphor in which law is capable of distorting the truth. By
suggesting that “Bazemore’s vision” is “marred by racial subjugation,” Goldberg alludes
to the distortive powers of legal decisions. In addition, his use of the phrase “platonic
vision” suggests that there are multiple truths as opposed to Truth with a capital T—not
one mirror image presented by the law.
The law in this passage represents the potential consequences of distorting and
manipulating how we “see” minorities and how they “see” themselves. Even the phrase
“demeaned with the quality of chameleons,” takes on new meaning when we take into
account the definition of the word “demean” as “to handle, manipulate, or manage.”43
An overreliance on race-neutral policies manipulates racial minorities and requires them
to claim a specific racial persona. The law, then, has the ability to manipulate the way
society perceives black Americans and their educational opportunities. Consider the
implications of Goldberg’s final sentence in this passage in regards to literacy and
education. For while Goldberg is referring to worldviews, his claim that black students
are manipulated into positions of chameleons could just as easily refer to the assimilation
desired by historically white institutions in regards to the cultural literacies of black
Americans. Goldberg is clearly attacking such a notion, but his rhetoric is ultimately
unsuccessful as this is a case based on “standards” and a desire to erase racial
identifiability of the state’s public institutions.
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Goldberg goes on to argue that “if a less demanding standard [than Green] were
adopted, images of inferiority would be memorialized with the force of law” (Ayers v.
Allain, 88-4104 n. pag.).44 In this passage, he once again emphasizes the relationship
between law and the images it creates, only this particular selection returns to the concept
of mirror images as opposed to distorted images. He also argues that the words of the
court “should serve to illuminate the road map that the district court must create to
remedy the violation of the equal protection clause in this case” (Ayers v. Allain, 88-4104
n. pag.). This emphasis on how the language of judicial decisions can illuminate—cast
light on—how the court should proceed in its dealings with the case also adheres to a
view of Law as Looking Glass and truth. The relationship between legal discourse and
images is coherent and consistent; however, the legal discourse he himself refers to is
caught in a double bind. Perhaps the law is a looking glass; but whether it reflects or
distorts ultimately depends on who is holding the mirror.
The Law as Looking Glass metaphor threads its way through the remaining
judicial opinions of this case as well—including those of the U.S. Supreme Court. In his
justification of the Court’s decision to remand Ayers to the lower court system, Justice
White utilizes the idiomatic expression “in light of” six different times in the discussion
section of the opinion alone. “In light of” is an idiomatic expression that I argue is based
on the Law as Looking Glass metaphor. In Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson
argue that idioms themselves are inconsequential; rather, it is the “deep metaphor” that
entails the expression that is culturally significant. They argue that “the idea that
metaphors are nothing but linguistic expressions—a mere matter of words—is such a
common fallacy that it has kept many readers from even entertaining the idea that we
think metaphorically” (245). The connection between idiomatic expressions that involve
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light and light sources and Law as Looking Glass are grounded in our understandings of
mirrors as reflective devices. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, our
associations of reflection and light probably result from “the sun and reflective surfaces
such as mirrors being considered alike as immediate sources of light, without regard to
whether that light is direct or reflected.”45 Reflection then involves light both literally
and figuratively in its ability to shine light upon a person or thing and to both stop the
passage of and reflect rays of light. Consider the following passage in which
commonplace idiomatic expressions are manipulated in a manner that corresponds with
the idea of light as reflective of truth (as in a mirror):
In highlighting, as we do below, certain remnants of the prior system that
are readily apparent from the findings of fact by the District Court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we by no means suggest that the Court
of Appeals need not examine, in light of the proper standard, each of the
other policies now governing the State’s university system that have been
challenged or that are challenged on remand in light of the standard that
we articulate today. (Ayers v. Fordice 90-1205 n. pag.)
In each of these instances, we are being asked to reflect upon specific readings and
standards of the law. Adhering to the conceptual metaphor of Law as Looking Glass,
Justice White essentially argues that an accurate reading of the legal precedents involved
will shine a light on the future actions that need to be taken by the state of Mississippi.
Interestingly enough, each time that White utilizes this expression, he does so in regards
to standards—but not always standards of law. Consider for example the following
passage: “The segregative effect of this automatic entrance standard is especially striking
in light of the differences in minimum automatic entrance scores among the regional
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universities in Mississippi’s system” (Ayers v. Fordice 90-1205 n. pag.). White also
claims that use of ACT scores alone to determine college eligibility is “irrational in light
of most States’ use of high school grades and other indicators” (Ayers v. Fordice 90-1205
n. pag.). In his discussion of the number of universities from which to choose in the state
he argues that the large number of institutions in itself leads to different choices
“particularly when examined in the light of other factors present in the operation of the
system” (Ayers v. Fordice 90-1205 n. pag.) And finally, White closes his opinion by
stating that, “because the District Court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider the
State’s duties in their proper light, the cases must be remanded” (Ayers v. Fordice 901205 n. pag.). This is to say, White argues that these courts failed in their judicial
responsibilities because they did not employ reasoning that reflects correct legal
standards—legal truths.
My description of Law as Looking Glass is too brief to encompass the
complexities of such a metaphor and all it entails, but even these examples point to the
significant role that the Law as Looking Glass conceptual metaphor plays in providing a
basis for reasoning in the legal texts of Ayers. Now, I would like to shift my emphasis
somewhat. Eubanks argues that recognition of conceptual metaphors in discourse is one
thing, but “it is another thing to note that each of these metaphors entails—is inflected
by—political, philosophical, social, and professional commitments. It is yet another to
note that these inflections give rise to a standard rhetorical etiquette that flexibly governs
the use of [such metaphors]” (“Conceptual” 191). This is to say, it is one thing when
Justice White claims that the state has been remiss in its readings of the law and that
these laws must be read “in light of proper standards” (Ayers v. Fordice 90-1205 n. pag.).
White’s use of the expression is inflected by his perceived commitments and ideologies.
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In fact, Eubanks argues that when uttering any metaphorical expression, the speaker
makes a rhetorical choice: “to claim the metaphor or not to claim the metaphor” (191).
White is claiming the metaphor in these passages. His articulations of standards, cultural
norms, and institutional histories are predetermined by his willingness to reason this case
using the conceptual metaphor Law as Looking Glass. For White, the very purpose of
the law is to shine a light on the ways in which justice should function in our society.
I agree with Eubanks’ theory that this is not a simple choice, but I would add that
it is not always a consistent or conscious choice either. Consider for example Justice
Clarence Thomas’ concurring opinion regarding this case.46 Thomas utilizes but does not
claim the Law as Looking Glass metaphor to which he finds himself responding. In his
discussion of de jure segregation and intent, he claims: “Thus, if a policy remains in
force, without adequate justification and despite tainted roots and segregative effect, it
appears clear—clear enough to presume conclusively—that the State has failed to
disprove discriminatory intent” (Ayers v. Fordice 90-1205 n. pag.). For Thomas to claim
this metaphor and argue his point convincingly, the phrases “appears clear” and “clear
enough to presume” are not compelling. Certainly, the conceptual metaphor Law as
Looking Glass demands clarity if nothing else. Thomas, therefore, casts doubt on his
own opinion via his rhetorical choices. Indeed, he does so more than once. In his
discussion of the Court’s analysis of the application of Green to Ayers v. Fordice, he
states: “As Justice Scalia points out, our standard appears to mirror these formulations
rather closely. Nonetheless, I find most encouraging the Court’s emphasis on ‘sound
educational practices’” (Ayers v. Fordice 90-1205 n. pag.). In this passage, Thomas is
using the Law as Looking Glass metaphor, but he is simultaneously contradicting the
implications of the metaphor. Standards of law can be mirrored or not; they cannot
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“appear to mirror.” Eubanks claims that metaphors have costs and benefits associated
with them when utilized and the costs often involve the credibility of the rhetor. Thomas’
refusal to take responsibility for the metaphor leads to doubt regarding his ruling in this
case. And his status as the lone African American justice provides additional strength to
this reading and further confusion to the community of students he is purportedly
attempting to serve. His ethos is suddenly called into question as he attempts to justify
his ruling.
Interestingly, in his orders to the state based on the Supreme Court’s remand,
Judge Biggers’ adherence to the Law as Looking Glass metaphor is problematic; in fact,
he attributes the metaphor to the Supreme Court from the beginning of his opinion.
Biggers responds to the metaphor in question, but only by quoting directly from the
Supreme Court’s ruling. His rhetorical choice to quote the Supreme Court’s language is
clearly intentional. In his statement of the case, Biggers acknowledges the high court’s
ruling and remand that the district court consider “the State’s duties in their proper light”
and defines the his court’s task on remand as an examination of state policies “in light of
the proper standard” (Ayers v. Fordice 4:75CV009-B-O n. pag.). Biggers is caught in a
double bind in his attempt to maintain his own legitimacy while following the orders of
the nation’s highest court. The result of this double bind is a legal opinion in which
Biggers’ attempt to regain authority in this case leads to ambiguity regarding the
outcome. By suggesting that he disagrees with the Supreme Court’s remand and refusing
to claim one of the salient metaphors being utilized by the Court, Biggers can be viewed
as consciously casting doubt on the validity of his own decree; his rhetoric directly
contradicts the stated (and intended) outcomes of the case. His use of language is an
example of what Gale claims is “legal rhetoric work(ing) to undermine justice as it

61
attempts to deliver justice” (4).
The contradictions between outcomes of legal cases and the legal discourse that
makes up the cases have the potential to create problematic inferences regarding basic
writers. For example, if the majority of society consciously or unconsciously reasons that
the law reflects social truths, how are our understandings of basic writers (and their
perceptions of themselves) shaped and enacted by the legal discourse of these opinions?
For despite the conflicting ways remedial education is described in these documents,
basic writers tend always to be characterized as deficient. If the law is a looking glass
that allows us to see truths about the objects before it, in this case the law is most
definitely informing society that basic writers are deficient and less promising than other
students. Therefore, when Judge Biggers, in his original dismissal of Ayers v. Fordice,
points out that “ACT requirements currently in use are reasonable and constitutional and
that medical, law, and engineering hopefuls should be held to at least as high admission
standards as the NCAA requires of tight ends,” we must consider the implications of his
language (Ayers v. Allain GC75-9-NB n. pag.). He is consciously comparing the
intellectual worth of college students by referring to the cultural stereotype of college
athletes as “dumb jocks” and suggesting that such exceptions to academic rigor and
standards are the only worthy exceptions because they at least provide us with
entertainment. This type of characterization is detrimental to basic writing students as an
establishment equated with power in our society is defining them.
Racism as Environmental Disease
In my attempts to identify and examine salient patterns of conceptual metaphors
in the judicial opinions of the Ayers case, not surprisingly the most explicit conceptual
metaphors involve racism. Historically, the most common conceptual metaphor of
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racism is Racism as Disease.47 In order to metaphorize racism as a disease, we must rely
on another conceptual metaphor: Nation as Body. Such an image-schema requires us to
consider the nation as a human body and leads to various metaphorical expressions such
as “racial healing,” “racial wounds,” and even “ethnic cleansing.” I argue that the
disease metaphor adhered to in the judicial opinions of Ayers v. Fordice is Racism as
Environmental Disease. Many of the linguistic expressions afforded by the Racism as
Disease and Racism as Environmental Disease metaphors are similar, but conceptualizing
racism as an environmental disease assumes an environmental and heterogeneous view of
the nation as an ecosystem that consists of numerous “bodies” and environmental
forces—a conceptual metaphor that still allows for image-schema that suggests disease
and infestation. This conceptual metaphor provides a rationalization for expressions such
as “uprooting the effects of segregation,” “patterns of segregation,” and “eliminate the
vestiges of racism” (Ayers v. Allain 88-4103 n. pag.). The nation becomes a garden in
need of cultivation. Like weeds, racism makes its way into the garden and must either be
eliminated or effectively managed in order to ensure the productivity and growth of the
garden as a whole.
The conceptual metaphors Racism as Disease and Racism as Environmental
Disease can certainly be viewed as systematic and coherent based on Lakoff and
Johnson’s requirements for subcategorization. In each of these conceptual metaphors,
racism is characterized as harmful and as something that can be remedied. Racism as
Disease entails that racism is capable of infesting the body of the nation in the same way
that bodily disease is capable of infestation, of continued growth and survival, of
perpetration, of scarring, of killing, and of inhabiting the “body.” However, such an
entailment also suggests that racism as a disease can be treated, remedied, and even
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eliminated. The same is true of Racism as Environmental Disease. In the south, this
conceptual metaphor might be envisioned as a kudzu vine. It has roots and branches; it is
capable of survival and growth even in foreign climates; it smothers healthy growth
around it; and, in short, it infests the landscape. In addition, like bodily disease, this
environmental disease, this “weed,” can be treated, uprooted, and, for a time at least,
eliminated. Two issues need to be examined regarding these conceptual metaphors. The
first is something we cannot ignore: whether we metaphorize racism as a bodily disease
or as an environmental disease, we, on some level, are conceptualizing it as natural. It is
no one’s fault. We are suddenly forced to consider the prospect of racism as cognitively
entrenched—a concept often manipulated by white supremacists in efforts to justify
racial subjugation. Second, both of these metaphors require that we consider a method of
treatment—as both bodily and environmental disease are considered harmful to their
respective host environments.
The complexities inherent to these two similar conceptual metaphors are evident
throughout Ayers v. Fordice, and it might be helpful to begin considering specific
examples. As a starting point, I return to Judge Goldberg’s opinion explaining the U.S.
Court of Appeals’ decision to reverse and remand the District Court’s dismissal of Ayers.
Goldberg begins the Decision portion of his opinion by contrasting the two courts’
readings of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Green v. School Board of New
Kent County regarding the responsibility of the New Kent County school board in West
Virginia to ensure desegregation of public schools. Goldberg argues that “the standard
implemented by the Green Court places an affirmative duty on states to eliminate all of
the ‘vestiges’ or effects of de jure segregation ‘root and branch,’” and that the District
Court’s alternative reading of Green “requires a state to implement, in good faith, race
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neutral policies and procedures instead of uprooting the vestiges of segregation root and
branch” (Ayers v. Allain 88-4103 n. pag.). Goldberg essentially argues that adhering to
race neutral policies (consistent with the District Court’s reading) is not the same as
eliminating practices and policies that might be associated with racism and encouraging
further integration. These conflicting readings of Green and their application to Ayers v.
Fordice constitute the majority of the legal dispute between courts as to Mississippi’s
responsibilities in regards to the racial identifiability of its public universities.
The metaphorical language of removing the vestiges of segregation root and
branch utilized by the Supreme Court in Green is quoted, co-opted, and reframed
throughout each of the judicial opinions in the Ayers case. Indeed, this metaphorical
expression that enables the reader to conceptualize racism as an organic, living, weed in
our public universities is the most cited conceptual metaphor in the legal texts of this
case. In Goldberg’s opinion alone, the phrase “root and branch” is used nine times, not
including the quotations from Green. And while one could certainly argue that this is
merely a metaphorical expression that became convenient in order to reference legal
cases of precedent, such an argument does not take into account the pervasiveness of this
particular metaphor. This is to say, conceiving of racism as something organic like a
weed requires us to imagine it as having a cause and react in respect to it; this is one of
the metaphors we consciously or unconsciously use to reason about racism. As a society,
we understand and experience racism as something naturally present, but with negative
consequences. For example, consider the following passages from Goldberg’s opinion:
•

“mandate to uproot the entrenched results of racial subjugation”

•

“a state’s duty to eradicate the effects of de jure segregation”

•

“the application of Green in all of its fertility”
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•

“vestiges of de jure segregation permeate the public university system”

•

“even if the roots of prejudice and the effects of segregation run deep”

•

“ventilate the court room with ideas from the winds of truth.”
(Ayers v. Allain 88-4103 n. pag.)

Each of these phrases clearly utilizes the metaphor Racism as Environmental Disease.
These passages emphasize disease and the negative effects of disease by reasoning about
racism as decay that “permeates” and “run[s] deep.” In addition, Goldberg’s rhetorical
decision to refer to the “fertility” of previous court cases and the need for “ventilation”
and “winds of truth” in the court room underscores the significance of the environmental
portion of the metaphor. Goldberg’s reasoning requires the reader to conceptualize
society as a landscape that includes numerous “bodies,” as opposed to the one physical
body that the more common metaphor denotes. In addition, note Goldberg’s concluding
paragraph:
The defendants have not satisfied their affirmative duty under Green.
Green demands the removal of all vestiges of de jure segregation root and
branch. The facts in this case, however, demonstrate that roots are spread
all over the terrain and that branches create shadows over areas where
Brown was supposed to usher in rays of sunshine. The badge of
inferiority that marks black institutions has not been removed. As such,
there remains in Mississippi’s higher educational system vestiges of
discrimination which distort the perceptions of black students.” (Ayers v.
Allain 88-4103 n. pag.)
These examples are certainly representative of Goldberg’s intentional and poetic use of
the metaphor Racism as Environmental Disease, and some readers might argue that such
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use is merely a rhetorical device meant to thematize Goldberg’s opinion. Such a literal
reading, however, ignores the cultural, historical, and political power of racism in
American culture, as well as the role conceptual metaphors play in our ability to reason
about abstract issues. Goldberg is simply articulating our tendency to inscribe such
relatively abstract concepts (in this case, racism) with characteristics from another
domain (in this case, the organic environment) in order to reason about the effects and
underlying components of racism. The conceptual metaphor Racism as Environmental
Disease is what allows us to understand that racism is not simply a belief, a severely
warped personality flaw. Rather, it is an environmental disease that permeates the
ecosystem. Indeed, in his discussion of Ayers and whether or not there is evidence of
discrimination, Goldberg claims, “the present case is replete with the disease” (Ayers v.
Allain 88-4103 n. pag.).
While Goldberg makes use of this conceptual metaphor in concrete and literary—
almost thematic—ways in his opinion, the remaining judicial opinions reason about
racism in similarly metaphoric ways. In the U.S. Supreme Court’s remand, Justice White
rejects the premise that the state’s responsibilities are limited to present discriminatory
effects and argues the state must address “whether such consequences flow from policies
rooted in the prior system” in order to take the necessary steps to “ameliorate” racial
identifiability (Ayers v. Fordice 90-1205 n. pag.). White’s opinion contains numerous
metaphorical expressions similar to these in his efforts to publicly explain the
responsibilities of the state to eliminate surviving aspects of segregation in the state’s
public universities. One of his most interesting articulations of the Racism as
Environmental Disease metaphor involves his discussion of how state and institutional
policies linked to de jure segregation must “be eliminated without eroding sound
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education policies” (Ayers v. Fordice 90-1205 n. pag.). In this context, racism is
certainly an organic disease; it is a weed that must be eliminated. More importantly, this
elimination must be conducted in a manner that will not cause erosion of the so-called
sound education policies—the land the garden inhabits—surrounding it. White uses this
expression two different times in his opinion, and it is quoted in Justice Thomas’
concurring opinion. Indeed, if we continue to push this metaphor we are confronted with
the concept of these sound education policies as “healthy growth” in our educational
environment. How exactly are we to completely eliminate the weeds without harming
the flowers? Do we uproot them? Are they so entrenched that such action is futile? Do
we use organic pesticides? Prune them in hopes of creating something more similar to a
butterfly garden? Encourage some sort of cross-pollination? Is the goal some sort of
remission; or is it complete elimination? And how might these goals be met? Critiques
of the High Court’s decision in this case involve the lack of direction the Court provides
the lower courts regarding exactly how they expect these vestiges of discrimination to be
addressed and eliminated while still maintaining “sound educational policies.”48 This
lack of clarity regarding how to address the problems that stem from conceptualizing
racism as an environmental disease does not affect the role and pervasiveness of the
metaphor, but rather further points out the ambiguousness of a “cure” based in
“remediation.”
As suggested above, we must pay attention to the fact that our conceptualization
of Racism as Environmental Disease can be extended to basic writers. Certainly it is not
uncommon to hear discussions in university hallways of how we as faculty are going to
cultivate the growth of our student population when we have so many students in need of
additional attention. How do we weed out the unprepared students? Whose
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responsibility are they? Do we simply not allow them access to the university for fear
that they may infect the rest of the student population? Do we establish gate-keeping
courses as a means of eliminating underprepared students? Do we segregate them and
simply try to keep them from encroaching on the healthier student spaces? Do we
employ alternative pedagogies that might be capable of reaching such a diverse student
body? The questions posed above are accurate representations of the questions being
asked by faculty with differing perspectives of what constitutes a student capable of
doing college-level work and, unconsciously, they are relying significantly on an
environmental and disease-laden metaphor of difference.
Moral Politics and Competing Views of Basic Writers
The conceptual metaphors Law as Looking Glass and Racism as Environmental
Disease clearly function to shape our understandings of the ways legal discourse frames
basic writing programming and, consequently, the subject positions of basic writers. In
addition, each of these metaphors can be subverted for different aims and purposes. The
final system of conceptual metaphors this project will examine is more overtly political
than the previous metaphors because the associated metaphorical expressions can be
plainly classified as conservative or liberal—creating even more irresolvable conflict
regarding the roles of metaphors in framing basic writing programming. Because these
types of programs play a major role in students’ access to higher education, it is not
surprising that the most foundational conceptual metaphors present in legal discourse that
affects access involve standards of education.
In order to begin to understand how conceptual metaphors associated with
standards lead to competing views of basic writing, I must return to George Lakoff and
his influential text, Moral Politics. According to Lakoff, the discourse that constitutes
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discussions of any contentious political issue—including education—can be traced back
to liberal and conservative competing worldviews of the family, and these views are
readily apparent via power-based metaphors centered on family models. This conceived
relationship between the conceptual metaphors Nation as Family and Moral Accounting
are significant to our understandings of each of these issues. Lakoff argues that the
conceptual metaphor Nation as Family entails that our nation is a family and the
government serves as the parental figures for this family. In addition, the Moral
Accounting metaphor entails that our moral systems involve a quantifiable and financial
system of checks and balances regarding the moral choices we make as citizens and
includes each of our major moral schemes: retribution, restitution, reciprocation, and
altruism among others. Because our cultural understandings of family dynamics include
parental figures investing in their dependents’ moral character, these two conceptual
metaphors are schematically linked, and they result in metaphors of opposing family
models: the Strict Father Morality model and the Nurturant Parent Morality model. In
brief, the Strict Father model of the family alluded to in the discourse of political
conservatives involves a patriarchy in which the father figure sets policy and rules for the
household, and obedience, self-discipline, and self-reliance are advocated for children.
Parental authority in and of itself, in this model, is representative of the love and nurture
expected in family relationships. The liberal family model based on the Nurturant Parent,
on the other hand, prioritizes love, empathy, and nurture. In such a metaphorical model
of the household, children learn responsibility by caring for and working with others, and
communication is essential. Lakoff argues that each model with its differing moral
priorities is linked to politics based on the common belief in the nation as a family in
which the government serves as parental figures.
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Lakoff provides an in-depth examination regarding how these familial metaphors
are utilized by conservatives and liberals in order to address numerous social policy
issues, including education. Lakoff claims that the conservative, Strict Father model of
morality is represented in education most specifically by concepts of absolute standards
of education. He argues:
The conservative recipe for a good educational system is simply to apply
conservative principles and the conservative notion of standards. Teach
conservative morality and the conservative notion of character, starting
with self-discipline; this is called traditional morality. Set standards based
on the classics of Western culture that are tried and true and have
withstood the test of time. Make students work hard. Use a system of
rewards and punishments: grade seriously and rigorously and fail people
who deserve to fail. If there is going to be an elite, it should be an elite of
talent, hard work, and achievement. Let those factors determine success.
If students fail, they have to take responsibility for their failure, and either
do better next time or go through life as failures. (234)
The relationship between conservative discourse on education and standards suggested by
Lakoff is alarmingly accurate.49 Historically, political and public outcries regarding the
perceived literacy crises in education are evidence of such mentality. More importantly
for the purposes of this project, however, the judicial opinions of Ayers v. Fordice and the
eventual settlement documents are representative of such conceptualizations of the
function of education as well. In his discussion of academic preparedness in his original
dismissal of Ayers, Judge Biggers continually refers to academic standards and economic
bottomlines. Students are referred to as “not capable of doing college level work” or
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“simply unprepared” (Ayers v. Allain GC75-9-NB n. pag.). Discussions of the
contribution of remedial courses to the university system involve whether or not students
can show “mastery of content.” Note the following passage in which Biggers discusses
the differing academic standards of the historically black colleges and universities and the
historically white institutions:
“If the [challenged education standard] is valid, enjoining its use would
not, in any meaningful way, counteract the effects of past segregation, but
might simply serve to perpetuate a dual standard,” by reinforcing the
stereotype that minority students cannot satisfy generally applicable
educational standards and by diluting educational benefits offered to all
students, black and white. Indeed, if valid academic standards were
lowered to eliminate a disparate impact, this would simply serve to lock in,
not correct, any educational deficiencies suffered by black children in
elementary and secondary schools, by “celebrating and perpetuating the
hollow certification that accompanied black graduation pre-Brown v.
Board of Education.” (Ayers v. Allain GC75-9-NB n. pag.)
Biggers’ reliance on standards is representative of the conservative model of parenting
defined by Lakoff. From Bigger’s perspective, universal standards of education are not
only necessary, they are the basis for a sound educational experience. Consider the
phrase “valid academic standards.” Who is it that defines these “valid” standards? In
this particular instance Biggers is discussing ACT entrance requirements and the state’s
college preparation “core” curriculum. There is much discussion of the historic use of
ACT scores to discriminate against minorities attempting to gain entrance to colleges and
universities, but in his original judgment, Biggers argues that the ACT alone is a sound
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indicator of college preparedness. And while he is forced to reconsider this decision
when the case is remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court, his original inclinations regarding
standards of education are evident even in his final decision eight years later.
In addition to a reliance on standards, the Strict Father approach adheres to a
market metaphor of education in which education is conceptualized as a product and
students are consumers.50 Indeed, this conservative, market-driven metaphor of
education has been embraced by many critics of higher education who argue that we are
turning out an inferior product at increasing costs to the consumer. This conservative
conceptual metaphor emphasizes the efficiency and accountability of institutions of
higher education. It is also, not surprisingly, the prevailing metaphor of legal texts
surrounding education because of the fact that the role of the law is to discern the rights
and duties of educational institutions and private citizens. When discussing higher
education this means reasoning about education by conceptualizing it as a service akin to
a business. Consider the previously quoted passage and its adherence to this
conservative, market-driven model of education. Biggers discusses “counteracting” the
negative effects of segregated education in the same way that the market responds to
external pressures. He embraces market-based notions of cash fluidity in his suggestion
that the education “benefits offered” can be “diluted.” He refers to standards as entities
that can be raised or “lowered” supposedly at will. And he refers to education
deficiencies as rates that can be “locked in.” Also in his original dismissal, when Biggers
discusses state funding of eight public universities with overlapping missions, he claims:
“it is very easy indeed to become concerned with the inefficiencies and wastefulness of
the higher education system in the state which came out so clearly from the evidence”
(Ayers v. Allain GC75-9-NB n. pag.).
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His emphases on standards and economic accountability are reinforced in his final
decision as well. Consider, for example, the epigraph to this chapter in which Biggers
describes the new admissions requirements for Mississippi’s institutions as “moderate” in
comparison to California’s “competitive” admissions standards (Ayers v. Fordice
4:75CV009-B-O n. pag.). This rhetorical choice immediately suggests that Biggers
considers the admissions requirements as less than appropriate for a college education. In
this passage, not only does Biggers’ language describe Mississippi’s college system in a
fashion normally reserved for business or home purchase (clean environment, low crime
rates, etc), but he also points out that on some campuses 90% of students are attending
college on federal Pell Grants. This rhetoric makes a problematic connection between
students who are underprivileged financially and lower admissions requirements.
Moreover, in the discussion section regarding the varying admissions policies of the
state’s universities and his consequent justification for parity, Biggers writes:
Likewise, the segregative effect of such differential admissions policies
cannot be denied in view of their operation in a system of higher
education where racially indentifiable institutions provide essentially
many of the same academic course offerings in identical or overlapping
service areas. The defendants’ current proposal seeks to eliminate this
vestige of the de jure era, and it is clear that under the Fordice analysis the
admissions standards have served to channel black students to the HBIs.
It should be noted that the lower ACT requirements at the HBIs were put
into effect by the Board only after recommendations by the HBI
presidents, but it is the Board’s responsibility to manage the higher
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education system in accordance with constitutional principles. (Ayers v.
Fordice 4:75CV009-B-O n. pag.)
Here, despite the fact that Biggers is re-examining the case on remand, the legal discourse
remains consistent with his earlier opinion. His metaphorical language adheres to the
Strict Father model of parenting that advocates absolute standards of education and
emphasizes personal and financial accountability. Biggers’ cognitively entrenched
beliefs regarding education are clearly evident in passages such as this one. This is
significant because in a court of law, a judge (the government’s representative) is
responsible for determining the rights and duties of the citizens in any given case in order
to determine what is owed by each party in order for justice to be rendered. Justice, then,
is the settling of accounts, the “balancing of the moral books.” Theoretically, at least, the
decision maker involved in a legal dispute is objective and apolitical (the blind eye of
justice); this supposed lack of bias is what allows a person of legal authority to distribute
justice fairly. However, if, as Lakoff suggests, our worldviews are cognitively
entrenched in a manner that leads us to privilege either strict or nurturant parental (i.e.,
governmental) strategies, it is impossible for a judge to disavow these beliefs in the
interpretation of legal cases.
The problem is that this particular conceptual metaphor that results in a standardsbased model of education directly conflicts with the ways we conceptualize remedial
education. Remedial education cannot be rationalized in financial terms; rather, the
whole concept of basic writing programming adheres to a nurturing metaphor of
education that revolves around growth.51 Such a worldview centers on nourishment of
the mind. In fact, Lakoff suggests that the liberal, Nurturant Parent approach to
education does not deny the importance of standards, but instead questions which
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standards are appropriate. The priorities of such an approach, according to Lakoff,
involve maximum self-development of every individual in order to ensure that he or she
can contribute to and serve the community in a manner that is important and satisfactory
to all involved. He argues that:
In the Nurturant Parent approach to education, the ability to nurture
successfully requires honest inquiry; we must know ourselves and our
history, not only the bright side, but more importantly, we must know the
dark side of America…It involves teaching honestly about controversial
and socially volatile issues, and understanding why they are socially
volatile. It does not distort either the past or the present to make us feel
good. It tells the truth. It encourages questioning. It is not just a matter
of learning facts. It involves understanding what those facts mean in a
larger context—both a historical and a contemporary one. It also requires
understanding differences in points of view, in learning that there is not
just one way to view events. (235-36 emphasis mine)
I would argue that in theory most compositionists subscribe to a model of education
similar to this. After all, such an emphasis on inquiry, access, and community is proven
to provide students with more significant educational experiences. According to Lakoff,
the nurturing and growth model of education does not ignore standards; rather, it chooses
not to utilize standards as a method of exclusion. It should not be surprising, then, that
while the legal mandates that resulted from Ayers suggest access (and, consequently,
nurture), this particular metaphor is most notable for its absence in the legal discourse
that comprises the case.

76
Of course, the brief explanation offered at the beginning of this section simplifies
the role Lakoff’s argument regarding conceptual metaphors and political orientations
plays in both education and the law. However, Lakoff’s descriptions of how
conservatives and liberals reason about issues based on radically different notions of
morality lead to important questions regarding the Ayers case specifically, and the law
and education more generally. What are the implications when a judge, a person of
authority and purported objectivity, describes admissions requirements, developmental
education programs, and potential students using metaphorical language that is grounded
in conservative notions of standards, failure, economic bottom lines, rules, meritocracy,
and complete self-dependence and self-reliance in a case that is supposed to lead to
access for these same students?
The problem, as I have illustrated in this chapter, is not that any of these
metaphors is more productive than others; rather, the problem is that the various
conceptual metaphors that we consciously and unconsciously use to make decisions
about basic writers conflict to the point of unproductive tension. Relying as it does on
competing conceptual metaphors, legal discourse enacts competing models of basic
writing programming and basic writers. This in turn leads to further isolation of these
students because the conservative rhetorical approach to the metaphors is often
privileged. Ayers v. Fordice is an example of how the legal discourse in any court case
can serve to undermine the original intentions of the case. Ideally, the final Ayers
settlement would have lead to increased access for minority students at all state
universities and academic and financial support for students considered underprepared by
traditional standards. My analysis demonstrates how legal discourse can undermine such
idealized intentions and the inconsistencies that result. In the next chapter, I will examine
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how these conceptual metaphors in media and community responses to Ayers further
complicate the subject positions of basic writers.
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CHAPTER IV
AYERS V. FORDICE: PUBLIC RESPONSES AND INSTITUTIONAL ENACTMENTS
Racially identified space results from public policy and legal sanctions—in short,
from state action—rather than from the unfortunate but irremediable consequence
of purely private or individual choices…if racial segregation is a collective social
responsibility rather than exclusively the result of private transgressions, then it
must either be accepted as official policy or remedied through collective action.
Richard Thompson Ford (1995)52
The messages to Mississippi’s current crop of college students are becoming more
skewed and more dangerous when the Ayers desegregation case is the topic of
debate.
Sid Salter (1994)53
The first three chapters of this project are devoted to examining the ways that
legal discourse and conceptual metaphors help to shape and determine our
understandings of basic writing programming. I now want to discuss how the public
discourse responding to court cases such as Ayers—interviews, news articles, cartoons,
letters to editors, and opinion columns in national and state news outlets, as well as
political correspondence—further limit how we think about and discuss basic writing
programs and the subject positions available to basic writers. As compositionists, we
must heed such reactive texts and “take seriously the ordinary documents and local news
that describe us and our students, rather than dismissing them as just university politics or
local news” (Stygall 20). We must address the significant impact of legal discourse and
public and political discourse on both the subject positions available to students and on
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priorities in the arena of higher education. Indeed, as Susan Miller claims in Assuming
the Positions, ordinary, reaction-based texts such as the texts mentioned above
simultaneously appropriate and mutate an expanding range of human
identities that become available in specific cultures over time…[They]
embody the always provisional human identities that are unevenly
available in discourse, subject positions that experimental moments of
utterance constitute. Ordinary texts unite experience, official discursive
practices, and fleeting statements on graphic surfaces that make specific
cultural signatures legible. (2)
This is to say, the examination of ordinary, daily discourse provides an insight into how
our culture is not only constructed, but also constructed “unevenly.” Veritable snapshots
of public discourse combine in ways that privilege specific cultural identities over others.
Ordinary language, according to Miller, “reveal[s] the intersections of social vectors,
forces that produce discursive actions that have simultaneously material, aesthetic, and
ideological consequences” (2). Miller’s claim expands our understanding of how public
responses to laws governing higher education are relevant to the functioning of the
university and to the specific ways that our students perceive themselves and are labeled
by others. Indeed, an analysis of the “ordinary” discourse surrounding the Ayers legal
battle reveals the same conceptual metaphors prevalent in the judicial opinions of the
case alongside the legal, political, cultural, and historical forces that ultimately shape how
we teach and value both writing and underprepared students in composition classes at the
university level. It is my hope that an examination of the metaphors and standards-based
language in these everyday documents will provide insight into the public’s varied
perceptions of the Ayers case and the ideological consequences of legislation and higher
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education.
In his 1998 dissertation, Kenneth Gilreath notes the significance of public interest
in Ayers v. Fordice:
Fordice had become much more than an issue of education. To many
citizens of Mississippi and other proponents of equal opportunity, this case
had the potential to decide whether black students, especially those who
were products of an inferior elementary and secondary school system,
would ever have an opportunity to attend any college or university. The
importance of this case was confirmed with a simple canvas of the
courtroom. In attendance, there were not only educators and legal experts
but patrons from numerous areas of the community. Two parents and
their six children came because they were interested in the future of
Mississippi’s treatment of its black residents. Also in attendance was an
80 year old former teacher hoping for a change in the long lasting
educational process. An elderly store owner whose eight grade education
was interrupted when white supremacists set fire to his schoolhouse, and a
curious Senegalese anthropologist who specifically traveled to Mississippi
in an attempt to understand Mississippi’s hypocrisy to American
democracy. (237)
Gilreath’s observations of the Ayers courtroom provide insight into the ways legislators,
administrators, loan providers, and parents pay attention to political and legal happenings
regarding the institutions in which they feel they hold intellectual, legal, and financial
stakes. This interest ultimately leads to public demands regarding the role of the
university and its students. Inevitably, such demands assist in the formulation of
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classroom practices that lead to students’ understanding and reliance on the same
conceptual metaphors prevalent in the judicial documents that dictate how we read this
case and reason about its consequences. These “ordinary documents” complicate, create,
sustain, and enact what become restrictive and problematic subject positions available to
basic writers, creating a limiting “cultural signature” for these students.
As discussed in Chapter III, the Ayers case and resulting legislation influenced
higher education in Mississippi in numerous ways: the cultural, political, and educational
roles of historically black colleges and universities, the state’s fiscal responsibilities to
each of its institutions, the role these institutions play in ensuring access, the revised
admission standards that purportedly allow both access and retention, and the
responsibilities of higher education institutions regarding remedial education. While the
majority of the public responses to the Ayers case involve the fiscal appropriations and
proposed methods to achieve equality between HWIs and HBCUs, there were also
myriad responses to the various ways Biggers’ ruling changed state admissions standards
and, consequently, access and remediation.54 Biggers rejected the open admissions
standards suggested by the plaintiffs and ordered all eight universities to adopt identical
admission standards that used indicators other than the ACT and completion of the
college preparatory program. Biggers’ final decisions were widely criticized by the black
population, and plaintiffs in the case unsuccessfully attempted to have the Supreme Court
block the enactment of the new standards.55
Biggers argued that while initially this solution might result in fewer black
candidates for higher education, the proposed summer developmental program would
ensure that every student had the opportunity to prove himself capable of college-level
work. He pointed to the state of Louisiana as an example of failed open admissions
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experiments, and, as noted in the previous chapter, he argued that these new standards
were still extremely moderate when compared to states such as California where only one
in ten students who apply are accepted to state universities. Biggers argued that higher
standards lead to higher achievement and that these admissions standards were a
promising compromise for Mississippi’s students. Responses to the state’s new
admission standards and the various settlement options being considered in relation to the
case circulated through numerous public venues, including national and state media
outlets. This public discourse allows us to examine how what Miller refers to as “the
intersections of social vectors” leads to an “undoing” of mandates for educational access
(2). Analysis of such discourse suggests that legal requirements to provide access to
underprepared students cannot lead to genuine access because the majority of the public
reasons about these students via pre-framed, conservative conceptual metaphors that are
limiting, rather than freeing, in nature.
The belief that public, written discourse regarding educational priorities, and
media coverage of those priorities in particular, has the power to shape our culture is the
basis of Romy Clark and Roz Ivanic’s seminal text, The Politics of Writing. Clark and
Ivanic argue that the writing practices of the mainstream press “play a major role in the
construction and maintenance of dominant ideologies and the related socio-economic
order that these sustain” (21). Relying on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, Clark and
Ivanic argue that the press is “crucial in constructing and maintaining consent around the
interests, values, and actions of the dominant socio-economic group whose interests are
more or less directly represented by the government,” and that the resulting public texts
are “where meanings are transmitted by few and received by many” (23-5). According
to Clark and Ivanic, the common belief that media “plays a purely reflective role” in
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society leads to the mistaken notions of an unbiased and free press corps; when, in fact,
the media continues to “articulate themselves around definitions that generally favour the
hegemony of the dominant class” (33). While aspects of Clark and Ivanic’s arguments
regarding the impacts of the press are now dated, especially given the proliferation of
blogs and the independent news outlets enabled by internet access, their belief that the
mainstream press reflects the values of the government and, therefore, influences the
tactics employed by local schools in the educating of children is one that I share. In
addition, while Clark and Ivanic do not extend their argument to focus specifically on
higher education, an examination of the press coverage of Ayers v. Fordice suggests that
the policies and standards of higher education are intimately connected to a governmental
system whose rhetoric simultaneously invites and dismisses the educationally
underprepared.
This chapter will consider the ways in which the public discourses of both the
media and citizens of Mississippi regarding the Ayers case shapes our understandings of
underprepared students and the programs that serve them. To do so, I will examine a
corpus of national and local news articles and archived letters from private citizens to
Governor Kirk Fordice, looking at two different, but related, aspects of the texts. I intend
to examine how the conceptual metaphors identified in the legal discourse of the Ayers
case are enacted in the public discourse surrounding the case, but I also plan to pay close
attention to the “moral politics” of ordinary public discourse and what emerges as a
nuanced portrait of the subject positions available to basic writing programs and the
students associated with them. This is to say, we cannot fully appreciate the significance
of the conceptual metaphors identified in this study unless we also examine the power of
public discourse in determining how these metaphors are enacted. My corpus includes
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the twenty-three articles published in the The Chronicle of Higher Education between
1991 and 2002 addressing the Ayers case, seven articles published in The New York
Times from 1990 to 2001, 188 articles collected from the Ayers subject files at the
Mississippi Department of Archives and History from 1987 to 1995, and fifteen letters
archived in the files of Governor Kirk Fordice’s Education Advisor, Jeanne Forrester.
Ayers v. Fordice, Conceptual Metaphors, and the Mainstream Press
The previous chapter examined the conceptual metaphors nested in the legal
discourse of the Ayers case. Not surprisingly, the conceptual metaphors present in the
legal discourse of the case are readily apparent in the media’s coverage of the case as
well. Indeed, of the thirty articles published in national periodicals addressed in this
study, seventy percent involve standards-based conceptual metaphors, and thirty percent
of the articles include references to the conceptual metaphor of “Racism as an
Environmental Disease.” While the “Law as Looking Glass” metaphor and growth
metaphors of education are less prevalent, they are also represented in the public
discourse of the national press. These metaphors are also noticeably evident in coverage
of the case by the local press. Almost twenty-five percent of the 188 articles included in
the Ayers subject files contain standards-based conceptual metaphors. Many of these
local news articles also contain references to the three additional conceptual metaphors
identified in this project, but the numbers are not statistically significant. This section of
my project will provide close analysis of the ways these conceptual metaphors play out in
public discourse and the consequent implications for basic writing programming and
basic writers. For not only are these conceptual metaphors present in media discourse,
but they also serve to enact limiting subject positions for basic writers.
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Racism as Environmental Disease
The national, perhaps even global, perspective of Mississippi as a state incapable
of escaping its racist past dominates news articles addressing Ayers v. Fordice, and public
responses to Ayers that circulate in a national forum very often adhere to the conceptual
metaphor of Racism as an Environmental Disease present in the legal discourse of the
Ayers case. For example, in the January 18, 1994 issue of the New York Times, Peter
Applebome considers how Mississippi’s history of racism continues to dominate its
political landscape by comparing two separate, but concurrent, legal trials: the trial of
Byron De La Beckwith for the assassination of civil rights worker, Medgar Evars, and the
Ayers case. Applebome describes Mississippi as “a state where the past seeps into the
present like the smoke from a grass fire” (emphasis mine, n. pag.).56 Applebome
strategically employs a metaphor to which readers will easily relate as he suggests that
Mississippi’s racist past is similar to “grass fire,” an environmental issue with the
potential to cause serious harm to the landscape. It is yet another type of environmental
disease capable of destruction. His metaphorization of Mississippi’s racist past as “the
smoke from a grass fire” is also interesting because, unlike naturally occurring
environmental diseases, brush fires can be both natural and man-made. In addition, his
emphasis on the word “smoke” allows the notion of racism to be viewed as something
that cannot be fully extinguished, but lingers even after the fire is exhausted.
Local perspectives referenced in such articles provide similar examples of the
Racism as Disease image-schema. For example, discussing the crippling effects of
racism in the state, Applebome quotes Mississippi Senator John Horhn, a black democrat:
“This state's psyche is very much like a cancer patient. You can't deal with a cancer until
you get past denying it's there” (n. pag.) Deploying very explicitly the Racism as Bodily
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Disease metaphor, in which racism is metaphorized as a type of cancer, Senator Horhn’s
comments are indicative of the black community’s response to the political and financial
ramifications of the Ayers case for HBCUs. Not only is Horhn reasoning about racism as
a disease commonly associated with fear and death, but he also suggests that the state is
in need of a diagnosis (and, consequently, a remedy). In each of these examples, racism
is conceptualized as an infestation of otherwise healthy environments. And while neither
of these passages refers specifically to basic writers, they both have implications for the
community’s perceptions of how racism relates to education and for minority students
(often assumed to be basic writers). From this perspective, racism in education is not
only historic and ever-present, but even when in a state of “remission,” it is obviously
present in the minds of admininstrators, educators, and students. And while
Applebomb’s and Horhn’s versions of this conceptual metaphor lead to descriptions of
the institutions as diseased due to their historically racist actions, I will argue later in this
chapter that students ultimately get branded with the stamp of disease supposedly
reserved for racist cultural institutions.
Moral Politics
This single article, “The Past Plays a Role in Two Mississippi Trials,”
incorporates additional conceptual metaphors as well. Senator Horhn is quoted later in
the same article saying,
“The Ayers case is a big struggle for this state, because to do it in a way
that is most effective for blacks means that whites will have to give up
something,” he said. “They're going to have to give up not being
committed to quality education for everyone, or they're going to have to
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give up some of the resources that historically have been going to white
schools.” (n. pag.)
Responses such as Horhn’s highlight the public’s perception of the complicated
relationship between education, financial resources, and race. Horhn’s suggestion that
predominantly white state institutions must choose between racist educational practices
and financial resources is provocative. Reminiscent of Lakoff’s moral accounting
metaphor, such statements reinforce our tendency to reason about education as a marketdriven enterprise—a “give and take” system that requires institutions to “give up”
resources and “provide” services. However, Horhn’s use of a conservative metaphor in
what might be seen as a more liberal stance is somewhat ineffective because he is
utilizing reasoning strategies regarding the role of higher education that will always be
deemed conservative in nature. His argument concerning resource distribution is unlikely
to be effective because opponents will counter that resource allocation should be based
on production, and that black students will be better served by shifting resources
completely to the more established (i.e., historically white) schools. Lakoff argues that
liberal politicians are ultimately unsuccessful in persuading the public to action because
the metaphorical family model is inherently conservative. I believe the same is true in
this situation. For example, this same conceptual metaphor can be seen in its more
traditional usage in an April 1996 issue of the New York Times:
Proponents say the new standards, which increased the ACT score
requirements by one point, will do what higher standards are supposed to
do: increase student achievement. "I hear the plaintiffs saying this is
going to destroy undergraduate programs at Jackson State," the state's
largest historically black institution, said David Sansing, a retired history
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professor at the University of Mississippi. "I said to myself, I wish they'd
said, 'It's going to be tough, but these black kids can do it; they've
overcome more than standardized tests, and they'll buckle down and score
higher. The world is so much more competitive these days, kids just have
to achieve more." (Archibold n. pag.)
In this excerpt the emphasis on a conservative, standards-based model of education
nested in our preconceived notions of moral accounting is obvious. Education is about
personal choice and responsibility: “Buckle down,” “Score higher.” Students must
prove that they can “overcome” the barriers created by circumstances often beyond their
control. As suggested by Lakoff in his description of a conservative worldview of
education, Sansing’s appeal emphasizes the responsibilities of the student, not the
institution. In addition, Sansing’s statement is couched in the idea that this is somehow
doing “these black kids” a favor. His reference to what the black population has
overcome suggests a level of respect for black achievements, but it does not acknowledge
the cultural racism associated with standardized tests. He assumes that each student—
black or white—has access to quality educational experiences prior to entering college.
Although both Horhn and Sansing draw on the conceptual metaphor of moral
politics, they utilize that metaphor differently. In his remarks, Senator Horne attempts to
co-opt what is traditionally a conservative metaphor regarding education, emphasizing
the significance of resources to education. He reasons that quality education is nested in
equality and that equality can only be reached via the exchange of financial resources.
Horhn’s suggestion certainly has merit, given the long history of financial inequality for
historically black institutions, and he attempts to consign the responsibility for education
to the state and its institutions using this metaphor. By contrast, Sansing, while arguably
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sympathetic, deploys the metaphor to place the responsibility of education back on
minority students as individuals responsible for their own educational choices. What
must be acknowledged in both of these cases is that readers of the New York Times will
most likely relate to conservative uses of the metaphor because the public at large reasons
that students, not institutions, are responsible for educational success. The result in either
case is public descriptions of education that relegate polar subject positions to students
and institutions, and the public is more likely to privilege views associated with
institutions and the state.
This privileging of subject positions is also understandably evident in the
nurturing parent metaphorical approach to education prevalent in the public discourse on
Ayers. In a December 1991 letter to the editor published in the Chronicle of Higher
Education, Thomas Bonner claims that “the world of the Ayers Court cases is not the best
of all possible worlds, and there has to be space in our gardens for some historically
black institutions to insure the intellectual and cultural growth and stability of a people
still alienated in so many ways from society” (n. pag). Bonner’s opinion piece relies on an
organic metaphor of education that emphasizes the state’s responsibility to nurture
minority students. His use of the phrase “space in our gardens” is compelling, allowing
us to see the ways various conceptual metaphors such as Racism as Environmental
Disease and metaphors associated with moral politics are often nested together.
However, Bonner’s argument, like much of the legal and public discourse surrounding
the Ayers case, conflates minority students and minority institutions in an unproductive
manner. For while there is certainly an argument to be made regarding the ability of
historically black institutions to provide black students with educational and cultural
growth, such commentary privileges institutions over individual students in the minds of
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the public. Bonner is promoting access and equality for an underserved population, but
conceptual notions of the role of individuals in education ultimately lead readers to
privilege students who can make their way without institutional support.
Similarly, consider the following excerpt from an article in the New York Times,
published April 9, 2000, discussing the effects of standard admissions criteria at
Mississippi’s universities:
Henry Ponder, president and chief executive of the National Association
for Equal Opportunity, a Silver Spring, Md., umbrella group that
advocates for historically black colleges, said the results in Mississippi
defied the special mission of the institutions. ''We have proven that we can
take a child with low test scores and G.P.A.'s and make competent citizens
out of them,'' Dr. Ponder said. ''I don't mean high standards are not
worthwhile. I just don't think all schools should force students into the
same peg hole. We should have respect for individual missions.''
(Archibold n. pag.)
Bonner and Ponder both emphasize the role of the university in cultivating the
intellectual and cultural growth of minority students often considered underprepared for a
rigorous academic experience. However, Ponder’s description of these students as
“children” who are then “made into competent citizens” is especially interesting. There
appear to be significant differences between a conservative model of higher education
that describes students as young adults who must take responsibility for their actions, and
Ponder’s more “liberal” approach, in which these same students are described as children
who simply need to be molded in order to be “competent” citizens. I also think it is safe
to say, however, that neither of these descriptions is appropriate or beneficial to the
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students themselves. In addition, these metaphors of education are polarizing in ways
that limit how we view the institutions and the associated students. By choosing to
describe the historically black institutions in ways that accentuate nurture and growth,
such rhetoric restricts society’s notions of minority students and suggests they are less
than able. American society, for the most part, accepts and reasons about education via
standards, and when particular institutions are classified in alternative ways, those
institutions will automatically be deemed lesser in value. In addition, because academic
standards are inherently conservative in nature, most conservative readers will not
respond to more liberal interpretations that prioritize institutional responsibilities over
individual responsibilities.
Law as Looking Glass
Finally, the Law as Looking Glass metaphor is also threaded throughout the
public discourse surrounding Ayers as the media examines the legal rulings related to the
case. For example, in the April 16, 1991 issue of The New York Times, Linda
Greenhouse discusses the Supreme Court’s agreement to review the Ayers case and
states:
Despite dozens of desegregation rulings in the ensuing decades, the Court
has never directly confronted the issue in the context of higher education.
Lower court judges have struggled to apply principles that, while clear-cut
in the arena of elementary and secondary education, often appear less
clear in the arena of higher education where student choice and historical
tradition add to the complexities. (n. pag.)
Greenhouse’s suggestion that legal principles might be clear in some situations and
murky in others provides further evidence of society’s willingness to view the law as
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capable of both mirroring and altering the social landscape. The relationship of the law
to the social arena mutates based on the control that citizens have in regards to the
situation. In this example, Greenhouse reasons that the law clearly reflects the social
needs of state-required education systems, but not that of higher education. This
suggestion implies that utilizing legal precedents not specific to higher education results
in the perversion of the law and, consequently, a distorted view of society. In addition, in
his 1991 article in the The Chronicle of Higher Education, “For the Supreme Court, a
Stark Choice on Civil Rights,” Jay Heubert reasons about the potential outcomes of Ayers
v. Fordice via the Law as Looking Glass metaphor. Heubert methodically examines the
civil rights era judicial decisions leading up to Ayers and forecasts the various possible
outcomes based on alternate interpretations of the laws at hand. Such reasoning provides
examples of the ways in which the law reflects and alters social realities by viewing the
social landscape via different legal looking glasses.
What becomes evident upon further investigation of how these conceptual
metaphors are utilized in both legal and public discourse is that the same conceptual
metaphors can be used, as Lakoff suggests, “with different—almost opposite—priorities”
(12). This is to say, each of the metaphorical constructions discussed in this study can be
utilized to promote specific ideologies that are very often at cross purposes. Our ability
to reason about and express our opinions regarding various social issues hinges on our
unconscious use of conceptual metaphors. The political worldview we bring to these
metaphors, however, determines how they are deployed and whether they are privileged
or ignored by consumers. Indeed, as I have illustrated above, each of these metaphors
can be manipulated to serve the needs of the speaker. However, as the analysis of Ayers I
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have offered suggests, conservative uses of these metaphors that align with the social
priorities of the state are almost always privileged.
Ayers v. Fordice, Moral Politics, and Media Discourse
Analysis of the public’s responses to the Ayers case is complicated by the fact that
the case is addressed, at both the national and state level, from significantly different
political perspectives with the national media forwarding a more liberal perspective in
their discussions of the case. Nevertheless, the conceptual metaphors identified in the
judicial opinions of Ayers and in the national press articles covering the trial negotiations
are also present in local news articles. Rather than continuing to point out where and
how these metaphors present themselves, however, I intend to further this study by
exploring additional ways the press provides conflicting messages to basic writers
through a definite emphasis on standards. In this section of my study, I will analyze the
tendencies of media discourse to forward the priorities of the state by adhering to similar
conservative worldviews via rhetorical choices. As discussed briefly in Chapter III,
George Lakoff claims that “standards define what counts as being disciplined enough”
and deems them the “heart of Strict Father morality” (405). Given the extensive press
coverage of the changes in admissions standards due to the Ayers case, additional
exploration of how these standards—academic rules and regulations addressed in each of
the conceptual metaphors discussed in this project—are perceived and forwarded by
parties in the case and both the local and national press seems necessary.
The Clarion Ledger is considered by many to be the most reliable news source in
Mississippi, partly due to its physical proximity to the state legislature.57 For the
purposes of this project, I will rely primarily on articles from The Clarion Ledger in an
effort to examine instances in which local press coverage of the Ayers case not only
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limits the institutional narrative regarding basic writers via entrenched conceptual
metaphors, but also limits the agency and actions of these students via the linguistic
patterns and rhetorical choices linked to specific political worldviews. Given the
extended duration of the Ayers legal battle, it should not be surprising that there are
hundreds of newspaper articles devoted to coverage of the case. In an effort to limit my
examination of these articles to the texts that will be most valuable to our understanding
of the subject space of basic writers, the majority of my analysis will concentrate on
articles published in the Clarion Ledger from 1994 to 1995.
I chose to limit my analysis to this particular time period because it was the most
volatile in regards to standards of admissions—the issue that most explicitly affects basic
writers in my state. It was in May 1994 that Ayers returned to court after parties were
unable to come to consensus regarding the U.S. Supreme Court’s findings regarding de
jure segregation in the state’s educational institutions, and in March 1995, Judge Biggers
issued the court’s decree regarding the state’s responsibilities to students interested in
public higher education. The press coverage during this time emphasized the various
plans of desegregation proposed by the plaintiffs and the IHL. The IHL proposed closing
two of Mississippi’s universities (Mississippi University for Women and Mississippi
Valley State University), merging Alcorn State University with Delta State University
(for a total of six public institutions of higher education) and raising admissions standards
at each of the proposed institutions. The plaintiffs argued that such a plan was racist.
According to the plaintiffs, historically black institutions are necessary for embracing
black culture and enhancing the educational opportunities of students who, due to
socioeconomic circumstances that bear on their preparation and secondary education,
may not be accepted at other schools. Their plan involved continued support of all eight
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institutions, transferring the administration of various professional schools to the
historically black institutions, lowering the admissions standards at the three HBCUs and
raising the admissions standards at the HWIs.
Because my research is geared toward basic writing programming, I have chosen
to exclude articles that focus on institutional closings and financial disagreements in
order to examine articles that specifically address access, admissions standards, and
educational parity.58 Therefore, of the sixty plus articles addressing various aspects of
the Ayers case published in the Clarion Ledger from May 1994 to May 1995, I will
examine the thirty articles that focus on the issue of admissions standards at Mississippi’s
universities. My readings of these documents reveal the power of the press in
determining how institutions of higher education and the public label basic writers. By
adhering to the culturally entrenched conceptual metaphors surrounding law, race, and
standards of education, the press effectively limits what is said and who is allowed to say
it. In addition, titles of articles, relative neutrality of language, and pictures that depict
interested parties all suggest a level of fair treatment while simultaneously silencing the
voices of black Mississippians.
One need only look at the titles of the articles in the Clarion Ledger to begin to
understand the role the press plays in maintaining a hegemonic society. As mentioned
previously, at this point in the Ayers trial there were two opposing plans for
desegregating the state’s university system. The titles of each article covering the state’s
proposals and witnesses are presented as statements of fact without qualifying clauses
regarding who advocates these stances: “New Admissions Policies Urged in Ayers
Trial”; “Standards for Admission must be Toughened”; “College Admissions Standards
to be Argued in Court”; “State Must Meet Challenge Offered by Ayers Decree.” Without
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exception, however, articles addressing the concerns of the defendants are qualified with
a clause that identifies whose opinion is being discussed: “Ayers Plaintiff: ‘Education is
our Way Out’”; “Racial Inequity Starts at Elementary Level, Ayers Witness Says”; “ACT
Fosters Segregation, Ayers Witness Says”; “Tougher Standards Will Hurt Black
Colleges, Biggers Told”; “Ayers Ruling Inconclusive, Say Black Critics.”
These examples clearly illustrate one of the methods used by the press to
differentiate more commonly accepted views from those of the plaintiffs. Articles
emphasizing what is presumed to be the views of the white majority are titled based on
ideological presuppositions. The reader sees only “Standards for Admission must be
Toughened.” It is presupposed that the majority of the readership will agree with the
concept that standards are necessary for quality education. It is important to note that the
reverse is not true. There are no articles titled “ACT Fosters Segregation”; instead,
writers and editors strategically attribute such statements to the plaintiffs—black
Mississippians. The Clarion Ledger editorial staff aligns itself with the state of
Mississippi by “tagging” statements and ideas that might be contrary to the beliefs of
white, middle-class Mississippians through a discursive practice that clearly delineates
between majority (conservative) and minority (liberal) views on education. Such a
practice creates asymmetrical power relationships regarding the state’s role in
adjudicating these views. The Clarion Ledger is adhering to the conservative stance on
standards in education—the same stance being advocated by the government.
Another example of the conservative ideologies found in ordinary documents of
the press involves references to the revised admissions standards proposed (and
eventually enacted) by the state college board. The staff writers for the Clarion Ledger
consistently refer to the changed admissions standards as “tougher” or “challenging.”
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Representatives for the state describe the new standards in very positive terms,
suggesting that revamped standards will improve quality of education for all Mississippi
students. Standards are described by these witnesses as “extremely low,” “very modest,”
and “raised slightly.”59 Such descriptions attempt to undermine the plaintiff’s complaints
that the standards do not take into account the cultural significance involved in
standardized testing. In addition, the state’s descriptions of the modified standards are
often in response to the plaintiffs’ suggestions that the new standards are too difficult for
many minority students to achieve and therefore are not acceptable. In these examples,
standards are defined in terms of what the state says they are NOT. For example, note
the following phrases: “not elitist,” “not too difficult,” “not rigorous at all,” and “not too
challenging.”60 In one article, the lead attorney for the state claims that the plaintiffs are
“proposing no standards at all” and that their plan “would admit black students with a
junior high reading level.”61 These statements make it clear that the state is responding to
an ongoing debate regarding standards in education.
These same standards are defined by the plaintiffs as “additional hurdles,” access
being “reduced,” “not tolerable,” “discriminatory,” “illegal,” “punishing,” and capable of
“eliminating access.”62 Note the significant change in vocabulary. The state describes
the admissions standards using relatively passive adjectives that presume agreement on
the part of the reader. The plaintiffs utilize adjective phrases associated with racism
(discriminatory, illegal, punishing) and nominalizations that provide these standards with
the potential for action. For black Mississippians, admissions standards are not impartial
policies; rather, they are less than subtle means of further alienating minority students.
This is not to suggest that black Mississippians advocate “lowering the bar” in education.
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Rather, they are arguing against the conservative notion of standards in which standards
are absolute as opposed to cooperative.
In the epilogue to Moral Politics, aptly titled “Problems for Public Discourse,”
Lakoff asserts that a balanced (i.e., politically neutral) discourse is impossible due to the
media’s approaches to political discussions and the format of news reporting (385).
Lakoff convincingly argues that language is never neutral since it is always associated
with a conceptual system. This means that “to use the language of a moral or political
conceptual system is to use and to reinforce that conceptual system” (385). By reporting
on the Ayers case using language associated with the conservative worldview regarding
the role of standards in higher education, local news outlets reinforce that same
conservative worldview.
It is also important to point out that the press determines who has the right to
speak and who is excluded from this conversation regarding university admissions. As
suggested by Clark and Ivanic, “vast numbers of people as individuals but, more
importantly, powerless social groups are excluded from contributing to the collective
store of knowledge, cultural and ideological activity, from the production and projection
of ideas that fundamentally shape society” (55). The social group most affected by new
admissions standards—minority students who are considered underprepared—does not
have a voice in these articles. When black students are represented in these articles, it is
through pictures of demonstrations and prayer vigils, not through words.63 Clearly the
press is capable of marginalizing the views of minorities interested in examining the
discriminatory nature of education in Mississippi through strategic rhetorical moves that
allow the press to seem fair-minded. Voiceless pictures serve to provide “balanced”
coverage of the issues. Such rhetorical strategies literally create the subject positions
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available to basic writers by suggesting that the public at large views specific admissions
standards merely as tough; those, however, who view these standards as unfair, must be
part of the minority. They must be black. More damning even are the voiceless pictures
that accompany such rhetoric, for they suggest that these students are incapable of even
expressing their concerns through the mainstream media outlets and must instead resort
to protests and prayer.
These limiting subject positions assigned to basic writers are evidenced further in
correspondence between private citizens and the state government in response to news
articles addressing Ayers. In Lives on the Boundary, Mike Rose claims that “public
discourse, heard frequently enough and over time, affects the way we think and lead our
lives” (254). The following examples of correspondence between citizens of Mississippi
and the Office of the Governor suggest that Rose’s assertion is correct. Not only are the
conceptual metaphors present in legal and media discourse also threaded throughout
ordinary documents, such as letters and proposals from citizens of Mississippi, but public
discourse also has the power to discourage action and further silence the voices of
Mississippi’s black citizens.
Conceptual Metaphors and Subject Positions Enacted in Political Correspondence
Not surprisingly, the press coverage of the Ayers case during this time period led
to significant input from citizens of the state in the form of letters to the Governor’s
office. Some of these letters, along with the Governor’s responses, were included in the
files of Dr. Jeanne Forrester, Governor Fordice’s Education Advisor. 64 I was able to
locate fifteen letters written during the state’s negotiations regarding how to implement
the U.S. Supreme Court’s instructions to the state of Mississippi. These letters certainly
adhere to the conceptual metaphors discussed up to this point; at the same time, they also
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reinforce the ways in which both the powerful and the oppressed are limited by the
subject positions that public discourse makes available to them. These archived letters
become our first glimpse into how individual citizens respond to conceptual metaphors
that help define underprepared students.
Of the fifteen letters in Forrester’s files, only two are written in support of the
plaintiffs, and private citizens from Mississippi did not write these letters. One letter is
from Janette Wilson, the National Director of the Operation PUSH National Education
Commission, requesting a status report and a meeting regarding the status of the state’s
HBCUs. 65 The second letter is from John Dunne, the Assistant Attorney General for the
Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, offering to assist in the
negotiation settlements regarding the Supreme Court’s directives. I find these particular
letters interesting for a number of reasons. First, there is no way to determine whether or
not black Mississippians chose to write letters to the Governor regarding the outcomes of
the Ayers case. I find it difficult to believe that black Mississippians, all of whom are
named as plaintiffs in this case, chose not to make their opinions known to the state
government. Assuming this is true, where are their letters? Why are the only letters
remaining in these files that advocate on behalf of black Mississippians letters from civil
rights organizations—letters that demanded some sort of response from the Governor?
Of course, the idea that the letters were written and discarded is better than the
alternative: perhaps I am wrong, and the letters were never written. For while one would
hope that black citizens chose to voice their opinions regarding the case, it is also within
reason to imagine that the black population who was denied access and education for
centuries did not voice their opinions regarding the Ayers case as they found it unlikely
that anyone would listen.
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In the letter from PUSH, mentioned earlier, Wilson adheres to a rhetoric
consistent with the Racism as Environmental Disease metaphor identified in the judicial
opinions of Ayers. Wilson expresses concerns about the survival of black education. She
ends her letter stating:
We are certain that you realize the importance of education to the well
being of any community. The elimination of black colleges will have a
devastating impact on the deliverance of African Americans from
economic stagnation, moral debility, and sectional isolation. (January 7,
1993)
Certainly Wilson’s rhetoric is consistent with what some might term “rights rhetoric,” but
I would argue that it is much more than that. Rather, the language of Wilson’s letter is
predetermined by the Racism as Environmental Disease metaphor that structures the most
basic ways of understanding the minority experience in our society—in fact, most
racially-charged rhetorics are responsive to conceptual metaphors that determine how we
think about and discuss race. Wilson is not being dramatic in her choice of rhetoric, she
is articulating her concerns regarding the impact of Ayers on HBCUs using metaphorical
expressions that are culturally and cognitively entrenched.66 Wilson’s argument
accentuates the link between education and the well being of a community, but, more
importantly, the expressions she chooses in this particular rhetorical situation are meant
to conjure images of stunted growth. As I propose in the previous chapter, this metaphor
is often altered, resulting in “otherness” replacing “racism” in the metaphor; racial
minorities, rather than racism itself, become the disease. In discussing the possibility of
closing historically black institutions, Wilson, a civil rights activist, claims this metaphor
and appropriates it in an attempt to articulate to Governor Fordice that the education
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programs designed out of necessity for minority students are not the disease—they are
the cure. Unfortunately, Wilson’s attempt to co-opt this metaphor is ultimately
unsuccessful; it remains a disabling metaphor true to its conservative base.
I am interested in Wilson’s letter because it is one of the two letters included in
Forrester’s files that advocate on behalf of the plaintiffs and also because it is the only
letter that includes a response directly from Forrester. Every other letter contained in the
files received a direct response from the Governor. The majority of the letters from
Governor Fordice were form letters clearly written to appease opponents of the Ayers
case. The introduction of the Governor’s standard response letter to these inquiries
begins as follows:
I have read with much interest and appreciate your comments regarding
the Ayers decision. The time has come to bow to the inevitable and
integrate the IHL with minimal further outlay of fees and expenses. I
intend to offer the leadership necessary to turn this into a positive step for
Mississippi.67
One cannot help but be cognizant of the problematic undertones of this paragraph as the
Governor seems to be empathizing with citizens concerned about the implications of
Ayers in his race-inflected suggestion that integration is inevitable, something to which
he (and his fellow, presumably white, Mississippians) must “bow.” Just as interesting,
however, is Fordice’s claim regarding his leadership role. According to Fordice, he
intends to offer the leadership necessary to transform this negative turn of events (the
integration of higher education institutions) into a positive step for the state. He is
positioning himself as an advocate for the people, an advocate with the power to make
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changes. Governor Fordice’s response to Janette Wilson of PUSH, however, was to
request that Jeanne Forrester respond on his behalf.
In her response to Wilson, Forrester introduces herself and states:
First of all, I would like to assure you that Governor Fordice is as
concerned as anyone that actions and reactions to this case are not punitive
in effect. He does, however, understand that significant changes are
necessary. Our actions from this office have been in line with our role
which is fairly passive in nature. The Governor has no real authority in
governing colleges and universities. He has taken leadership in
facilitating input from the lay population by creating a lay advisory panel.
I am enclosing the panel’s initial report. Additionally, we attend and
monitor all meetings in regard to Ayers. (February 3, 1993)
Forrester’s defensive posturing with the opening clause of this paragraph is disconcerting,
but her description of the leadership role of the Governor’s office is even more
problematic given Fordice’s platform of leadership when addressing white citizens. Two
issues are evident: a) Governor Fordice claims to be a leader capable of promoting
positives changes in education when communicating with white citizenry, but not when
dealing with citizens concerned with the effects on the black population; and b) Governor
Fordice, at least based on accessible files, chooses not to respond to citizens writing on
behalf of the black plaintiffs at all, delegating these responses to his staff instead.68
As I have already mentioned, only two of the letters included in Forrester’s files
were written in support of the plaintiffs. The remaining letters were inquiries regarding
the Governor’s proposed lay council of citizens and letters addressing individual
concerns over various possibilities being explored to meet the U.S. Supreme Court’s
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demands regarding desegregation. For example, Robin Price, a twenty-two year old
citizen of Mississippi, writes to Fordice’s Chief of Staff, Andy Taggert. Price expresses
concerns raised by articles in the Clarion Ledger reporting on the status of Jackson State
University and the state’s role in fulfilling obligations to HBCUs and issues of
admissions standards. Price writes:
If we were to do as the Justice Department proposes this is what would
happen next. Dr. Lyons would decide that the blacks are still being
discriminated against and this time he is going to want more and more
until there is nothing left to give. The next thing you know there will be
no College Admissions Board. All you will have to do is just sign up for
the college of your choice. It will not matter what your high school grades
were or what you scored on the ACT or SATS. Now where will that leave
our educational system? If we give Dr. Lyons and Jackson State
University everything the Justice Department wants to, what will be the
challenge of public education? There will no longer be any goals for our
youth to achieve or any challenges to overcome. We must put a stop to
this absurd proposal now; before it is too late for Mississippi’s youth.
(italics mine, January 7, 1994)
Price’s letter presents interesting correlations between standards of education and the
state’s discussions of how to compensate Mississippi’s HBCUs in a paltry attempt to
address de facto discrimination. She equates “giving” funding and programs to JSU with
a lowering of educational standards. Essentially, Price is suggesting that truly integrating
the educational system in a manner that redresses racial concerns will have long-term,
negative effects on higher education in the state. Her second inquiry, “If we give Dr.
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Lyons and Jackson State University everything the Justice Department wants to, what
will be the challenge of public education?” clearly establishes her stand. Price’s
adherence to the conservative metaphor for education contains racist dimensions, in part
because her allusions to “giving” resources to historically black universities echoes the
altered version of the Racism as Environmental Disease metaphor. Price’s rhetoric
suggests that black Mississippians are threatening and representative of disease. When
an environment you care about, in this case predominantly white educational institutions,
is threatened with disease, you react. From her perspective, the idea of “giving”
resources, of providing assistance, is not an appropriate reaction; building stronger
fences, via academic standards, to ward off the threat of the disease is the most
appropriate answer.
Another interesting document included in Forrester’s files is a proposal letter
submitted to Ray Cleere, Commissioner of the MS IHL office, by J.P. “Jake” Mills, a
member of the State IHL. The title page of the document is hand marked as confidential
with copies being submitted to the Governor and Forrester. In this letter, Mills argues
that the current problems facing the state can be addressed by changing the state’s
funding formula. Mills claims that politically it would be almost impossible to close any
of the HBCUs and that by changing state appropriations to universities based on student
needs (as opposed to institutional needs), weaker institutions would be forced to close.
Mills’ argument is clearly articulated using the conservative metaphor for education. He
claims the following:
[A] change in governance and funding permits our university presidents to
become full time administrators rather than part-time lobbyists…Students
are considered and treated like customers, and the beneficiaries are
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students, legislators, university presidents (free to do what they do best)
and the Mississippi taxpayer. Market forces would strengthen good
programs and eliminate inefficient or unattended ones…Public education
in general and higher education in particular has almost reached divine
status (everybody has to have a college education) and like all idols that
do not produce, they always call for more sacrifice. (More money and
children on the altar)…The only solution to the aforementioned problems
is one that has worked consistently throughout history—free people and
free markets. Nothing in history has worked better than free people and
free markets. (September 9, 1992)
Mills’ proposal is sustained by conservative conceptual metaphors of education as a
market-driven enterprise. His emphases on financial markets, customers, beneficiaries,
production, and efficiency accentuate clear notions of the business model of education.
According to Mills, the solution to desegregating Mississippi’s institutions of higher
learning involves eliminating any sort of public funding that allows institutions that
cannot support themselves to exist. By revising the funding formula, universities that
have the lowest enrollment and graduation rates will be forced to close, and no one will
be able to claim they were closed for racist reasons. Of course, the logic behind such
changes can certainly be viewed as racist in its suggestions: Mills is assuming that the
two most vulnerable institutions, Alcorn State and Mississippi Valley State, will be
forced to close. Universities subsidize state funding with strong alumni bases. These two
universities have the least number of graduates, and the degree programs offered are less
likely to produce graduates in the top percentage of income brackets. Essentially, Mills is
advocating that the state let these institutions die a “natural” death.
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Another interesting aspect of Mills’ letter is his emphasis on the divine. Mills
claims that “public education in general and higher education in particular has almost
reached divine status (everybody has to have a college education) and like all idols that
do not produce, they always call for more sacrifice. (More money and children on the
altar).” By emphasizing the problems that result when higher education is deified, Mills
reinforces his belief that the current funding system allows educational institutions to
make financial and moral demands of citizens. In a true business model, such as the one
Mills is advocating, citizens in the form of students and parents are empowered to play
this role. For Mills, and many other conservatives, our country’s meritocratic system
pays too much homage to education and not enough to hard work. To say that education
has reached divine status is to claim that it is untouchable, in some cases unreachable,
and, more importantly, all powerful. Mills is undermining the idea that education is part
of the American Dream and claiming instead that it has become a false idol. When
considered in context with his discussion of how to successfully eliminate black colleges,
this insinuation is even more problematic. Mills’s line of reasoning suggests that “good
programs” will “produce” and therefore establish their right to existence. Black
educational institutions, however, will prove to be false gods, calling for continued
sacrifice, but not contributing to the public good.
Reading these letters written by citizens of the state of Mississippi provides
further insight into the ways conceptual metaphors that affect our labeling of basic
writers are threaded throughout our everyday texts. In addition, these letters reinforce the
notion that standards of education are intimately yoked with the homogenous ideologies
of the state in problematic ways. For example, in an interesting letter from Hardy Lott, a
law partner in Lott, Franklin, Fonda & Flanagan of Greenwood, Mississippi, there is a
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written note to Jeanne Forrester at the top of the letter that says: “Jeanne—This is
cosmic—he read our minds. Please prepare a response for KF.” The letter to which this
hand-written note refers involves Lott’s analysis and suggestions regarding Ayers after
having read the Supreme Court’s opinions. In this letter, Lott states:
The Court’s opinion does not necessarily hurt us. It mentions a great
many issues but does not mandate the way in which they should be
decided but instead leaves the decision of them to the Circuit Court of
Appeals and the District Court at Oxford to be decided by them after
additional evidentiary hearings. As both of these Courts initially decided
these issues in favor of Mississippi and as the Supreme Court has not
mandated any particular finding by them, I see no reason to believe that
their future decisions will be particularly harmful to us; and in fact there is
a very good chance that they will be helpful. (June 29, 1992)
Lott’s analysis of the Supreme Court’s ruling regarding Ayers v. Fordice leads him to the
opinion that the Court of Appeals and District Court are already in agreement with the
state and therefore will not hand down rulings that are overly generous to the plaintiffs.
More significantly, he draws a parallel between himself (as a legal professional), the
Institutions of Higher Learning, and the state of Mississippi. By referencing the
interested parties as “us,” Lott aligns the ambitions of these entities. This is to say, from
his perspective, what benefits the state, benefits education as a whole. Therefore, the
conservative, dominant ideology of standards will prevail in the local courts.
In her examination of private correspondence regarding writing instruction in
nineteenth-century America, Susan Miller argues that such texts “reveal material and
social exchanges on which both recognized and seemingly random cultural identities

109
depend” (Assuming 50). The letters discussed above provide historical, political, and
material contexts that expose the culturally entrenched beliefs regarding minority
students and students considered underprepared. They provide us with an understanding
of the ways institutional narratives of basic writing programming are impacted by
everyday public discourse. In addition, they reveal the ways conceptual metaphors in
legal discourse are co-opted and reframed in our everyday discourse. Each of the
conceptual metaphors identified in the legal discourse of the Ayers case is present in the
everyday documents that discuss elements of the case, but the nature of the metaphor is
determined by the author’s subject position. Each metaphor, however, is ultimately
distorted so that it serves the interest of the dominant social group. The Law as Looking
Glass conceptual metaphor symbolizes both the law as an honest depiction of American
society and the law as an instrument capable of distorting our understandings of that same
society. The Racism as Environmental Disease metaphor reasons that racism is a disease
capable of infesting and destroying those that come in contact with it; however, the same
metaphor can be used to suggest that other races are in fact the disease and society must
protect itself from the social decay at hand. Finally, as I discussed in the previous
chapter, moral and political metaphors regarding education also fall into binary
categories. When viewed through a moral accounting metaphoric lens, education cannot
uphold standards and nurture students simultaneously. It must do one or the other, and
our culturally engrained reasoning about education suggests that standards, not nurture,
result in educational success.
Consequently, these conceptual metaphors hinder effective institutional policies
regarding basic writing programming. Our very way of reasoning about each of the
issues involved in programs designed to support students who are underprepared—law,
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race, and education—lands us in the double bind that is basic writing programming. All
involved constituents utilize the same metaphorical epistemologies to determine the
institution’s responsibilities to basic writing students, and their cultural and conceptual
means of reasoning about educational priorities ultimately lead to a privileging of
conservative beliefs regarding standards of education. It should be no surprise, then, that
our institutions speak out of both sides of their mouths when discussing basic writers.
Institutional Policies and Basic Writing Programming
The “socially significant meanings” of these entrenched metaphors in which
student identities are appropriated and limited by commonplace documents in the press,
the government, and responses by citizens, are reinforced in Mississippi’s schools.69
Clark and Ivanic cogently argue:
It is obvious that as the state provides education for its children, no state is
going to want schools that subvert the purposes, values and ideals of that
state. So, schooling can in that sense be seen as crucial in terms of
reproducing the values and purposes and the socio-economic order of the
hegemonic forces whose interests are maintained by political society. (45)
So, if the law, the media, and the citizenry all reason about issues that affect the nation’s
educationally underprepared via the same conceptual metaphors, and history shows us
that conservative applications of these metaphors eventually prevail, it should not be
surprising that institutions run by the state also forward limiting and typically conflicting
messages regarding these students. The goals of education systems in this sense involve
replicating class structures already in place; if the state does not value the educationally
underprepared, state-financed institutions will not be rewarded for doing so. This means
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writing programs and classes designed for this student demographic can be viewed as
instruments of the state used to remind students of their positions as “basic” writers.
As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the conceptual metaphors nested in the
public discourse associated with Ayers v. Fordice provide students with a conservative,
standards-based model of education that simply does not allow for minority and
underprepared students to make a space for themselves in academe. In addition,
marginalized subjects who attempt to co-opt these same metaphors are unsuccessful
because the objectives of the law, the political spectrum, the media, and the educational
institutions are so similarly aligned. The state of Misssissippi has predetermined the
futures of these students despite its legal calls for access, and we, as compositionists,
must reflect on how to address this disturbing fact. In my final chapter, I will argue that
the rhetorical strategies employed by writing program administrators to define their basic
writing programs plays the most significant role in combating these perceptions and
determining how we re-envision basic writing programming and basic writers in academe
today.
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CHAPTER V
REFRAMING BASIC WRITING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BREAKING OUT
OF THE GHETTO
There are close connections between language, social structures and writing
[which have] important consequences for the learning of writing. Access to
writing is not equally available to all members of a society. Furthermore, the
kinds of writing which children are taught and learn to produce at school may
provide an insight into the value-system of our societies, particularly given the
fact few children grow up to be writers in any significant sense of the word.
Gunther Kress 1994
A critique of our rhetorical ideology, however, suggests that the struggles in our
disciplinary discourses are not esoteric, ivory-tower theories without social
impact; they just may be the primary areas where hegemony and democracy are
contested, where subject positions are constructed, where power and resistance
are enacted, where hope for a just society depends on committed intervention.
John Clifford 1991
Freshman English will never reach the status of a respectable intellectual
discipline unless both its theorizers and its practitioners break out of the ghetto.
Janice Lauer 1970
This project is, in essence, an institutional narrative. In it, I have attempted to
trace the ways in which the legal discourse of Ayers v. Fordice and the conceptual
metaphors that enable such discourse explicitly frame our perceptions of basic writers in
Mississippi and limit the opportunities for successful basic writing programming. I am
conscious of the fact that this work often concentrates on basic writing programming as
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opposed to basic writers, and certainly student voices are necessary to fully explore the
impacts of legal discourse and conceptual metaphor theory on basic writing
programming. However, as I attempted to negotiate the social and ideological
components of this project, I found myself surrounded by public discourse—that of the
law, the state, the media, and the community—that ultimately silenced the voices of these
students. The “close connections between language, social structures, and writing” were
evident in ways that altered my perspective (Kress 2). The top-down nature of the effects
of legal discourse on basic writing programming forced me to consider the social impact
of our scholarly and institutional discourse as an administrator first, in an attempt to make
room for what Clifford terms “power and resistance” in the classroom space.
Further examination of compositionists’ scholarship addressing basic writing
programming reveals that the conceptual metaphors prevalent in the legal and public
discourse of the Ayers case are also present in our field’s scholarly literature, our
institutional policies, and our classrooms. For example, consider the role of the Law as
Looking Glass conceptual metaphor in the following passage from Mike Rose’s Lives on
the Boundary:
Through all my experiences with people struggling to learn, the one thing
that strikes me most is the ease with which we misperceive failed
performance and the degree to which this misperception both reflects and
reinforces the social order. Class and culture erect boundaries that hinder
our vision—blind us to the logic of error and the everpresent stirring of
language—and encourage the designation of otherness, difference, and
deficiency. And the longer I stay in education, the clearer it becomes to
me that some of our basic orientations toward the teaching and testing of
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literacy contribute to our inability to see. To truly educate in America,
then, to reach the full sweep of our citizenry, we need to question received
perception, shift continually from the standard lens. (205)
Rose does not refer specifically to the law as reflective of basic writers; however, his
central metaphor of class and cultural boundaries includes the legislation that leads to the
standardized testing of these students. Indeed, Rose recognizes the ways in which “social
order”—a phrase that Rose certainly intends to include class, cultural, political, and legal
boundaries—labels and predetermines how we see basic writers and how they see
themselves. This is to say, our perceptions of basic writers are defined by the “standard
lens” through which we view these students, and this lens is, in part, determined by legal
discourse. Recognition of the implications of conceptual metaphors, such as Law as
Looking Glass for basic writers is necessary if we are to successfully contribute to the
educational goals of our students.
Likewise, while the legal documents referred to in this project metaphorize racism
as an environmental disease, as one can see from the examples in previous chapters, this
metaphor ultimately is altered so that otherness becomes the disease. Somehow,
something gets lost in translation. The diseased domain of the metaphor remains, but it
attaches itself to race and otherness, not racism. Due to society’s tendency to
automatically label minority students as students most likely to be basic writers, the
disease metaphor—as well as society’s fearful reactions to disease—extends to basic
writers. For example, in her discussions of the impact of Mina Shaugnessy’s work on
English studies, Susan Miller argues that “basic writing by disempowered, lower-class
students who were suddenly placed where they too might receive the tests and principles
of a privileged education has only briefly fallen under the gaze of the establishment that
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hysterically avoids it” (Textual Carnivals 172). Miller’s emphasis on the ways university
administrators “hysterically avoid” addressing the needs and rights of basic writers is
only too accurate. Also, consider Mike Rose’s damning conclusion to “The Language of
Exclusion” in which he argues that “the notion of remediation, carrying with it as it does
the etymological wisps and traces of disease, serves to exclude from the academic
community those who are so labeled. They sit in scholastic quarantine until their disease
can be diagnosed and remedied” (352). Both Miller and Rose illustrate the pervasive
nature of this disease metaphor as well as its social implications. Unintentionally
breaking academic conventions and inhabiting the role of society’s “other” results in
“scholastic quarantine”—the placement of these students in an academic leper colony
that emphasizes the cruelty of our society regarding those who do not fit into the mold
society desires for productive students. Once again, we see the cyclical connections
between legal discourse, scholarly discourse, and the students we are attempting to serve.
Not surprisingly, the growth metaphor associated with what Lakoff terms the
Nurturant Parent model in Moral Politics also dominates scholarship regarding basic
writing. Indeed, in “Negotiating the Contact Zone,” Joseph Harris argues that three
primary metaphors dominate basic writing discourse: growth, initiation, and conflict.
Harris claims that the growth metaphor encourages a shift away from academic discourse
and, instead, emphasizes the cultivation of students and the strengths they bring to the
classroom. According to Harris, this particular metaphor, while positive in its efforts to
embrace students’ strengths, is problematic because it represents basic writers as
“somehow stuck in an early stage of language development, their growth as language
users stalled” (29). I agree with Harris’ critique of this particular metaphor for basic
writing instruction; however, I would also argue that the other metaphors he examines are
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so closely related to the growth metaphor that they cannot be distinguished from the
concept of growth. Indeed, each involves the assumption that students are part of a
cultural landscape in which various constituents are fighting for survival (or, in many
cases, simply waiting to see if they can at least avoid being noticed). In “Revising the
Political,” Laura Gray-Rosendale critiques each of these metaphors as well:
The basic problem with the metaphors for Basic Writers’ situations that
dominate our scholarship [is that] they betoken a troublesome willingness
to ignore the fact that the students we call “Basic Writers” seldom, if ever,
think of themselves as such—and that they rarely construe their tasks as
writers in terms which accord closely with our preferred metaphors of
“growth,” “initation,” and “conflict.” (26)
Gray-Rosendale’s argument is a cogent one; it is rare that our students conceive of
themselves as basic writers, and they certainly do not consciously conceptualize their
writing tasks as part of their own intellectual growth. However, this does not change the
fact that the major entities that have power over their futures in education—the judicial
system, the legislature, university administrations, departmental entities, and teachers—
utilize various conflicting conceptual metaphors to reason about basic writers and
determine their actions in regards to these students.
In order to redirect the scholarly and institutional narrative that results from such
discourse—in order to make room for students’ voices to be heard—we must concentrate
on finding the open spaces in the rhetoric that surrounds basic writing students. I feel
that writing program administrators (WPAs) are uniquely positioned to influence how
basic writing is perceived at our institutions and in our communities; consequently, I am
interested in concluding this project by examining the roles of WPAs in defining basic
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writing for their institutions, communities, and students. WPAs, oftentimes by default,
are students’ primary designated advocates, and they are the most direct link between
institutional politics and the classroom. WPAs are privy to many of the processes of
institutional change that often are not visible to others, and this means they are
responsible for producing the departmental texts that will help determine how basic
writing is represented, branded, and taught at their individual institutions. Chris Anson
and Robert Brown accurately point out the following about WPAs:
acutely aware that all relationships between writing programs and their
broader institutional settings must be understood as socially constructed,
highly localized, temporal, and interpersonal. In order to represent
themselves, their programs, their beliefs, and the products of their
investigations, successful WPAs must critically read their institutions as
complex educational cultures with powerful habits of governance,
disciplinarity, and interpretation. (emphasis original, 142)
The problem, as I have illustrated in this study, is that despite the cultural and
institutional awareness among WPAs promoted by scholars such as Anson and Brown,
we are unable to move forward and advocate for basic writing programming because the
conceptual metaphors prevalent in legal discourse trickle down to the institution in ways
that determine and limit how we think about and discuss basic writers even in our own
scholarship. This said, I would like to forward my recommendations regarding how both
my institution and the field of composition might respond to the limits we place on basic
writers by virtue of our own conceptual metaphors. For while the experiences of
Mississippi’s higher education system are certainly unique in some respects, the
discourse that describes basic writers and the programs that serve them is not.
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The most obvious means of addressing the problematic subject positions available
to basic writing programming and basic writers involves awareness of the power of
discourse to enact and limit subject positions. In order to begin addressing the needs of
these programs and students, WPAs must be aware of the conceptual metaphors
employed by legal decision makers, politicians, members of the press, and community
members to think about and discuss basic writing programming. I believe that critical
discourse analysis of the ordinary documents that come into play at our institutions is
necessary in order to remain aware of such cognitively and culturally entrenched beliefs
regarding education. Stygall suggests the following:
by keeping the ideological in close focus, critical discourse analysis—with
its attention to agency, action, stakes, and absence as well as presence—
provides us with the analysis tools we need to assess our situations. Once
we assess the local terrain, we can begin to challenge the unconsidered
ideologies that govern public discussion about access to higher education.
(19)
Curricular design and textual production are two of the most significant contributions of
WPAs. By paying attention to legal and public discourse regarding basic writing
programming, we have the opportunity to reframe a discussion that up until now has had
its perimeters set by others. A movement such as the one I am proposing will not be
easy. Rethinking how we discuss education for the underprepared means risking
stepping outside of the discursive box in a way that will no longer allow easy recognition
of our educational goals. I mentioned in Chapter III, for example, that we cannot
successfully reframe the conceptual metaphor Argument as War through a lens such as
Argument as Dance because it will no longer be recognized as argument at all. As I have
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demonstrated, basic writing programs are yoked to conceptual metaphors in problematic
ways, and our success rests in our ability to see the open spaces in the rhetoric targeting
basic writing programming and students in order to describe and address their needs.
This is to say, the success of basic writing programs may very well depend on the ability
of compositionists to liberate these programs (and students) from the pre-framed
conceptual metaphors that currently define them. Surely, as the primary link between
administrations and students, WPAs can revise how our basic writing programs are
labeled and discussed, and, consequently, can make room for basic writers to define
subject positions for themselves. Therefore, the remaining portion of this project is
dedicated to analyzing the departmental and institutional discourse associated with both
unsuccessful and successful basic writing programs.
Ayers, USM, and the Summer Developmental Program
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the most significant aspects of the new
admissions standards in regards to remedial programming stemming from Ayers v.
Fordice are the Summer Developmental Program (SDP) and required remedial courses
offered during the regular school year at each university.70 Based on the new admissions
guidelines, students who are not eligible for regular admission have the opportunity (or
are required, depending on your perspective) to participate in a spring placement process
using an academic screening program designed by the IHL Board. This screening
program, the Mississippi College Placement Exam, is used to determine whether a
student should be placed in the SDP or enrolled in the regular freshman curriculum with
or without academic support.
In brief, the SDP is an intensive, ten-week summer program in which students
receive skills-based instruction in reading, writing, and math. At the half-way point
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students are tested and have the opportunity to exit the program and gain admission to the
university if their scores are high enough, continue with the program of study, or receive
counseling regarding other educational opportunities such as vocational schooling and
community college options. Mississippi’s IHL mandates acceptable textbooks for the
course, leaving instructors with very little leeway in terms of pedagogy.
Students who exit the SDP successfully are required to take intermediate courses
in the subjects in which they are considered deficient as well as learning skills courses
mandated by the IHL. From a distance, programs such as the SDP might be deemed
encouraging. Often referred to as bridge courses, such programs appear to provide
underprepared students with access and support. The problem with bridge courses, such
as the SDP, is that they are completely separated from the academic units of the
university. On a surface level the SDP represents access and alternative routes to
admission for students. In reality, it is a means of garnering additional tuition and
funding through a program that is not officially linked to the academic learning outcomes
of any of the disciplines it is meant to “bridge.” Students who enroll in the SDP do
receive additional access and remediation, but they are also ghettoized. They are isolated
from the very academic endeavors they are attempting to reach. In addition, upon
successful completion of this program, students are still not accepted into the university.
They are placed in yet another tier of remediation that may or may not be associated with
academic units. This obvious separation of programs designed to ensure access and
success from academic departments (designed to uphold standards of education) sends a
strong message to students: We want you, but not really.
This message is even more clear, however, when one analyzes the institutional
discourse regarding the SDP. At USM, the SDP recently transitioned from the Division
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of Undergraduate Studies to the Student Success Center, a newly formed academic unit
within the Provost’s Office. This new university unit certainly has potential. It
encompasses programs dedicated to first-year students, programs designed to monitor
students’ mental, academic, and fiscal well-being, and programs dedicated to recruiting
first-generation college students interested in graduate school. By housing the unit within
the Office of the Provost and referring to it as an “academic unit,” university officials are
attempting to provide institutional recognition and respect to the associated programs.
However, the new website for the Student Success Center does not mention the SDP at
all. The academic home for the SDP, a unit that according to their website is “dedicated
to providing students in transition with the knowledge and skills on which to build a
successful university experience,” chooses not to advertise its association with this
program in any way (n. pag.). Given institutional politics, there is no way to determine
whether this means the program will slowly be dissolved as the Ayers mandate comes to
an end, or if the Student Success Center simply does not want to publicly address and
invite underprepared students to apply for the program. Indeed, since the transition,
finding information regarding the SDP involves a massive internet hunt that ends with the
Office of Admissions.
The following description of the SDP is listed on both the Mississippi IHL
website and the University of Southern Mississippi’s Admissions website:
The Summer Developmental Program is an intensive nine-week program
developed to prepare students for success during their first year of college
studies. The program concentrates on those high school subject areas
(writing, reading, mathematics) that are crucial to success in first-year
college curricula. To be eligible to enroll in the program, students must
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first go through an on-campus interview, which includes taking a
diagnostic test called the Accuplacer. Students who successfully complete
the Summer Developmental Program will be allowed to continue in the
fall term with mandatory participation in the Year-Long Academic
Support Program during their freshman year. Students who do not
successfully complete the Summer Developmental Program will be
counseled to explore other post-secondary opportunities, including those
offered by community colleges. (n. pag.)
There is nothing inherently wrong with this description. It is a brief summary of a
program designed to address complex needs. However, this description, with its
emphasis on standards-driven definitions of success, is not an invitation. It is not student
centered. It is not even grounded in academic discourse. It is a required cut and paste
explanation of a program that appears to be carefully placed so that it is not easily
discovered. The problem with this institutional decision is that the students of
Mississippi, specifically those at underperforming high schools, are handed brochures
from the IHL that advertise this program. They are told in high school that they have a
chance. They are provided with materials regarding the SDPs offered at each of the
state’s universities as well as information on financial aid for the summer programs. One
can only imagine how these students interpret the fact that their “chance” is only
highlighted in their home communities. The academic community they seek to enter
does not seem to embrace them—only to accept their tuition dollars and to mask their
discomfort with a changing institutional landscape by paying little attention to how they
might meet the needs of these students. Discussions of the permanence of this situation
(there have always been and there always will be students labeled by some as deficient)
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must take place, and this discussion must be framed in a manner that will allow for a
well-designed, pedagogically sound writing curriculum in which institutional players
reconsider the purpose of their university based on their specific student demographic.
This is to say, “We want you, but not really”—and the non-academic programs
associated with such programmatic ideologies—is not an acceptable platform for
education.
Arizona State University and the Stretch Program
At this point, I would like to highlight some programs that I believe are
successfully working towards redefining how they meet the needs of diverse student
populations by liberating themselves from the traditional rhetoric associated with basic
writing programming. Arizona State University’s Stretch Program is one of the most
well known models involving the piloting and implementation of a successful
reformulation of their basic writing program. ASU’s Stretch Program “stretches” ENG
101 over two semesters in order to provide enrolled students with additional time and a
real writing community. In a 2007 article in the Journal of Basic Writing, Greg Glau
argues—and the program’s quantitative research proves—that this stretch program helps
at-risk students become the best achievers in non-stretch classes and improves student
retention rates significantly.
Arizona State University implemented its first-year composition stretch program
in fall 1994. Basically, this model enables students who might be considered borderline
based on test scores and previous written work to experience first-year composition
“stretched over” two semesters and receive full academic credit for both semesters. The
first semester students receive a writing-intensive, elective credit and the second semester
they receive credit for English 101. Students are assigned the same readings and writing
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assignments as all students taking English 101, but they complete two additional writing
assignments. This allows these students the additional time necessary to fully
comprehend, analyze, and execute the academic conventions expected of them at the
collegiate level. In addition, students are able to establish a real academic and social
community because they have the same instructor and classmates throughout both
semesters. Instructors are afforded the opportunity and time needed to work with
students on a much more individual basis and to plan their classes based on the needs of
each individual group of students.
According to their most recent statistics, ASU students who enroll in the stretch
program pass both the English 101 component of the course and English 102 at a 4%
higher rate than “regular” English 101 students. In other words, the most at-risk students
not only succeed because of the stretch program, but after one year, they actually
outperform all of their counterparts. Perhaps more dramatically, ASU’s overall retention
data is extraordinary. Of the students who take the first component of the stretch
program, 61% more of the students register for the English 102 class than the students
who took the previously offered English 071 (a non-credit, remedial writing course).
This correlates to a retention rate of almost 400 students.
While I do not believe that all programs are replicable and appropriate for all
universities, ASU’s Stretch Program was the model that we followed in our attempts to
rethink basic writing programming at USM. One of the reasons we chose this model is
that in spite of our concerns regarding certain elements of the program, ASU employed a
consistent and effective rhetoric when discussing the program that could appeal to
administrators, teachers, and students. On their website, ASU claims, “We see our basic
writers as those who are capable of writing full, complete, and thoughtful papers, but who
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also might need more time for revision, group peer review, [and] conferences with their
instructors” (n. pag.). Immediately, readers are presented with a thoughtful and positive
description of the student population that ASU is attempting to reach. This is not empty
rhetoric about helping students “make successful transitions.”71 It describes the students
involved as capable and thoughtful, but argues that the issue being addressed is time. In
addition, ASU’s website describes the student demographic served by the Stretch
Program by acknowledging how the public defines these students:
The Stretch Program works with those students who record the lowest
standardized test scores, and nearly two in five come from groups
traditionally under-represented at the university . . . in other words, our
students are from groups who often are labeled "remedial" and "not up to
college-level work". . . yet Stretch helps them succeed better than
"regular" ENG 101 students. (n. pag.)
The decision to confront the standards-based discourse traditionally used to describe
underserved students is significant. ASU’s program administrators acknowledge the
labels already affecting these students and provide data regarding the success rates of the
program. They are cognizant of the fact that these students deserve accurate information
regarding their writing program and that the students themselves know they are labeled.
The goal, then, involves informing students that they understand their frustrations, that
they do not consider them to be less intelligent than their counterparts, and that they have
developed a program that research shows is effective in helping some students achieve
greater success.
The “stretch” model de-stigmatized what many students and faculty considered a
remedial course by giving students elective credit for completing the first semester; and
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by promoting the whole sequence as an alternative to English 101 and English 101
Honors, administrators at ASU found that perceptions of and overall satisfaction with all
of their composition courses improved significantly. According to their website, Stretch
is “not a remedial or ‘pre-101’ class; it's a stretched-out and expanded version of ENG
101 (just like we have an ‘honors’ version of ENG 101 . . . and summer ‘versions’ of
ENG 101)” (n. pag.). This rhetoric acknowledges the culturally engrained belief that nontraditional courses are automatically deemed remedial in nature. By positioning Stretch
101 as just another “version” of English, the WPAs at ASU are making a space for
students to define themselves. ASU is doing an extraordinary job of branding this
program and redefining for their institution, their community, and their students
programmatic goals for their collegiate writers.
Community College of Baltimore County and the Accelerated Learning Project
Another program currently making waves in basic writing circles is the
Accelerated Learning Project (ALP) at Community College of Baltimore County
(CCBC). According to CCBC’s website, ALP is a “form of mainstreaming developed at
the Community College Baltimore County. ALP attempts to combine the strongest
features of earlier mainstreaming approaches and, thereby, to raise the success rates and
lower the attrition rates for students placed in developmental writing” (n. pag.). Unlike
ASU’s Stretch Program, participation in ALP is completely voluntary. Students who
choose to enroll in the project are mainstreamed into specially-designated ENG 101
courses that are capped at twenty students. Twelve of those students are students who
placed into ENG 101, and eight slots are reserved for students who placed into the
remedial writing course. The course is conducted exactly like a traditional 101 course,
but the basic writing students also enroll in a companion course that meets immediately
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following the traditional 101 section. The companion course is taught by the same
instructor who teaches the 101 course, and it serves as a required supplement for students
enrolled in ALP during which students receive additional feedback, grammar instruction,
and additional workshopping opportunities. Students receive credit for the 101 course
but not for the companion course.
CCBC’s data shows that students who enrolled in the ALP scored between fifteen
and twenty percent higher than their counterparts who took ENG 101 after taking and
passing the remedial course, and pass rates are more than double for those taking the ALP
designated courses. The program also shows promising results in regards to retention,
and the faculty researchers argue that one of the reasons for this success is that students in
ALP are not required to spend so much time passing remedial writing courses before they
get to the course that counts for academic credit. They do not get worn down and
discouraged. Unlike ASU’s program, ALP cannot show that students who enroll in the
program also score higher in ENG 102. In fact, the pass rates for the second course in the
sequence are the same for students who enrolled in ALP and the pre-writing course.
Interestingly, ALP researchers suggest that stronger writing is not necessarily the goal in
this situation, but that the goal is to produce students who write well enough to pass.
This is not a stance I personally favor, but I am more than willing to accept the idea that
CCBC’s research regarding the academic and vocational goals of their student population
leads them to believe this is a practical and theoretically sound outcome.
Another appealing aspect of the ALP is the way in which the department has
chosen to brand their program. Their website provides a history of the program and
provides a narrative describing the problems their students faced. In an interesting, if
overly brief, account of the origins of the program, the website states the following:
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In the 1960s and 70s, colleges and universities throughout America
adopted "open admissions" policies. In many universities and most
community colleges, anyone who wanted to go to college could. And
shortly thereafter, as institutions began to develop or expand
developmental education programs, an odd thing occurred. Developmental
education was supported by many people, but for very different reasons.
Those on the left saw developmental education as a path to success.
Developmental courses would help underprepared students gain the skills
they needed to succeed in college. Some people worried about open
admissions. They worried that institutions would lower their standards
because the influx of open admissions students wouldn't be able to
measure up to the rigors of college-level courses. These folks were
enthusiastic about developmental education because they saw it as a gate
to keep students who couldn't do college-level work out of college-level
courses. At the Community College Baltimore County we worried about
our developmental program. Was it serving as a pathway to college
success or as a gate to "chill students out" so they would give up?
(emphasis mine n. pag.)
This description of the ALP is posted on the site addressed to community members
interested in learning about the program. The programmatic decision to address the
polarized beliefs regarding basic writing programming in non-academic jargon that
utilizes the conceptual metaphors already framing basic writing is effective. The decision
of CCBC’s program administrators to acknowledge the standards-based rhetoric of most
remedial programming, perhaps as a means of shocking students into action, strikes me
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as a strategic rhetorical move. This public description of the ALP intentionally addresses
legal, institutional, communal, and student-held beliefs regarding remedial programming.
In the same way that ASU employs rhetoric intended to allow students to define
themselves in relation to various versions of writing courses, CCBC’s rhetoric allows
students to glimpse their positions in a historic, institutional narrative of education.
The reason, in my opinion, that both ASU’s Stretch Program and CCBC’s
Accelerated Learning Project have achieved successful results with their student
populations is because the faculty involved in designing the two programs considered 1)
the missions of their institutions; 2) their local population of student writers; and 3) the
rhetoric they used to market the programs to administrators responsible for funding such
initiatives, faculty who might be interested in rethinking how they teach first-year
students, the local community, and students potentially interested in such academic
endeavors. I am not suggesting that the faculty members who designed these programs
were consciously aware of the conceptual metaphors that frame basic writing programs
and the consequent labels for basic writers. Rather, I think they recognized the desperate
need for student-centered language that would allow all constituents to re-envision the
basic writing enterprise at their respective institutions in a manner that would provide the
students involved with the respect that any student pursuing higher education deserves.
They deserve to be taken seriously, and they deserve educational efforts that do not
constantly remind them of their supposed inadequacies. I believe that these efforts have
the potential to be even more successful if compositionists are aware of the conceptual
metaphors they are engaging and combating as they design their basic writing programs.
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The University of Southern Mississippi and Composition I-Expanded
I mentioned in Chapter II that our desire to rethink our basic writing program was
the catalyst for this research project examining Ayers v. Fordice. We began piloting
Composition I-Expanded, based on ASU’s Stretch Program, in Fall 2009. When we
proposed and began piloting Expanded, I had just begun my inquiries into the Ayers case
and its impacts on basic writing at my institution. We designed and proposed our new
program based on concerns regarding our student data and a desire to try something
new.72 At this point, our plans involved research and what I guess is best termed
“pedagogical instinct.” It was not until a year after we began piloting the program that
my readings of the judicial opinions from the Ayers case led to my recognition of the
conceptual metaphors at play in these documents. These discoveries, if you will, have
led me to both applaud and critique the current design of our pilot program as well as the
literature we have devised to portray the program. In this section, I would like to share
specific thoughts regarding how faculty at my institution can continue to improve on our
current efforts to rethink our basic writing program. Because the SDP is not associated
with our department, I will concentrate on the remedial courses for which, as the Director
of Composition, I am responsible.
First, I would like to point out the rhetorical moves I continue to believe are
especially successful. I collaborated with two colleagues to design a brochure to present
to students and parents at the University Preview sessions for incoming first-year
students.73 Our goal for this brochure was to brand the program as a six-credit, twosemester writing course that was “expanded” in every sense of the word. We wanted a
student-friendly brochure that presented this program as an opportunity and an alternative
as opposed to a punishment, or even a requirement. We wanted to ensure that all
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literature relevant to the program clearly marked it as non-remedial. The two major tag
lines for the brochure are “We want you to experience everything Southern Miss has to
offer” and “Comp I-Expanded: More of what you are looking for.” We highlighted the
benefits of the program in the form of questions: “Are you interested in joining a genuine
writing community? Having a deeper, more meaningful experience in reading and
writing?”74 We wrote a letter to the parents of first-year students whose composite ACT
scores placed them in our target population. We prepared letters for students enrolled in
traditional ENG 101 who might be better served by the Expanded program based on
assessment of an informal writing diagnostic performed the first day of class in all of our
first-year writing courses. To be honest, we felt extremely confident about how students
would respond to our program. We were going to make additional writing instruction
cool.
We were wrong. It turns out that additional writing instruction is never cool. Our
attempts to rethink the program, to “market” it effectively, and to offer genuine and sage
advice regarding first-year writing was interpreted as false advertising for what was
simply another take on remedial writing. I presented our first-year writing options at
preview sessions all summer long for two summers. This presentation included
descriptions of ENG 099, ENG 101, 101 Expanded, and Honors 101, and we
inadvertently tested out self-directed placement in these efforts. At each session, I
thought I modeled the cool English professor (if there is such a thing) as I explained the
significant differences between writing in high school and writing in college in a jocular
manner. I described the various course offerings but spent the majority of the session
explaining the benefits of the Expanded program. At each Preview, I was asked at least
once “So, is this just dummy English?” My immediate response to this ever-present
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question was firm denial. I now realize that my attempts to reframe the discourse of
basic writing were unsuccessful in recruiting students because they were not framed in
ways that acknowledged students’ preconceived notions regarding writing instruction.
These students are bombarded with conceptual metaphors that have predetermined how
they view basic writing courses no matter how they are packaged and presented to them.
While scholars and administrators have the luxury of viewing basic writing programming
from two very different cultural and political perspectives, first-generation college
students, minority students, and underprepared students of all ethnicities do not see the
“access” perspective of our rhetorical strategies. They see only separate, different, and
unequal. They see ghettoization. In order to provide students with the opportunity to
define themselves in academe, those of us responsible for generating the institutional
literature targeting these students must provide students with an invitation to academe
that is meaningful, supportive, and does not patronize students, AND we must
acknowledge the culturally entrenched beliefs these students have about remedial
education. If students are to define themselves, they must know that we understand how
our culture has defined them and that we believe their self-definitions hold more weight.
Knowing this, my own goals and my recommendations to my colleagues involve
not only adhering to my earlier advice regarding the significance of institutional
missions, student populations, and institutional discourse, but also an overt attempt to
rethink how we might provide needed services to basic writers at our institutions without
ghettoizing them from their peers. The Expanded Program, based on ASU’s award
winning Stretch Program, is a good start for our institution. Students who enroll in this
program are taught composition from the same premise as the traditional 101 students.
They have the same learning outcomes, they use the same textbook, and they receive
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academic credit for the entire sequence. My experiences with Preview students and the
relatively low number of students who have chosen voluntarily to enroll in our pilot
project, however, suggest additional modifications are necessary. Nonetheless, at this
point, I would like to highlight some of our successes.
I would argue that the most effective aspect of our program involves our
collaboration with the University’s Writing Center. Using student-paid composition fees,
we pay graduate writing tutors to work specifically with our Expanded students. The first
semester we offered the course, we held “Writing Center Events” specifically for
Expanded students. A Writing Center liaison attended each section of Expanded to
explain our goals for the sessions that were strategically scheduled between students’
sketches and first drafts, and students would sign up for twenty-minute individual
tutoring sessions with tutors who had been trained specifically regarding the assignment
at hand and the instructors’ desired outcomes. We were excited about the possibility of
these extra events, and we marketed them as part of the Expanded package—“More of
what you’re looking for.”75 We had a sixty percent no-show rate.
These events turned the corner, however, when we decided the no-shows simply
made the events unproductive for students and financially draining for the Department.
We decided to try again, but this time we worked with the Writing Center to design inclass tutor-led workshops. Students were put into groups, and one student from each
group volunteered to submit his or her essay to the group and the Writing Center tutor
assigned to the group prior to the event that was to be held during regular class hours.
We were amazed at the effectiveness of these workshops and students’ positive
responses. Each group finally had the opportunity to experience a productive workshop
that modeled how to effectively respond to a peer’s writing. The second year of the pilot,
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we decided that all Writing Center events would involve small group workshops but that
we would vary the types of workshops with each event. Thus far, we have been
extremely pleased with the results, and student surveys suggest that students understand
just how much these sessions have benefitted their understanding of their revision
processes. Our successes with these events suggest the need for guided, small group
events for students who come to us with little practice in revisions processes—
collaborative or otherwise. They also suggest that students desire additional insight
regarding their writing, but they do not want it in the form of assistance that might be
labeled as required tutoring. They want their experiences to be similar to their peers in
every way possible. If they go to the Writing Center outside of class time, they want it to
be their choice.
Another successful component of the Expanded Program is one of the additional
writing assignments we require of the students. In our current first-year sequence,
students in traditional ENG 101 write four essays and complete a final portfolio.76 In
Comp I-Expanded, students write three essays in the first semester, three essays in the
second semester, and both semesters include a portfolio submission. One of these
“additional” essays is a critical reflection essay regarding education. Students are
required to read numerous texts addressing issues in education and formulate an
argument about education that synthesizes the arguments of two of their readings.77 This
assignment, in part due to excerpted readings such as Jean Anyon’s “The Hidden
Curriculum of Work” and Mike Rose’s “I Just Wanna Be Average,” pushes students to
consider their own educational experiences. Students’ responses to this assignment are
often dramatic as they realize that their perceptions of themselves as students and their
own histories of education are products of a historically, politically, and culturally fraught
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America. Obviously not every student had an epiphany regarding the role of education in
his or her life, but the students who had these moments of insight cited this assignment as
particularly beneficial to them in their understandings of the role writing will play in their
college educations. My colleague and I designed this assignment prior to my grappling
with the conceptual metaphors inherent in the texts that address these students. I am
interested in rethinking this assignment as a rhetorical analysis that pushes students to
analyze specifically how both institutions of education and students are labeled in various
kinds of texts. Such an assignment has the potential to reveal to students the significant
role discourse plays in labeling various “types” of students.
We are still in the midst of collecting data to determine what needs to be done in
regards to the Expanded program. I am confident, however, that whether we fully
implement the program or sideline it due to political and financial issues, my role as
WPA will allow me to reproduce the most effective aspects of the program in productive
ways for our student population. This project has provided me with a level of insight that
makes my job both more manageable and far more complicated. I am fascinated by the
ways in which analysis of legal discourse and conceptual metaphor theory can benefit
composition theories and pedagogies, and I am committed to rethinking my program and
my own classroom in response to what I have learned. I find Kelly Ritter’s call to action
mentioned in the first chapter of my project especially engaging as I attempt to meet the
needs of my constituents. I agree with Ritter in her suggestion that
we can work toward a better, more historically informed schemata for
first-year writing programs, one that is cognizant of the role that local
values play in shaping definitions of literacy, and that employs these
values to wisely, equitably, and openly provide resources and instruction,
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rather than disincentives or sanctions, for underprepared student writers.
(14)
Students in southern Mississippi, like students all over the country, come to our
university with certain educational, political, and cultural values that must be embraced in
our attempts to provide valuable composition courses. In order to incorporate our
students’ understandings of academic literacy into the curriculum of our composition
courses, we must be willing to rethink our basic writing sequences, the legal and
institutional politics that determine how these programs operate, and the discourse used
to describe these courses so that students have the opportunity to critically reflect on their
individual positions in academe. We must liberate our programs from ingrained
conceptual metaphors that ultimately prescribe a standards-based model of education that
silences students who are fully capable of defining themselves.
I would like to end this project by quoting a portion of Franz Kafka’s parable,
“Before the Law”:
BEFORE THE LAW stands a doorkeeper on guard. To this doorkeeper
there comes a man from the country and prays for admittance to the Law.
But the doorkeeper says that he cannot grant admittance at the moment.
The man thinks it over and then asks if he will be allowed in later. "It is
possible," says the doorkeeper, "but not at the moment." Since the gate
stands open, as usual, and the doorkeeper steps to one side, the man stoops
to peer through the gateway into the interior. Observing that, the
doorkeeper laughs and says: "If you are so drawn to it, just try to go in
despite my veto. But take note: I am powerful. And I am only the least of
the doorkeepers. From hall to hall there is one doorkeeper after another,
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each more powerful than the last. The third doorkeeper is already so
terrible that even I cannot bear to look at him." These are difficulties the
man from the country has not expected; the Law, he thinks, should surely
be accessible at all times and to everyone, but as he now takes a closer
look at the doorkeeper in his fur coat, with his big sharp nose and long,
thin, black Tartar beard, he decides that it is better to wait until he gets
permission to enter. (n. pag.)78
Of course, the man from the country in Kafka’s parable spends the rest of his life outside
the first gateway to the Law. He never achieves his aspirations of reaching the Law, as
he chooses to accept the first gatekeeper’s interpretation of the difficulties of the journey
and his unpreparedness for such pursuits. As the man is dying he asks why no one else
has come to beg admittance to the Law in all of the years he has waited, and the
gatekeeper informs him that this first entry to the law was designed only for the man and
reminds him that it was his choice not to continue on his journey. Kafka’s depiction of
individuals’ willingness to accept others’ interpretations of the law and their fears of
pursuing information regarding their individual rights is alarmingly accurate, and it is
indicative of Peter Goodrich’s description of how the obedient subject responds to the
law. Unfortunately, the man in Kafka’s parable—the curious but obedient subject—is
also the picture of our basic writing students. They are standing at the doors of higher
education and being denied entrance by numerous gatekeepers—legal discourse being the
first, but certainly not the last. When they choose not to continue their journeys, they are
“indifferently” dismissed as unprepared for their educational pursuits, and, at the same
time, as ignorantly obedient when they are willing to accept the “doorkeeper’s” account
of inaccessibility. Discussions regarding basic writing programming have had their
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perimeters set by numerous gatekeepers—judges, university officials, and public citizens.
It is my contention that by paying attention to legal and public discourse regarding basic
writing programming, we have the opportunity to reframe a discussion that up until now
has been defined by professionals who are not compositionists. Basic writing programs
are yoked to standards-based discourse in problematic ways, and our success rests in our
ability to see the open spaces in the rhetoric surrounding basic writing students and the
programs that serve them in order to describe and address students’ needs. Surely, our
field can revise how our basic writing programs are labeled and, consequently, make
room for a subject position that basic writers can define for themselves without having to
wait for permission to “break out of the ghetto” and enter the gates of academe.
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APPENDIX A
COMPOSITION I-EXPANDED PROPOSAL
OVERVIEW
As part of our mission to offer first-year composition courses that address individual
needs and provide the most opportunity for success and retention, the Department of
English at The University of Southern Mississippi is interested in piloting an expanded
version of Composition I (English 101). Based on Arizona State University’s very
successful Stretch Program, we would target students who enter our university with a
composite ACT score between 17 and 19. These students will register for Composition IE (ENG 100) prior to taking a slightly modified version of traditional 101, allowing us to
“expand” the traditional 101 class over two semesters, providing credit for both
semesters.
THE PROBLEM
In order to help address student retention issues, the English Department has been
working for over a year to identify risk factors for students enrolled in our composition
courses. We have determined that one critical group is students with English ACT scores
of 17-19.
Each fall semester approximately 1,000 students from across the disciplines enroll in
English 101. According to USM’s Institutional Research data from 2002-2007, 30% of
these students scored between a 16 and 19 on the English portion of their ACT exam.1
In compliance with IHL regulations, we currently require English 099 for students with
an ACT index of 16 or below who might not be prepared for college-level writing.
However, students with an ACT score between 17 and 19 are not well served by English
099, failing at a rate of 21%. But these same students fail at a disproportionately higher
rate (13%) than their counterparts when they enroll in 101. Even more disturbing, of
these students who take and pass English 099, 60% do not pass English 101 and 102
within 4 semesters. Further, of these students who pass English 101 (and did not take
099), some 35% do not pass English 102 within two semesters.2
These statistics clearly suggest that for students with an ACT index of 17-19, there is a
gap between the English 099 and 101 curricula. When these students enroll in 099, they
fail at a higher rate than students who are required to take that course. When these
students enroll in 101, they fail at a higher rate than their counterparts with ACT scores
of 20 and above. When these students successfully take and pass either 099 or 101, or
both, they continue to have extremely low matriculation rates.

1

The ACT scores of students enrolling in ENG 101 at USM from 2002 to 2007 are broken down as
follows: 59.61% received a 20 or above, 9.45% earned a 19, 7.26% an 18, 6.33% a 17, 10.19% a 16, and
7.13% are categorized as unknown.
2
The data regarding 099 students includes Fall 2002 to Spring 2005; data for 101 students includes Fall
2002 to Spring 2006.
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While more difficult to measure, we believe that because these students seem ill-served
by the way these courses are currently structured, their enrollment adversely affects the
learning of the other students enrolled in both 099 and 101.
THE SOLUTION
It is our contention that a program such as the English 101 Stretch Program offered at
ASU would benefit these students academically, and benefit the University socially and
financially via improved rates of student retention and satisfaction. Indeed, ASU faculty
members argue—and their statistics prove—that this stretch program helps at-risk
students become the best achievers in non-stretch classes, and improves student retention
rates significantly.
Arizona State University implemented its first-year composition stretch program in fall
1994. Basically, this model enables students who might be considered borderline based
on test scores and previous written work to experience first-year composition “stretched
over” two semesters and receive full academic credit for both semesters. The first
semester students receive a writing-intensive, elective credit and the second semester they
receive credit for English 101. Students are assigned the same readings and writing
assignments as all students taking English 101, but they complete two additional writing
assignments. This allows these students the additional time necessary to fully
comprehend, analyze, and execute the academic conventions expected of them at the
collegiate level. In addition, students are able to establish a real academic and social
community because they have the same instructor and classmates throughout both
semesters. Instructors are afforded the opportunity and time needed to work with
students on a much more individual basis, and plan their classes based on the needs of
each individual group of students.
Finally, the “stretch” model de-stigmatized what many students and faculty considered a
remedial course—by giving students elective credit for completing the first semester; and
by promoting the whole sequence as an alternative to English 101 and English 101
Honors, administrators at ASU found that perceptions of and overall satisfaction with all
of their composition courses improved significantly.
According to their most recent statistics, ASU students who elect to take the stretch
program pass both the English 101 component of the course and English 102 at a 4%
higher rate than “regular” English 101 students. In other words, the most at-risk students
not only succeed because of the stretch program, but after one year, they actually
outperform all of their counterparts.
Perhaps more dramatically, ASU’s overall retention data is extraordinary. Of the
students who take the first component of the stretch program, 61% more of the students
register for the English 102 class than the students who took the previously offered
English 071 (similar to USM’s 099). This correlates to a retention rate of almost 400
students. If USM saw an increase in retention even similar to that of ASU ( say 40% of
the students who completed our stretch program registered for and passed English 102),
the university would retain an average of over 200 additional students per year. The
financial and educational implications of this retention are considerable.
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FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR USM
It is extremely difficult assessing the amount of money involved in student retention.
The most obvious financial benefit to retaining students involves students as tuitionpaying consumers. However, we must also consider the amount of money the University
invests in each individual student, money that cannot be recouped if the student drops
out. Individual student recruitment costs and instructional costs are lost, as well as costs
associated with losing a member of the university community and its ramifications for
other students, general student morale, and the wider community.
In November 2005, Noel-Levitz conducted a national research study on the cost of
recruiting students at two-year and four-year institutions of higher learning in the U.S.
With a total of 163 institutions responding, Noel-Levitz found that based on specific
components of recruitment and admission budgets, the average four-year, public
university spends $455 per student on recruitment. As a conservative measure, if USM
spends $300 per student on recruitment, retention of the 200 previously mentioned
students would result in a “savings” of $60,000 a year.
According to data collected via IPEDS, and reported on College Results Online, USM
spends $7,205 per student, per year on instruction, academic support, and student
services. The formula used to calculate this amount was developed by the National
Center for Higher Education Management Systems. If we are able to retain 200 of the
students we are losing through the cracks of our current remedial writing program, we are
ensuring that almost $1.5 million does not go to waste annually, but instead achieves the
goal of our investment—USM graduates and alumni.
Finally, we need to look at financial numbers that involve actual monies coming into the
University. Currently, full-time, in-state tuition is $2,548 per semester. Excluding
summer sessions and mini-sessions, this means Mississippi students pay $5,096 per year
in tuition cost. If we retain 200 students, USM will see over an additional $1 million in
incoming tuition per year.
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY
We hope to pilot six sections of “Expanded Composition I” beginning in Fall 2009 in
order to assess the viability and impact of a Stretch Program similar to ASU’s at USM.
To implement this program, we request that USM’s Academic Council approve a change
in course name and numbering for what is currently English 100; and then approve a new
course, “Composition I Expanded.” This course will provide three elective credit hours.
Upon completion of this course, students will enroll in specially designed sections of
ENG 101 in the spring semester.
Re-sequencing
Currently, English 100—a grammar course taught entirely online and that does not
require any papers—is mistitled “Basic Composition.” Independent of this proposal, the
primary instructor of this course has long advocated that the English Department change
the title of this course to “Basic Grammar,” and renumber it English 110, to avoid
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confusion by students who mistakenly believe the course to be part of the composition
sequence. Doing so would then allow us to create a new course, English 100,
“Composition I - E.” As previously noted, this course will be only offered in the fall, and
will be linked to specially designated sections of ENG 101 in the spring, forming the twosemester sequence that will collectively be known as English 101 Expanded.
Enrollment/Registration
For the purposes of the pilot program we are considering two options regarding student
registration. The first option would involve working with specific academic advisors to
help ensure placement of the targeted student population. (For example, advisors in the
athletic program have already expressed interest in having their students participate in the
program.) The second option would rely on a directed self-placement model similar to
those used nationally, in which the Director of Composition and other representatives of
the English Department would participate more actively in the University’s Preview,
providing students detailed information regarding the differences between all our courses,
as well as administer a short self-assessment aimed at guiding students to select courses
based on their previous writing experiences. Students would also receive flyers in their
Preview packets, and the department’s website would provide additional descriptions of
our courses aimed at helping students determine the class that will be most appropriate
for them.
Additionally, all first-year composition courses now require an in-class writing activity at
the beginning of each semester, which instructors use to make recommendations to
students they feel might benefit by enrolling in 099. We will now tailor this process to
target students who would benefit from English 101 Expanded. We feel this method will
have a high degree of success, particularly as students who elect to switch from 101 to
101 Expanded will earn elective credit.
In any event, we will make our decisions regarding how best to enroll students in the
pilot sections after further consultation with representatives from College Councils, First
Year Experience, General Education, Admissions, and the Registrar’s Office.
Course Requirements
Students who enroll in ENG 100 will write three major papers; they will then write three
papers in the 101 section of the program for a total of 8,000 words of finished, edited
prose (the traditional 101 course requires four papers). As with traditional 101, the
course will utilize a portfolio assessment approach, requiring students to revise essays
from both semesters for submission at the end of the spring semester. The program will
use the same textbooks and writing assignments as the “regular” English 101 course;
students will simply complete two additional assignments aimed at extending their
writing and critical thinking skills.
Grading
Upon completion of the first semester of ENG 100, students will receive a traditional
letter grade. However, because we want to place emphasis on continuity between the two
semesters, students will conference with instructors at the beginning of the spring
semester to discuss their grades from the fall semester and the role their previous essays
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will play in the 101 section of the course. In addition, the students’ final portfolios will
include revisions of their work from both semesters.
Class Continuity
As with ASU’s Stretch Program, whenever possible, the students will have the same
teacher for the first and section sections of the program, allowing them to have continuity
and chemistry with their classmates and instructor. In order to achieve this goal as
seamlessly as possible, we are working with the Registrar’s Office to implement block
scheduling for students who enroll in ENG 100 as well as special section coding for the
101 sections of the course. In addition, one tactic for making this transition as easy as
possible will be to schedule the spring semester class for the exact same class periods as
the fall semester. While we do not expect this to be problem free, the English
Department is willing to take care of this internal coordination.
Programmatic Assessment
In order to assess the impact of this program, we will assess student and instructor
satisfaction, learning outcomes, and retention data. We will devise instructor and student
surveys to be completed at the close of both the fall and spring semesters in order to
assess satisfaction. All students enrolled in each section of English 100/101 will submit
their final writing portfolios and reflection journals to their instructors for final grading
and assessment. Students in each course will receive information regarding
programmatic use of their writing in the course syllabus. The protocol is already in place
as the composition program randomly assigns codes to student portfolios from the
101/102 courses for purposes of programmatic assessment. The syllabus notation will be
as follows:
Note: For program assessment purposes, some final portfolios may be randomly
selected for institutional review at the conclusion of the semester. In such cases,
portfolios will be collected anonymously from among all available sections of English
101-E. This review is intended solely to improve the quality of the curriculum, and
will not affect your grade in any way.
We will also work with the Registrar’s Office and Institutional Research to track the
students who enroll in the course for purposes of gauging retention data.
CONCLUSIONS
According to the Educational Policy Institute (an organization founded in 2002 and
dedicated to researching educational opportunity), academic preparedness—specifically
in reading and writing—is a primary factor in student retention. It is our contention that
the Composition I Expanded program will address these aspects of academic
preparedness in the most influential way possible—by providing underprepared students
entrance into a writing community that will encourage their growth and success in
academia.
If our success is anything like what we anticipate, our hope is to fully implement this
program on a wide scale in the 2010-11 academic year. When students elect to attend
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Southern Miss, they will find that we offer them every chance of being successful
through a variety of composition offerings: Introduction to Composition (ENG 099),
Composition I (ENG 101), Composition I-Expanded (ENG 100/101), and Honors
Composition (ENG 101-H). Our students are our priority and they deserve the best
possible chance at success.
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APPENDIX B
COMPOSITION I-EXPANDED REPORT
The University of Southern Mississippi
Department of English
Composition I-Expanded Report
Introduction
In Fall 2009, The Department of English piloted six sections of the newly designed Comp
I-Expanded Program targeting proven at-risk students who received an ACT English
score below 20. The course design requires students to take ENG 100E: Composition IExpanded and a corresponding section of ENG 101: Introduction to Composition. The
design of Comp I-Expanded involves teaching the same four assignments employed in
the traditional 101 class, plus two additional assignments. The success of the course
centers on three major premises: 1) that this particular student population needs
additional time and attention in the composition classroom in order to begin to analyze
and understand the academic conventions necessary in college writing; 2) that an
extended course with the same instructor and peers will provide these students with an
academic and social community that is imperative for retention; and 3) the Expanded
model provides students with a credit-bearing course that does not carry the negative
stigma students tend to associate with the ENG 099 coursework.
The original proposal for the Expanded program concentrated on the retention benefits
and consequent cost-effectiveness of this program. After one year, we obviously cannot
prove that our efforts have been successful in regards to retention. In order to collect this
data in the future, the Registrar’s Office designed a “student group” for the Expanded
program. Office staff entered each student enrolled in ENG 100E into the student group,
and we will be able to track these students for the rest of their USM careers. In addition,
any student who withdrew from the first semester of the course was marked as “inactive”
so that we can follow these students as well.
Instead, this report will examine the results of the writing assessment procedures,
students’ assessments of the course design, challenges, and recommendations. This early
research suggests that students clearly benefit from linked classes that provide them with
continuity, community, and additional resources.
Writing Assessment
In March 2010, the department performed the assessment measures necessary to compare
the written work produced by Expanded students with written work produced by students
enrolled in traditional 101. The assessment involved rating randomly selected portfolios
from all sections of Comp I-Expanded and a corresponding number of randomly selected
portfolios from traditional 101 courses. This protocol was already in place as the
composition program randomly assigns codes to student portfolios from the 101/102
courses for purposes of programmatic assessment.
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In order to ensure comparability of student writing, all Expanded students were required
to submit their fall portfolios with a self-assessment essay and a revised version of their
second project—a review essay. Portfolios from the traditional 101 class were collected
for departmental assessment and portfolios that included this same project were pulled for
use in this assessment. This means reviewers were rating the same assignment.
Reviewers were asked to rate students on a scale of 1 to 5 in regards to four different
prompts with 5 representing “strongly agree” and 1 representing “strongly disagree.”
Reviewers were asked to rate any question they did not feel could be answered with a
rating of 0. Two reviewers responded to each portfolio, and a third accessor reviewed
any portfolio in which there was a significant difference between the original two
reviewers’ scores. These scores were then averaged.
The first two prompts were the GEC assessment questions, and the second two questions
were based on the learning outcomes established by the composition program regarding
the review assignment. The questions are listed below:
1.

The portfolio demonstrates that the student is able to focus on a purpose and
present ideas in an organized, logical, and coherent form consistent with that
purpose.
2. The portfolio demonstrates that the student can observe conventions of Standard
English grammar, punctuation, spelling, and usage.
3. The portfolio demonstrates that the student understands that successful evaluation
depends on making claims and supporting them with evidence.
4. The portfolio demonstrates that the student understands the need to establish
criteria appropriate to the situation and audience in order to perform successful
evaluative writing.
The results of this assessment are extremely positive in regards to the quality of student
writing represented by the Expanded students. The Expanded students actually
outscored the traditional 101 students in three of the four categories. In fact, the
only category in which traditional 101 students were awarded higher scores was the
question regarding Standard Edited English. This isn’t surprising given that the
Expanded students as a group have significantly lower scores on standardized testing. It
should be pointed out, however, that ratings of the traditional 101 writings were higher
than the Expanded in this category by only two-tenths of a point.
It is also important to point out that due to the design of the Expanded curriculum these
students have the opportunity to revise their essays yet another time before submitting
their final portfolios at the end of the spring semester. Therefore, it is likely that portfolio
ratings regarding the Expanded demographic will be even higher at year’s end.
Student Assessments
Students have evaluated the program through three different channels at this point: Final
Self-Assessment Essays, Fall Teacher Evaluations, and an anonymous electronic survey
proctored in February 2010. Student responses from each of these are overwhelmingly
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positive. In the survey conducted of all six sections this spring, 84.5% of students
reported being “very satisfied” or “extremely satisfied” with the course.
One of our primary goals for this program was to create a community for a demographic
of students that according to the 2008 IHL Report on Student Retention report their
primary reason for dropping out of college is a lack of community. In this survey, 84.5%
of students reported that the Expanded Composition program has provided them with an
“incredibly supportive” or “very strong” sense of community.
Overall, student responses are extremely positive regarding the course design and
implementation. These students are statistically the most at-risk students at the
University and their feedback is imperative in ensuring future success of the program and
the students who choose to enroll in it. A few examples of Expanded students’ responses
to the program are below:
“I signed up for this class because of the initial desire to become a better writer. I wanted
more out of the education I was receiving and I wanted to expand my capabilities as a
writer…I believe it is safe to say that I have evolved in my writing as far as my
confidence in my meanings, my focus on initial points, and how to execute it. When I
come back in the spring I want to excel even farther.” –CY
“Writing has never been a strong point in my academics. I have barely gotten by in
writing papers. I have slowly progressed through the years and that is why I chose to
take this class. I knew that I needed help in writing and I knew that I would not lose
anything by taking this class. I use to hate letting others read my papers and now I see
the importance in it. I can only learn from my previous papers and this class has helped
me in understanding the way to write a good paper and how instructors grade the papers I
write.” –BL
“I am a more confident writer now than I ever was before. My idea of format has
changed, now I take in consideration the criteria I am using and the type of essay I am
writing. I will not use the same format for my personal essay as I do for an academic
essay. My ability to recognize mistakes in my own writing and thinking through my
assignments has given me confidence.”—BR
“Since I’ve entered Composition I-Expanded it’s been the best decision I’ve made in
college. The class slows down to just the right speed to get the full grasp of the subject at
hand to flesh out the full potential of my papers. Comp’s classroom is the perfect place
for freshman like me that have moved to Hattiesburg from out of state without any of my
major friends, and have comfortable environment with people you know to get feedback
on your paper to make it better.”—JY

Challenges
As with any pilot project, there are challenges that need to be addressed regarding the
program. The first involves enrollment. We scheduled six sections of Expanded and
purposely left slots available for undeclared majors. There was some miscommunication
with advisors so these slots were not filled. The department chose to allow all six
sections to continue, but the smaller class size may have actually been problematic as
opposed to beneficial in some of the sections.

148

The Preview presentations were extremely successful. In fact, these presentations
allowed us, somewhat by accident, to pilot student-directed placement as students were
given information regarding all first-year writing classes as well as concepts they needed
to consider in making their choices for enrollment. It also allowed the Department the
opportunity to impress upon incoming students the importance of writing in their college
careers. In the future, however, it would be helpful to flag the folders of students we are
targeting so that advisors can suggest to students that, at least based on ACT scores, this
may be a program they should consider.
Debbie Hill ensured that these students could be followed and block scheduled into the
spring section of their class. However, this required manual entry on her part. And while
this may be doable with six sections, if we were to offer additional sections I think this
would become problematic.
Finally, I would like to see the instructors receive additional training regarding the
student demographic of these classes and how to most effectively incorporate grammar in
context with writing as process instruction. Our TAs did fantastic jobs with these classes,
but additional information regarding issues they may encounter in the classroom would
certainly be helpful.
Recommendations
This program has the potential to make a significant difference in the educations of many
of USM’s students. As mentioned in the original proposal regarding this program,
according to USM’s Institutional Research data from 2002-2007, 30% of these students
scored between a 16 and 19 on the English portion of their ACT exam The preliminary
data from this program suggests that students are being well served by the Expanded
program. It has the potential to create stronger writers and retain a demographic of
students that has extremely low matriculation rates.
The Department of English is confident that this program will be successful. However,
due to administrative turnover and the current financial crisis, the department will not be
scheduling Expanded sections for Fall 2010. We are requesting that Academic Council
allow the department to place this program on temporary hiatus until a new Director of
Composition is hired. When the Department is able to commit the resources and staff
necessary for this program, they will contact Academic Council in advance and provide
any necessary information at that time.
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COMPOSITION I-EXPANDED BROCHURE	
  

150
APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ARGUMENT ASSIGNMENT
Project Three: Critical Argument Essay
Throughout your work this semester, you have been asked to consider similarities and
differences in the way people perceive things, to open yourself up to new and sometimes
startling ways of thinking and feeling about various topics, and to use writing as a means
of connecting with yourself and with others. This third project builds on these earlier
efforts by asking you to critically read and analyze a series of texts written by different
people on the topic of Education, and to respond to these diverse views in an essay that
tries to say something important. People often call this process of creating something new
by weaving together ideas and beliefs from different sources synthesis, and in a very real
sense, this project asks you to do exactly this: to construct an argument about some aspect
of American education that you find interesting, troubling, or problematic in some way,
using other texts and your own experience as support for your claims.
Getting Started: As Ballenger astutely points out, “writing is a means of thinking and
learning, so when your writing comes into contact with the writing of others, the
conversation illuminates them both.” So to begin this project, you will want to carefully
read, analyze, evaluate and reflect on the different articles on education provided in the
course readings. That is, practicing many of the critical reading strategies discussed in
Chapter 2, “Reading Rhetorically,” your first step will be to figure out not only what each
writer is trying to say about education, but how they go about doing so, and why. And
just as writing your Review Essay for Project Two may have required you to temporarily
suspend your own opinions about the thing you were writing about in order to discover
standards that were appropriate for your audience and context, to do this project well, you
may also need to step back from your own feelings about education in order to
understand each writer’s perspective and reasons for approaching the topic in the ways
that he or she does.
This is not to say that your feelings and thoughts about what you read are not important!
On the contrary, whatever argument you end up making will certainly be motivated by
what you want to say about education, rooted in your own experiences. But your paper
must also be informed by what other people have thought, felt, and written about the
topic—which means you’ll need to spend some time trying to figure out what these other
people are really saying. Or as Ballenger writes in Chapter 8, “The best argument essays
make a clear claim, but they do so by bowing respectfully to the complexity of the
subject, examining it from a variety of perspectives, not just two opposing poles” (287).
Indeed, it may be useful to think about this project as an attempt to locate yourself in an
ongoing conversation about education being had by the other writers we are reading, a
way of engaging what other people are saying and thinking about the topic. And just as
you would never just barge into the middle of a conversation a group of strangers were
having at a party or other social gathering without first getting a sense of what they were
talking about, in order to write a successful argument for this project, you’ll need to
spend some time figuring out this broader discussion before exploring your reactions to
it. Once you have a good sense of what these writers seems to be talking about, and have
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spent some time exploring your own thought and feelings, in might be helpful to consider
places in these readings where the writers seem to be agreeing with each other (or at least
talking about similar things), as well as places where they seem to have significant
differences. Again, because synthesis is the process of bringing different ideas together to
form some new contribution, often the best arguments are to be found in places where
texts seem to either naturally fit together, or in bridging the gaps where they seem to be at
odds with each other. That is, if writing a good argument is really like joining a
conversation that’s already in play, one of the keys to success will be finding a good
place to start, a moment in the discussion that doesn’t quite seem to make sense to you, or
where you can try to resolve or expand on something that’s already been said.
Rhetorical Considerations: Whatever argument you end up choosing to make about
education, your audience for this essay will be someone who has probably never read the
articles you will be discussing. So while your primary goal will be to persuade your
readers to share your particular point of view on the topic, you’ll also need to spend some
time summarizing and explaining the texts you use in support of your discussion, as well
as provide any additional background information your reader might need to make sense
of what you are trying to say.
There are many different ways to go about organizing a critical argument like this, and
we will certainly discuss several different strategies in class. But keep in mind that most
successful arguments tend to be organized around a set of clearly stated questions,
concerns, or claims made near the beginning of the discussion, with most of the rest of
the paper focused on answering these questions, resolving these concerns, or explaining
and supporting these claims. You should also think carefully about how to guide your
reader by offering strong transitions between paragraphs. As always, your introduction
and title should try to capture your reader’s attention by focusing on the core themes or
ideas you are trying to make.
Putting It Together: You must incorporate at least two of the readings on education we
have covered in this unit of the course, and you should provide proper citation for any
passages you quote, paraphrase or summarize from these texts. Your essay should be 4-5
pages (approximately 750 - 1000 words) and will be due Friday, November 20th.
Student Learning Outcomes: After successfully completing this project you will: 1) be
more familiar with a range of critical reading strategies; 2) be able to employ a number of
these strategies to comprehend and analyze complicated texts; 3) be better at
incorporating material from textual sources in support of your claims; and 4) be more
proficient at setting up and sustaining an argument.
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NOTES
1. As quoted in the epigraph to David Bartholomae’s “Inventing the University.”
2. I am conscious of the validity of the numerous arguments regarding labels for
underprepared students (i.e., remedial, developmental, basic, amateur, novice), but my
official title when I began this project was Basic Writing Coordinator. In addition, at a
recent statewide conference we were informed that the IHL considers the summer bridge
programs instituted at each public college following the Ayers case to be
“developmental” programs and that courses that follow these summer programs, but
precede traditional first-year programming, are to be labeled “basic.” Hence, I tend to
use the term “basic” as it is the preferred term at my institution.
3. See Judith Levi’s “Language and Law: A Bibliographic Guide to Social
Science Research in The U.S.A.”—a study commissioned by the American Bar
Association—for the most comprehensive list of studies in language and law. It should
be noted, however, that the document does not include critical commentary or summaries
regarding the entries; they are simply listed and categorized.
4. Numerous scholars continue to point out that a) remedial writing courses have a
long and varied history prior to open admissions (see Horner, “Discoursing”; Soliday,
“Politics”; Gray-Rosendale, “Inessential”; Ritter, “Before”), and that b) Shaughnessy’s
unpublished works provide more helpful insight into the realities of her program and the
institution.
5. See Shaughnessy, Errors; Perl, “The Composing Processes”; Flower and
Hayes, “A Cognitive Process”; Lunsford, “Cognitive Development.”
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6. See Bartholomae, “Inventing the University”; Lu, “Conflict”; Gray-Rosendale,
“Rethinking”; Mutnick, “Writing in an Alien World.” In addition, I would be remiss if I
did not mention the “students’ right to their own language” movement that occurred
during this same period. However, while I recognize the importance of this debate as yet
another unresolved issue in our field and acknowledge the inherent relationship between
institutional expectations and a lack of response to rights rhetoric and student language,
my focus for this review of literature is on the legislative and institutional language
surrounding and constituting basic writing. And while these conversations cannot truly
be separated, an analysis of the language regarding this movement is beyond the scope of
this project.
7. Consider also the following statement by Tom Fox in “Working Against the
State”: “One of the most distinctive features of intellectual work in composition is a focus
on the relationship of the discipline of composition to the academic institution in which it
is housed” (91).
8. See specifically both Terrence Collins and Karen Greenberg’s responses to
“Apartheid” published in JBW.
9. See Marilyn Sternglass’ Time to Know Them: A Longitudinal Study of Writing
and Learning at the College Level (1997).
10. Platonic idealism centers on the belief that reason and wisdom are the ideal
form of governance as opposed to rhetoric and persuasion. In the Platonic dialogues,
Plato critiques the sophists referring to rhetoric as an ignoble art of persuasion in relation
to justice and the public sphere. Artistotle’s writings subordinate rhetoric as simply one
means of persuasion relying instead on permanent truths and syllogistic logics.
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11. Linda Brodkey is perhaps the most well-known advocate of the study of
judicial writings in the composition classroom. Her failed attempt to incorporate judicial
opinions as the major texts in her first-year writing courses at the University of Texas at
Austin eventually received national attention when Maxine Hairston published her 1992
article “Diversity, Ideology, and Teaching Writing” indirectly critiquing such pursuits as
overtly political acts that do not serve the best interest of students. See also the
dissertation of Glenda Conway, which examines the language and ideology inherent in
judicial opinions and advocates the use of U.S. Supreme Court judicial opinions as texts
in composition classes.
12. This emphasis on the role of narrative in judicial opinions leads White to
argue that “law is at its heart an interpretive and compositional—and in this sense—a
radically literary activity” (91).
13. The Oxford English Dictionary provides the following definitions for
“remedial” as they pertain to law and legislation: 1: “affording a remedy: intended for a
remedy or for the removal or abatement of a disease or of an evil.” In addition, the term
“remedy” is defined as: 1.4: “the legal means to recover a right or to prevent or obtain
redress for a wrong: the relief (as damages, restitution, specific performance, an
injunction) that may be given by a court for a wrong; 2.1: to give legal redress to: render
justice to.” The OED defines “remedial” pertaining to education as 2: “concerned with
the correction of faulty study habits, the improvement of skills imperfectly learned, and
the raising of a pupil’s general competence.”
14. Conley and O’Barr’s distinction between the terms “language” and
“discourse” may be helpful at this point, as I tend to use them interchangeable when
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discussing written text: “These related terms have multiple meanings in the academic
world; they are synonymous for some purposes but distinct in other significant ways.
Language is the more straightforward of the two. Language includes sounds, units of
meaning, and grammatical structures, as well as the contexts in which they occur…The
term discourse has two senses, one linguistic and one social. The former sense, which
overlaps with language, is illustrated by phrases such as everyday discourse and
courtroom discourse, the latter by phrases such as the discourse of psychoanalysis and the
discourse of human rights. In the linguistic sense, discourse refers to connected segments
of speech or writing, in fact to any chunk of speech or writing larger than a single
utterance…Discourse analysis is the study of how such segments, or texts, are structured
and how they are used in communication” (6).
15. See USM Institutional Research Data, Factbooks.
16. According to a survey conducted by composition database, CompPile.com,
Mississippi, Texas, Illinois, South Carolina, Idaho, and Maryland are states in which a
state board of education determines policies regarding developmental coursework.
17. Ayers v. Fordice was originally titled Ayers v. Waller (1975). The changes in
governors led to changes in case name throughout the years: Ayers v. Allain (1987),
Ayers v. Maybus (1991), Ayers v. Fordice (1992), United States v. Fordice, and Ayers v.
Musgrove (1996). The majority of legal scholarship refers to the case overall as Ayers v.
Fordice as that was the case name when the U.S. Supreme Court heard it. Hence I will
refer to the case as either Ayers or Ayers v. Fordice.
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18. En banc is a French term used when referring to a legal case in which all
judges of the court will hear the entire case, as opposed to a panel of the judges. U.S.
Supreme Court cases, for example, are always tried en banc.
19. Certiorari in our judicial system occurs when a higher court returns a case to a
lower court to review the lower court’s judgment for legal error.
20. See Mississippi IHL website for Ayers settlement.
21. Ayers v. Fordice, 4:75CV009-B-0 U.S. District Court ND, MS (1995).
22. See Glenda Conway’s 1996 dissertation, Discourse in the Judicial Opinion.
23. In The Language of Judges, Lawrence Solan states, “judges, in their judicial
opinions, regularly write to create the impression that their decision is ‘the only possible
decision,’ one derived by applying readily ascertainable neutral principles to the set of
novel events that is the subject of the dispute being adjudicated” (13). According to
Solan, judges are caught in the double bind of admitting that the judicial process is
imperfect in order to sustain legitimacy, but losing that same legitimacy if they do not
write with confidence regarding their particular ruling.
24. In Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation, Richard Posner argues that
legal opinions are unavoidably rhetorical and “the reason why rhetoric or style is
important in law is that many legal questions cannot be resolved by logical or empirical
demonstration” (286). Hence, Posner recognizes the ideological nature of judicial
rhetoric and its role in defining justice. This recognition leads to a pragmatic theory of
the ways in which judicial opinions differ significantly from literature and from White’s
notion of the judicial opinion as narrative. Posner divorces a literary approach to the law
from a rhetorical approach to the law, arguing that “literature is not concerned with
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establishing the truth of propositions, at least by the patient marshaling of rational
arguments and rationally probative evidence; it is not (not generally, at any rate) didactic,
as works of scholarship or political advocacy are” (272). Ultimately, Posner argues that
judicial opinions are indeed rhetorical, but they are not always literary.
25. It is important to note that critical discourse analysis is not a research method,
but rather an approach to studying discourse that may use any number of research
methods. For this reason, van Dijk suggests the field refer to CDA as critical discourse
studies. I would argue that while this label might cause less confusion regarding issues of
methodology, it might also lead to further confusion between CDA and cultural studies.
26. See Noam Chomsky’s appraisal of such research as having “nothing to do
with linguistics” and Lester Faigley’s argument that the linguistic and ideological roots of
discourse analysis make it inapplicable to the field of composition.
27. Gail Stygall is perhaps the most recognized proponent of legal discourse
analysis in the field of composition. Stygall’s primary research focuses on trial language
and divorce proceedings and utilizes analytic methods drawn largely from the field of
sociolinguistics. Stygall suggests the use of narrative discourse analysis as a means of
examining the “the attempt to produce a persuasive narrative, study the response made to
that narrative, and to make some judgment about its impact on an adjudicator”
(“Narrative” 279). In her analyses of textual narratives of divorce, Stygall concentrates
on the typical features of narrative found in divorce affidavits and then expands that
analysis towards cultural and gender narratives and how they are adapted to the legal and
cultural contexts of the stories told about marriage and divorce.
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John M. Conley and William M. O’Barr argue that “talk” is the most important
linguistic element of the law as a microdiscourse that then gets reduced to written
opinions. They rely on Foucault’s theories of discourse as “not simply talk itself, but also
the way that something gets talked about” (7). In an effort to understand how discourse
practices reflect and subvert social hierarchies and legal power, Conley and O’Barr
examine rape trials, divorce mediation and civil disputes through conversational analysis
looking specifically at linguistic elements such as turn-taking, silence, question forms,
and topic management. They conclude that not only does language variation have social
consequences in legal settings, but “language is legal power” (emphasis original 14).
In her 1996 dissertation, Glenda Conway examines “selected judicial opinions for
the ways in which representations of voice convey ideologically coded images of
individual litigants, the governing communities in which they reside, and the legal
structures that regulate and govern their behavior” (3). Utilizing rhetorical analysis and
Bakhtin’s theories of dialogism, Conway ultimately argues that losing litigants in U.S.
Supreme court cases risk “textual invalidation” of their voices.
In his examinations of judicial writings, James Boyd White argues for a method
of “translation” as a means of looking at how we literally build our identities and
communities through language. Ultimately a form of rhetorical analysis, White points to
numerous opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court and analyzes the ways judges use
language in relation to their own ethos and their view of the constitution. He argues that
the central activity of law is the reading of texts—cases, statutes,
regulations—and their imperfect reproduction and arrangement, in
compositions of our making, in contexts to some degree distinct from
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those in which they were made. It is in fact a kind of translation, and this
knowledge should shape both the way we engage in it ourselves and the
way we judge the productions of others. (Justice 241)
White’s translation methodology leads to his argument that the linguistic and rhetorical
choices observed in judicial opinions are ultimately more informative than the actual
results of a case.
28. James Paul Gee argues that method always goes with theory and they cannot
be separated despite the attempts by some researchers to teach methods as rules and
strategies capable of standing alone (Discourse Analysis 6).
29. Gee differentiates between discourse with a “little D” and Discourse with a
“capital D.” Discourse with a capital “D” is “composed of distinctive ways of
speaking/listening and often, too, writing/reading coupled with distinctive ways of acting,
interacting, valuing, feeling, dressing, thinking, believing, with other people, and with
various objects, tools, and technologies, so as to enact specific socially recognizable
identities engaged in specific socially recognizable activities” (Social Linguistics 155).
30. See George Lakoff’s Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think
(1996).
31. “Memorable Quotes from Mississippi Burning (1988).” IMDb. Web. 15 Feb.
2009.
32. Ayers v. Fordice, 4:75CV009-B-0 U.S. District Court ND, MS (1995).
33. Lakoff and Johnson denote the conceptual metaphor by capitalizing the first
letter of each of the primary domains. I will do the same in this text for the purpose of
consistency.
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34. See Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (2003, 2nd ed.).
35. If, for example, we concede to Lakoff’s argument that the prevailing
conceptual metaphor for political rhetoric of liberals and conservatives is “nation as
family” and this requires the complimentary image-schema of “government as parents,”
do we argue that the university too is a family? If so, who takes on the metaphorical role
of parents in this conceptualization? How does the government—specifically the judicial
branch—figure into such a proposal? In what ways do the conversations mirror those of
political pundits? In what ways does such a conceptual metaphor conflict with modern
attempts to conceptualize the university as a business and students as consumers?
36. As early as 1926, Benjamin Cardozzo argued that “metaphors had to be
narrowly watched, for starting out as devices to liberate thought, they end often by
enslaving it.” For more recent works, see Bernard J. Hibbitts’ “Making Sense of
Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse”
Cordozo Law Review (1994) and Austin Sarat’s “A Prophesy of Possibility: Metaphorical
Explorations of Postmodern Legal Subjectivity” Law and Society Review (1995).
37. Winter bases his argument on what the terms a “theory of imagination.” He
cites Lakoff and Johnson as “pioneers” in of cognitive research regarding human
intelligence and imagination. He outlines his theoretical perspective along three
principles: “1. Human thought is irreducibly imaginative. 2. Imagination is embodied,
interactive, and grounded. 3. Imagination operates in regular, orderly, and systematic
fashion.”
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38. See Gail Stygall’s “Unraveling at Both Ends: Anti-Undergraduate Education,
Anti-Affirmative Action, and Basic Writing at Research Schools.” Journal of Basic
Writing 19.2 (1999): 4-22. Print.
39. It may be helpful to consider Humpty Dumpty’s phrase in its entirety given its
emphasis on language and control:
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different
things.’
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master— that’s all.’
40. From this point forward it should be assumed that I will italicize the linguistic
expressions that correspond to various conceptual metaphors in relevant passages, and the
emphasis is not in the original document unless noted.
41. Consider also the numerous texts that reference law and truth, such as Dennis
Patterson’s Law and Truth (1999).
42. Ayers v. Allain, 88-4103 U.S. Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit (1990).
43. Source: OED. Demean (v): 2. To handle, manipulate, or manage
44. In Green v. School Board of New Kent County the U.S. Supreme Court held
that New Kent County’s freedom of choice plan was unconstitutional because it did not
provide a system of admissions to public schools on a non-racial basis.
45. Source: OED. Reflect (v): etymology “Sense 4 apparently shows a sense
development within English, and probably results from the sun and reflective surfaces
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such as mirrors, etc., being considered alike as immediate sources of light, without regard
as to whether that light is direct or reflected.”
46. Justice Thomas is considered by many to be one of the most conservative
justices currently serving on the court, and perceptions of his rulings as conservative and
textually based would lead some to question his concurring opinion in the Ayers case. In
addition, we cannot ignore the fact that Thomas was the lone African American serving
on the Court. Thomas’ opinion serves as an effort to remind the lower courts of the
significance of historically black colleges and universities to black culture and education.
In addition, press surrounding the case consistently alluded to the significance of
Thomas’ opinion. Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court hearing, George Cochran, a law
professor at UM, was quoted in the Clarion Ledger saying “This will be a case in which
everyone…will be looking at Justice Thomas.” (November 10, 1991)
47. In The White Racial Frame, Joe Feagin argues that the conceptual metaphor
Racism as Disease is faulty because American culture was built on racism. He argues
that this metaphor assumes that Nation as Body was once healthy, and has been invaded
by disease (yet another common conceptual metaphor relevant to our discussions). He
attempts to articulate a Structural-Foundation metaphor of racism in which racism is
actually the “structural foundation” upon which the United States is “built.”
48. In his dissent, Justice Scalia concludes by arguing that “nothing good will
come of this judicially ordained turmoil, except the public recognition that any court that
would knowingly impose it must hate segregation. We must find some other way of
making that point.”
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49. Aspects of Lakoff’s perception of conservative notions of education certainly
can be countered simply based on his own political views.
50. Consider Kenneth Baker’s introduction to the 1987 Education Bill: “We must
give consumers of education a central part in decision making. That means freeing
schools and colleges to deliver the standards that parents and employers want. It means
encouraging the consumer to expect and demand that all educational bodies do the best
job possible.”
51. See also Jean Jacques Rousseau’s philosophies of education in Emile (1762):
“plants are shaped by cultivation and men by education.”
52. See Richard Thompson Ford’s “The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography
in Legal Analysis.” (1995)
53. See Sid Salter’s “Hateful Ayers Case Rhetoric has Nothing to do with
Education.” The Clarion Ledger. 8 May 1994.
54. The Supreme Court rightly claimed that it was reasonable to assume that the
disparity in ACT admissions requirements between HWIs and HBCUs was the result of
racism on the part of the HWIs. Historically speaking, most would agree that
Mississippi’s HWIs implemented higher standards of admissions as yet another means of
racial discrimination. In addition, it is not difficult to surmise that via lower standards of
admissions HBCUs were ensuring access to a population of students that would
otherwise have been denied that access. The plaintiffs, in theory at least, wanted black
students to have access at any university of their choosing, and, because statistically
black students tend to score lower on the ACT exam than white students, they wanted
admissions requirements that reflected this fact and did not discriminate against black
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students. However, once this case reached the Supreme Court the standard of law
became racial indentifiability. This resulted in the Supreme Court’s opinion that varied
admissions requirements led to the channeling of black students to black universities and
hence additional racial inequalities. Therefore, Biggers’ duty on remand was to
determine how to implement equal standards of admissions—with no guidance from the
Supreme Court on whether this meant raising or lowering standards.
55. According to the new admissions standards, students could be admitted to any
Mississippi university by meeting any of the following criteria:
•

Complete the College Preparatory Curriculum (CPC) with a minimum 3.2 high
school grade point average (GPA) on the CPC; or

•

Complete the College Preparatory Curriculum (CPC) with a minimum 2.50 high
school GPA on the CPC or a class rank in the top 50%, and a score of 16 or
higher on the ACT* (Composite); or

•

Complete the College Preparatory Curriculum (CPC) with a minimum 2.00 high
school GPA on the CPC and a score of 18 or higher on the ACT* (Composite); or

•

Satisfy the NCAA standards for student athletes who are “full-qualifiers” under
Division I guidelines; or

Students who do not meet the above criteria are nonetheless eligible for admission. Such
students must participate, however, in an on-campus placement process at the university
of their choice. These first three standards of admission are included in the original
decree with discussions regarding student athletes and conditional admission in separate
sections of the document. These standards have not been changed since 1995 and are
listed as such on the IHL website (www.mississippi.edu/oasa/admissions.html).
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56. From this point forward all italicized portions of quotations involve my own
emphases unless otherwise noted.
57. The Clarion Ledger claims to serve the metro Jackson area consisting of
Hinds, Rankin, and Madison counties. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the total
population of these three counties combined is estimated at 483,852. The racial
breakdown of the counties, however, is significantly different when assessed by county
lines. The black population in Hinds County is estimated at 66.3%, but Madison County
is estimated at 37.4% and Rankin County is estimated at 19.9%.
58. My collection of archived articles includes all articles available in the MS
Archives and History subject files and news databanks from 1987 to present.
59. See respectively: Kanengiser “20-year-old Desegregation Case Could Return
to High Court”; Kanengiser “Justice Department Expands Challenge of New Admission
Standards”; and Kanengiser “Ayers Judge Defends Higher College Admission
Standards.”
60. See respectively: Kanengiser “New Admissions Policies Urged in Ayers
Trial”; Kanengiser “Justice Department Expands Challenge of New Admission
Standards”; Kanengiser “Justice Department Expands Challenge of New Admission
Standards”; Kanengiser “20-year-old Desegregation Case Could Return to High Court.”
61. As quoted in Kanengiser’s “Ayers Trial Rivals Take Offensive.”
62. See respectively: Kanengiser “Tougher Standards Will Hurt Black Colleges,
Biggers Told”; Kanengiser “Supporters of Ayers Appeal Will Ask NAACP for Help”;
Kanengiser “Ayers Plaintiff Says Appeal is Necessary”; Kanengiser “ACT Fosters
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Segregation Ayers Witness Says”; Kanengiser “College Admission Standards to be
Argued in Court December 9th”; Kanengiser “Ayers Trial Rivals Take Offensive.”
63. There are articles that quote students’ concerns in my corpus; however, these
representations of students’ voices are always in regards to the potential school closings,
not the issue of academic standards.
64. Forrester’s files are housed at the Mississippi Department of Archives and
History.
65. PUSH, Inc. is now the Rainbow Push Coalition headed by Rev. Jesse Jackson.
66. Another interesting aspect of these letters involves the state’s responses. The
response letter to PUSH was written by Jeanne Forrester at the request of Governor
Fordice. Forrester’s response begins: “Governor Fordice forwarded your letter to me
and asked that I respond. I am the Governor’s executive advisor on education and have
been responsible for tracking events concerning the Ayers case.”
67. See the four letters listed as authored by Fordice in the Works Cited.
68. I should note that Fordice did respond to letter from the U.S. Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division, but I consider this to be different given the sender
represented the U.S. Government. In addition, one of the state’s attempts to address
complaints that black citizens were not included in discussions regarding resolution of the
Ayers case involved the creation of a twelve-member citizens task force to complement
the existing advisory panels appointed by Governor Fordice. According to Clarion
Ledger articles regarding this lay panel of citizens, the task force would be overseen by
Jeanne Forrester (Fordice’s education advisor), the Lt. Governor, Eddie Briggs, and the
House Speaker, Tim Ford. Critics argued that the panel was a smoke screen designed to
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“spare Fordice criticism in university fuss.” Supporters claimed the new group was
needed to pull together citizens “who don’t have a vested interested and don’t have a
political interest” to help determine the appropriate direction for higher education in the
state after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled further actions were necessary in order to ensure
the desegregation of state institutions of education. Correspondence regarding
membership in this committee of citizenry provides additional examples of the ways in
which conceptual metaphors trickle down to institutions of education via politics.
I was able to locate eight letters from citizens interested in serving on the governor’s lay
council regarding Ayers in Jeanne Forrester’s, Governor Fordice’s Education Advisor,
files. These letters range from brief memos indicating interest, to cover letters detailing
the interested party’s qualifications, to hand-written letters. Interestingly enough, none of
the letters included in Forrester’s files are written by black Mississippians.
69. See Clark and Ivanic’s The Politics of Writing (1997).
70. The SDP was designed by Dr. Hunter Boylan, the Director of the National
Center for Developmental Education and concentrates on reading, writing, and math—
skills considered necessary for a successful college career. At the time of its
implementation in Mississippi it had not been piloted, but the court deemed it to be
“credible and educationally advanced” (64). Interestingly, the SDP became synonymous
with remediation in Biggers’ 1995 mandate, leading some to believe that universities
would abolish other forms of remedial programming to the detriment of students who
might not participate in the SDP. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Appeals Court
agreed with this complaint and decreed that the SDP could not replace additional
remedial programming at the state’s universities.
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These various rulings were incorporated into the IHL 2001 Settlement Agreement that
outlined the fiscal aspects of the Ayers rulings. According to the settlement each
university is required to offer the SDP through 2010 (ten years after the settlement) and
the State Legislature is expected to provide special funding for student financial
assistance to attend the SDP in the amounts of $500,000 annually for FY 2002-FY2006
and $750,000 annually for five additional years (FY2007-2011). In addition the
opportunities for enrollment in the SDP are to be widely publicized in the state. This is
especially significant as this means summer 2011 is the last summer that universities will
be required to offer the SDP. Our current provost claims that the SDP is essential and
that USM will continue to offer the program.
71. See discussion regarding USM Student Success Center.
72. See Appendix A for our proposal to USM’s Academic Council regarding our
Expanded pilot. See also Appendix B for the report submitted to Academic Council at
the year’s end.
73. PDF versions of the brochure are attached as Appendix C.
74. See Appendix C.
75. See Appendix C.
76. Currently, these classes use Bruce Ballenger’s The Curious Writer. Students
write a photo memoir, a review essay, an ethnography, and a problem/solution proposal.
77. See Appendix D.
78. See www.kafkaonline.com
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